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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, subdivision control laws have become the pre-
eminent method by which local governments regulate residential devel-
opment.1 These laws will continue in importance as a result of
1. The residential development process consists of three phases: development, con-
struction, and occupancy. See S. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT REGULA-
TIONS 318 (1978). Subdivision controls are one of many types of regulations that
control residential development. Subdivision controls, environmental regulations, and
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population growth and migration patterns.2 Perhaps the most signifi-
cant aspect of subdivision control laws is the requirement that the land
developer take responsibility for constructing and installing, at his own
expense, a great array of subdivision improvements, including streets,
drainage facilities, sewers, water systems, landscaping, and many
others. Subdivision improvement requirements and guarantees are an
integral part of the subdivision process, affecting the quality of residen-
tial development, the cost of housing, the structure of the development
industry, and the fiscal welfare of the community. Subdivision im-
provement requirements are enforced by prohibiting the transfer of
property within a subdivision until the local government approves the
subdivision. Approval is conditioned on the developer's completion of
the requisite improvements. Recognizing that many developments will
growth controls affect the development phase, id., with subdivision controls being di-
rected at regulating undeveloped land by imposing site-specific regulations that can con-
trol the pattern of development. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 135 (1975). Although subdivision controls are related
to zoning, they differ in that subdivision controls regulate the manner in which land is
used rather than defining the uses themselves. See id.; D. MANDELKER, LAND USE
LAW § 9.1 (1982). In many urban areas, subdivision control laws have become more
important than zoning laws in regulating the quality of development in the community.
See R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS 13 (1975). Although
subdivision controls are responsible for setting the pattern for community development,
some commentators have suggested that little litigation concerning the controls oc-
curred until recent times. See, eg., 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW
§§ 156.01, 156.086 (1983) (noting in the 1975 edition that little litigation existed, but
reporting in the 1983 supplement that litigation had increased rapidly in volume); R.
YEARWOOD, LAND SUBDIVISION REGULATION 123 (1971). Part IV of this Article,
however, demonstrates that subdivision controls have generated much litigation since
their very inception.
2. See Alonso, Metropolis Without Growth, Pun. INTEREST No. 53, at 68 (1978).
Although the rate of population growth has decreased, absolute population continues to
increase. Id. at 73. More importantly, changes in family structure have increased the
number of households and the consequent demand for housing. Id. at 83. Migration
patterns also have been important in promoting residential development. Metropolitan
areas have decentralized, increasing the population growth in suburban and rural areas.
Id at 73-77. Additionally, at a national level, population increases are most pro-
nounced in the Sun Belt. Id. at 83. Many of the states experiencing the greatest popula-
tion increases from 1970 to 1980 were in the western United States. For example,
Colorado increased 30.7%, Wyoming increased 41.6%, Arizona 53.1%, and Nevada
83.5%. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS figure 1-2, at 8
(1981). All of these factors have a part in the projected rate of housing starts for the
1980s. It is estimated that housing starts will range from 1.5 to 1.7 million annually
during the 1980s, more than in any prior decade. See J. WEIPER, L. YAP & M. JONES,
METROPOLITAN HOUSING NEEDS FOR THE 1980s 4 (1982). Housing starts in metro-
politan areas will be even greater, ranging from 2.4 to 2.7 million. Id. at 5.
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founder if developers cannot sell lots within the subdivision until all
improvements are completed, local governments accept bonds or other
security guaranteeing the completion of subdivision improvements af-
ter the developer has been authorized to dispose of property in the
subdivision.
This Article examines the subdivision improvement process in gen-
eral and subdivision improvement requirements and guarantees in par-
ticular. Part II reviews the history of subdivision controls and the
parties, interests, and themes involved in the subdivision control pro-
cess. After this overview, Part III details the subdivision development
process from the private and public sectors with particular emphasis on
subdivision improvement requirements. Part IV surveys the case law
regarding subdivision improvements. Finally, Part V evaluates the
various methods for securing the completion of subdivision improve-
ments and offers suggestions for reform.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SUBDIVISION CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. A Brief History of Subdivision Control Laws
The subdivision of land for residential development is an inevitable
by-product of modern industrial societies.3 In the United States, the
unabated pressures to subdivide land have led to the ubiquitous adop-
tion of subdivision control legislation by state and local governments.'
State and local governments adopted substantive subdivision control
laws in response to the harmful consequences of the premature subdivi-
3. See generally P. CORNICK, PREMATURE SUBDIVISION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
1-23 (1938). There is a natural relationship between industrial development and urban
development. The division of labor, by which a number of individuals contribute to
manufacture a single product, inevitably leads to population concentrations. Land must
be subdivided for residential development. See M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CON-
VERSION IN THE UNITED STATES 39-40 (1971). Conversely, with the advent of im-
proved transportation, populations began to spread out within urban areas, resulting in
the rapid subdivision of land on the urban fringe. See Alonso, supra note 2, at 76. The
availability of federal home loan insurance and federal tax benefits also have increased
the demand for housing and the subdivision of land. See M. CLAWSON, supra, at 41-46.
4. See R. HARRIS, CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCING, at 2-12
(1982); D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 9.2. Seidel suggests that more stringent subdi-
vision controls exist in the Northeast than in the South or the West. S. SEIDEL, supra
note 1, at 25. The reactions of persons in the residential development industry, how-
ever, argue otherwise. See id. at 28-29 (46.6% of persons in the West reported that
government regulations were the number one business problem that they faced).
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sion of land that occurred in the late 1800s and early 1900s.5 That
period in American history witnessed a boom in land speculation that
led to the division of large tracts of agricultural and forest lands into
small residential parcels.' While some persons became rich as a result
of this land boom, many others found themselves living in partially
completed developments that lacked basic essential services. Still
others held small tracts of land that were not needed for residential
development and were not useful for any other type of development.
Large areas of subdivided land were held in multiple ownership and
remained vacant, generating little or no tax revenue, and eventually
landowners forfeited these parcels to the government.7
Local governments were called on to provide the basic services re-
quired by some developments and incurred large debts as they issued
revenue bonds to finance public improvements. Because much land
was vacant or had been forfeited for nonpayment of taxes, local gov-
ernments shifted the tax burden to owners of developed lands.9 Even-
tually, under the dual burden of an increased demand for public
improvements and a diminishing tax base, many local governments de-
faulted on their bonds and contributed, at least in a small way, to the
depression of the 1930s.1°
State governments enacted subdivision control laws prior to the most
serious problems created by the premature subdivision of land."t For
the most part, however, the laws were designed only to aid in the recor-
5. See 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 23.01 (2d ed. 1983); D.
MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 9.2.
6. See P. CORNICK, supra note 3, at 1-23. The amount of land that developers sub-
divided was out of proportion to the amount that was needed for residential growth as
the lure of quick profits provided an incentive to land speculators attempting to get rich
quickly. Id. at 2-3.
7. See generally P. CORNICK, supra note 3, at 120-56. "Premature subdivision" is a
generic term encompassing a variety of problems: low-grade subdivision, excessive sub-
division, partial or incomplete subdivision, and scattered subdivision. See R. YEAR-
WOOD, supra note 1, at 66-72. Land that developers partially subdivide ends up in
multiple ownership and may never be completed, resulting in "leapfrogging" as subse-
quent development goes beyond the boundaries of the partially subdivided areas, See D.
HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 134. Leapfrogging also occurs when developers "jump" over
areas subject to restrictive regulations and develop land in unincorporated areas that
local governments often control less stringently. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 123.
8. P. CORNICK, supra note 3, at 156.
9. Id. at 120-56.
10. See id. See generally 2 THE PLATTED LAND PRESS: A JOURNAL OF ANTI-
QUATED SUBDIVISION STUDIES (Jan. 1985).
11. Massachusetts and New York passed subdivision control laws in the early
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dation of land transfers and to facilitate the layout of city streets. 12 It
was not until the late 1920s with the promulgation of the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act that local governments began to use subdivision
control laws as an important public policy tool.'3 State enabling stat-
utes permitted local governments to enact ordinances that forced de-
velopers to bear the cost of constructing and installing many
subdivision improvements. In some instances, local governments re-
quired the developer to complete all improvements before he could sell
any land in the subdivision.' 4 In other instances, however, municipali-
ties permitted the developer to post a bond to secure the completion of
subdivision improvements some time after the authorization was given
to transfer land within the subdivision.' 5 This method permitted an
undercapitalized developer to receive some return on his investment
before being required to incur the additional expense of completing
subdivision improvements. At the same time, local governments hoped
to avoid the financial burden that the subdivision of land had placed on
them previously.
The period following World War II witnessed a shift in emphasis in
subdivision control laws. Local governments began to adopt subdivi-
sion regulations to design communities by providing open space and
recreational areas within developments.' 6 Governments also became
bolder in placing the burden of providing government services on the
developer. Governments enacted laws requiring developers to dedicate
land to the city for parks and school sites,' 7 and required developers to
1800s, see id. at 3, while Michigan and Wisconsin passed these laws in the 1830s. See R.
YEARWOOD, supra note 1, at 86.
12. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 9.2; B. ROGAL, SUBDIVISION IMPROVE-
MENr GUARANTEES 1 (Planning Advisory Service Report No. 298 (1974)).
13. See R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra note 1, at 2; D. MANDELKER, supra note 1,
§§ 9,2, 9.3,
14. See R. YEARWOOD, supra note 1, at 120.
15. Id. at 120-21.
16. See R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra note 1, at 3-4.
17. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, §§ 9.11, 9.13; 2 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND
LAND USE CONTROLS § 9.01[1] (1983). See generally Ferguson & Rasnic, Judicial
Lumitations on Mandatory Subdivision Dedications, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 250 (1984).
Note, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 269, 272-79 (1983). Local governments can use a variety of methods to
shift the cost of public improvements to the developer. Local governments may require
the developer: to reserve land for the benefit of residents in the development; to dedicate
the land to the local government, in which case the government takes title to the land;
to pay fees to the government for the pnvilege of connecting to government services or
in lieu of dedication; and to construct and install improvements, such as roads, sewers,
1985]
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pay fees to offset the demands that residential development placed on
the city infrastructure."8 Since the 1970s, subdivision controls have
served yet another purpose-limiting growth and its adverse environ-
mental consequences. 9 These controls can mitigate the excessive de-
mands placed on a local government's limited capital facilities while
also minimizing environmental degradation.2 ° Local governments,
however, can use growth controls to exclude moderate and low income
families from living in their communities.21
At all times since promulgation of the Standard City Planning En-
abling Act, two principal concerns have motivated local governments:
the desire to assure quality development and the need to shift some
portion of the burden of providing public services to the developer.22
Recent studies reveal the extent to which local governments have
adopted subdivision improvement requirements and the great array of
requirements that they impose on the developer.23 Studies also suggest
that subdivision control laws affect the location of development and the
cost of housing.24 Despite dozens of challenges to subdivision control
laws, however, local governments have demonstrated no inclination to
reduce the burdens imposed on developers.25
B. Subdivision Control Laws: An Overview of Players, Interests,
and Themes
1. Players and Interests
The subdivision of land for residential use is a process that requires
the successful interaction of the private and public sectors of the econ-
omy. On the private side, land owners, developers, lenders, sureties,
and water systems that the developer then dedicates to the local government. See Com-
ment, Allocating the Burden of Increased Community Costs Caused By New Develop.
ments, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 318, 318.
18. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.40 (discussing fees for parks and recrea-
tion); Note, supra note 17, at 270-71.
19. See R. FREILICH & P. LEvi, supra note 1, at 5-6.
20. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 18.
21. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 9.01[2].
22. S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 121.
23. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 138.
24. See Dowall, Reducing the Cost Effects of Local Land Use Controls, 47 J. AM. P.
ASS'N 145, 146-47 (1981); Friedan, Allocating the Public Service Costs of New Housing,
39 URB. LAND 12, 12 (1980) (estimating that required improvements contribute 15% to
the cost of a single-family home).
25. See R. YEARWOOD, supra note 1, at 120.
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construction firms, laborers and materialmen, and individual
homebuyers are involved. The public side involves technical planning
staffs, planning commissioners, government engineers and building in-
spectors, local legislators, and a variety of state and local agencies that
review development plans. Neighbors of the proposed development
also are enlisted in support of either antidevelopment or prodevelop-
ment forces.
Subdivision control laws implicate a variety of interests, not all of
which are compatible. The development industry primarily is inter-
ested in reducing the cost of development and the delays that frequent
administrative review.26 In contrast, the government is concerned with
assuring quality development and in shifting the cost of public im-
provements to the developer.2 7 Homebuyers are caught in a conflict
between the desire to live in a development with an adequate infra-
structure and the need to minimize the expense of buying a home.
Neighbors are interested in ensuring that the development does not di-
minish the value of their homes or create hazards that will jeopardize
their health and safety. Somehow, subdivision control laws must sat-
isfy these various and conflicting interests.
2. Themes
The importance of subdivision regulations in general, and subdivi-
sion improvement requirements in particular, cannot be overempha-
sized. That importance is reflected in several themes that recur
throughout this Article. Subdivision regulations now are the primary
tool by which local governments can affect the quality of residential
development z.2  Government-imposed improvements according to gov-
ernment standards and specifications are calculated to assure
homebuyers an adequate infrastructure for their development. This
concern for quality, however, implicates the first major theme-cost.29
Imposing subdivision improvements on the developer causes him to at-
26. See Dowall, supra note 24, at 146-47.
27. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 121; Note, supra note 17, at 270-71.
28. See R. YEARWOOD, supra note 1, at 37-38. Subdivision control laws improve
the quality of development in a number of ways. First, controls increase the likelihood
that developments will be completed and that an adequate infrastructure will be avail-
able. Second, low-grade subdivisions are avoided by imposing a community standard
on improvements. Third, predictability is increased for the developer who learns what
his up-front costs will be and who can then better plan the subdivision. See S. SEIDEL,
supra note 1, at 124-25.
29. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 39. "Subdivision controls were overwhelmingly
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tempt to recoup the costs of improvements by including them in the
selling price of lots and homes.30 Developers assert that many im-
provements are unnecessarily expensive with the result that many
Americans might be priced out of the home-buying market.3" On the
other hand, local governments reason that it is necessary to shift the
cost of improvements to the developer because the government is un-
able to finance the capital improvements required by residential subdi-
visions that do not "pay for themselves" with the tax revenues that
they generate.32 Thus, although a local government might prefer resi-
cited [by the study group] as the type of regulation most responsible for unnecessarily
increasing the costs of housing." Id.
30. See Friedan, supra note 24, at 12.
31. It cannot be doubted that developers will attempt to recoup the costs of im-
provements by passing these costs along to lot or homebuyers. See L. SAGALYN & G.
STERNLIEB, ZONING AND HousING COSTS 38 (1972). A study of new houses built in
northern Virginia demonstrated that lot development costs increased 74.1% between
1969 and 1975. S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 120. In a Chapel Hill, North Carolina
study, the per unit cost of land development on a condominium project was in excess of
$12,000. Id. at 58. A Denver, Colorado developer reported that the cost of a finished
lot in a recent development was $23,000. See Ditmer, Writer Pioneer in Open Space
Planning, Denver Post, Feb. 19, 1984, at I1. The alleged results of these costs are a
decrease both in housing starts and in the affordability of housing. See S. SEIDEL, supra
note 1, at 3. Although recent data suggests that more Americans are able to afford
housing, this is only because more houses in lower price ranges are being built as the
overall quality of houses decreases. See Austin, Falling Interest, Rising Earnings Help
Make Home-Buying Easier, Denver Post, Feb. 19, 1984, at 133. In addition, even
though more persons currently are able to purchase homes, a significant percentage of
"younger and poorer households" are unable to do so. Id.
Beyond the direct costs created by subdivision improvement requirements, delays
that result from the subdivision approval process also add to the developer's cost. It is
estimated that each additional month of delay adds 1% to 2% to the selling price of a
home. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 32. Delays affect overhead costs, increase interest
payments, and subject the developer to inflationary pressures.
At least one commentator is unimpressed by the costs imposed by subdivision im-
provements. Freilich argues that these costs can be amortized over a lengthy period of
time and thereby reduce the effect on the homebuyer. R. FREILICH & P. LEvi, supra
note 1, at 105. The alternative is to have the government install the improvements and
then assess the homebuyer over a much shorter period of time. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the kind of cost increases imposed by improvement requirements necessarily
results in many persons being unable to qualify for a new home loan. All that has been
said to this point assumes that the developer can pass the costs of improvements along
to the homebuyer; if he cannot, the developer may be forced to absorb the costs by
decreasing his profit margin. The margin for error in most developments is very slight,
however, and if the developer is unable to recoup his costs, bankruptcy might follow.
See M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 59.
32. See L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, supra note 31, at 14-15; McPherson, An
Underused Form of Land Use Control-Subdivision Improvement Bond Requirements, 45
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/2
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
dential development, it cannot afford to extend basic services in the
hope that tax revenues will reimburse the government; consequently,
the cost of providing these services is shifted to the developer and, ulti-
mately, the homebuyer. Subdivision improvement requirements, there-
fore, have developed into an important aspect of local fiscal planning.33
Closely linked to cost is a second important theme-the exclusion-
ary effect of subdivision regulations. Although a local government le-
gitimately can shift the cost of capital improvements to the developer,
excessive improvement requirements can be a subterfuge by which the
local government can exclude low income persons from the commu-
nity.34 Several courts have demonstrated a willingness to strike down
PA. B. A. Q. 461, 477 (1974). The local government certainly would be unable to
recoup its costs if after completing the public improvements, the development failed.
See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 8-9.
33. The use of fiscal impact analysis in local zoning and planning decisions is a
hotly debated issue. It is true that many local governments have been hard pressed to
meet the demands for public services that residential development has created. The
obvious solution was to require the developer to provide the public improvements. The
developer, in turn, will pass the costs along to the homebuyers that created the demand.
See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 9.01[1]. On the other hand, local governments cannot
be permitted to base their planning decisions solely on fiscal outcomes. Such a process
will result in the exclusion of low income persons from all localities. See Delogu, The
Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative and Judicial
Responses, 32 ME. L. REv. 29, 55 (1980).
34. See Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the
Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 370, 387. Exclusionary zoning and planning is closely
allied with fiscal zoning and planning. Exclusionary land use controls prevent "un-
wanted" households from setting up residence in the locality. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra
note 17, § 2.01[l]. The cost of housing is the key factor in erecting barriers to low
income and minority persons. Id § 2.01[2]. Thus, local governments may impose ex-
cessive improvement requirements for the purpose of making housing too expensive for
low income persons. While the requirements may be justifiable on a fiscal policy basis,
they become unreasonable when their purpose is to exclude. See Surrick v. Zoning
Hearing Bd. of Adjustment, 476 Pa. 182, 185, 382 A.2d 105, 108 (1977). The United
States Supreme Court has refused to invalidate zoning ordinances that have the effect of
excluding low income and minority persons when no motive or purpose to exclude was
demonstrated. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.s. 252 (1977). The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, has taken the lead in estab-
lishing an obligation on the part of local governments to make low income housing
opportunities available. In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel ("Mount Laurel P'), 67 N.J. 151, 180-81, 336 A.2d 713, 728, appeal
dismissed & cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), the court held that the plaintiffs had
made out a prima facie case for the invalidity of local land use controls when they
demonstrated no realistic possibility for a variety of housing that included moderate
income housing. More recently, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel ("Mount Laurel I'), 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983), the court
established an affirmative obligation on local governments to make low income housing
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local regulations that limit the availability of low- or moderate-priced
housing in a community."
A third theme is the need to recognize the impact of government
regulations on industry organization. Subdivision regulations can have
the effect of limiting entry into the development market by imposing
financial responsibility and subdivision improvement requirements. 36
Only financially sound developers can compete in the market if govern-
ments force developers to install improvements prior to selling lots or
homes, or post a corporate surety bond in lieu of completion. As mar-
ket entry barriers are enacted, concentration in the market will increase
with a concomitant increase in prices and a decrease in quality.37
The development industry is highly competitive at the present time.
In 1978, for example, the nation's largest homebuilder accounted for
available. Thus, it is possible to invalidate subdivision improvement requirements or
guarantees if it can be shown that local governments enacted them for the purpose of
excluding low income persons or that the requirements make low income housing im-
possible to construct and the requirements have an insufficient relationship to health
and safety. It is interesting that one study found that upper income cities demanded the
most from developers, and thereby increased the cost of housing. See Friedan, supra
note 24, at 14.
35. See, eg., Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983); Surrick v. Zoning
Hearing Bd. of Adjustment, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977). But see Appeal of M.A.
Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a
partially exclusionary zoning ordinance under a deferential standard of review). For a
thorough treatment of the exclusion issue, see R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, ExCLU-
SIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970S (1973);
Comment, A New Deference Towards Exclusionary Zoning in Pennsylvania: Appeal of
M.A. Kravitz Co., 28 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 381 (1985).
Land use controls also affect housing costs indirectly when developers decide to build
homes in areas with less stringent regulations. Seidel discovered that, in the West, over
76% of those questioned in his survey said that government regulations affected their
decision on where to build. S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 36. Thus, by decreasing the
stock of housing, a government indirectly can force up the cost of housing and cause the
exclusion of low income persons.
One answer to the potential exclusionary effect of costly subdivision regulations is to
permit flexible requirements based on land use, intensity, and location. See T. PATTER-
SON, LAND USE PLANNING: TECHNIQUES OF IMPLEMENTATION 105 (1979). The
problem with this solution is that it poses the potential for creating second class neigh-
borhoods with less than adequate infrastructures to serve low income residents. Rather
than permit low-grade improvements for low-income housing projects, local govern-
ments should analyze their requirements to ensure that they do not add unnecessarily to
the cost of housing. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 53 (estimating unnecessary costs at
one residential development in New Jersey).
36. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 6.
37. See generally L. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY AL-
TERNATIVES 71-97 (5th ed. 1977).
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only "six-tenths of one percent of the national market.""8 Moreover,
in that same year, the nation's top thirty-six builders produced only
five percent of all delivered homes.39 Although this competitive pos-
ture tends to drive prices down, a number of countervailing forces are
at work: the activity of most developers is localized, the industry as a
whole is fragmented, and most of the firms engaged in all parts of the
industry are small. 4° As a result, developers lack most of the benefits
associated with large scale operations and are highly sensitive to the
impact of local regulations.
Additionally, local governments must recognize that subdivision reg-
ulations that they impose on a developer will have ripple effects
throughout the development industry. The interests and conduct of
landowners, lenders, and builders will be affected whenever increased
costs are imposed on developers. Similarly, conditions that local gov-
ernments impose on developers will affect homebuyers and their lend-
ers.41 Local governments should appreciate the systemic effects of
their regulations before they increase the burdens on the land
developer.
A final theme is the need for flexibility in subdivision regulations.
Local governments should adapt subdivision regulations to each partic-
ular type of development. Not all developments, even residential de-
velopments, require the same improvements.42  Similarly, local
governments should make available several methods to secure comple-
tion of improvements to account for the needs of individual develop-
ers.4 3 Such flexibility, however, must be accomplished within the
limits of standards that can guide decision-makers. If standards are
not available, the industry might "capture" those that are supposed to
regulate it.'
38. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 23 (citing HOUSING, June 1979,
at 82-83).
39. Id.
40. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 117 (1969).
41. See Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REV. 389, 395-96.
42. See T. PATTERSON, supra note 35, at 105. For example, the size of a water main
should be permitted to vary with the density of the development. Similarly, road sur-
faces should vary dependent on the amount of traffic in the subdivision.
43. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 135.
44. See id. at 308-09; R. FREILICH & P. LEvI, supra note 1, at 23. Standards are
important for at least four reasons. First, standards define local authority, thereby min-
imizing the suggestion of an unconstitutional delegation of power. Second, they con-
strain local decision-making and limit the possibility for arbitrary and capricious action.
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Ultimately, the goal of any subdivision control regime should be to
guarantee quality development at the least possible cost with a proper
allocation of responsibility between the public and private sectors.
While that goal is simple to state, it is difficult to implement as a result
of the many and varied parties and interests that are involved in the
subdivision of land.
III. SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT
A. The Private Sector
The ultimate object of the development process is the production of
homes. 5 The role played by the developer in this process may be
stated in deceptively simple terms. The developer envisions a project,
acquires land, secures financing, installs improvements, constructs
homes," and, hopefully, sells the finished product at a profit. In real-
ity, however, the development process is not nearly as simple.
The housing industry is one of the most complex industries in the
country. 7 It includes literally hundreds of types of specialty firms, all
of which are fiercely competitive.48 The nature of the product itself
creates difficulties that add to the complexity of the process and ulti-
mately result in higher costs to the consumer.
Third, standards limit the opportunity for local governments to "extort" large conces-
sions from developers whose businesses are dependent on local approval. Finally, stan-
dards assist in preventing some developers from obtaining favors from the government
because they are connected politically. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note
2, at 236-38, 244-47 (discussing political corruption and deal-making in land use
decisions).
45. The development of commercial and industrial subdivisions may lead to some of
the same problems that surround the residential subdivision process. Nevertheless, resi-
dential development is by far the largest use of urban and suburban land. M. CLAW-
SON, supra note 3, at 8; See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 17, table 1-1
(quoting Niedercorn & Hearle, Recent Land Use Trends in Forty-Eight Large American
Cities, 40 LAND ECON. 105-06, table 1 (1964)). Additionally, it accounts for the over-
whelming majority of the reported cases.
46. For a small number of firms, land development is limited to the acquisition and
subdivision of raw land and the installation of improvements such as streets, sewers,
and watermains. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 22; see S. SEIDEL,
supra note 1, at 25 (quoting CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH, SURVEY OF THE
HOME BUILDER INDUSTRY (1976)). Most firms, however, engage in both land develop-
ment and home construction. Id.
47. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 40, at 113. See
infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
48. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 40, at 113.
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Certain distinctive features of housing require a production and de-
livery system unlike that of any other industry. First, housing is tied to
the land.49 This simple fact makes the development process highly sus-
ceptible to local regulation5" and tends to perpetuate the localization of
markets.5 Second, housing has long-term durability.52 Provided that
a house is structurally sound, it can be repaired or remodeled, and it
may last for generations. Thus, if market conditions prove unfavora-
ble, a large number of potential new homebuyers may fall back on this
readily available alternative to purchasing a new home.53
The sheer size of a home is another of its distinctive features.54 Due
mainly to high overhead, storage, and transportation costs, it generally
is thought that on-site assembly is the least expensive method of pro-
duction for most types of housing." Because the assembly is com-
pleted outdoors at the various jobsites, however, the homebuilder is
prone to the vagaries of the local labor market and the weather.56
The high cost of a house is perhaps its most distinctive characteris-
tic. Indisputably, the family home constitutes the single largest expen-
diture that most families will make.57 Since World War II, an
increasing number of homebuyers have financed their home purchases;
presently, more than ninety percent of all new homes are financed.58
Thus, not only are the sales of new homes subject to the fluctuating
mortgage market,59 but also the lenders themselves can exert a major
influence on the entire development process. 6°
49, Id. at 114.
50. Local governments traditionally have been responsible for land use and develop-
ment regulation, id., and local regulation continues to play the dominant role in the
subdivision approval process. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 19-20.
51. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 40, at 114.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 114-15; see also M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 80 (suggesting that
most new homebuyers purchase by choice rather than out of necessity).
54. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 40, at 114.
55. Id. at 116. Prefabricated or sectionalized homes have been most economically
competitive in areas where modern onsite assembly-line techniques have not been avail-
able. In contrast to prefabricated homes, the industry has very successfully employed
prefabricated components such as roof trusses, prehung doors, and sectionalized wall
systems.
56 Id.
57. Id.
58. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 99.
59, PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 40, at 116.
60 M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 71-72.
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Against the backdrop of the housing industry's distinctive product,
the development process may be surveyed best from the points of view
of the major actors in this process. These actors encompass a wide
array of individuals and firms ranging from the original landowner to
the ultimate homebuyer. Although their interests and objectives differ
significantly, they all share three common characteristics: they cooper-
ate with one another; they compete with one another; and they have an
impact on the decision-making process.
1. The Landowner and Land Dealer
The first actor in the development process is the landowner. Origi-
nally, the landowner probably was a farmer or rancher. More com-
monly, however, the developer purchases land from an interim
landowner-the "notorious" land speculator. 6 ' The speculators, or
land "dealers," are a relatively small group of individuals and firms
that hope to profit as the land shifts from rural to urban use.62 On the
way to the realization of that profit, however, landowner-dealers can
perform several important functions in the development process.
Landowner-dealers may function as market makers.63 Assume, for
example, that a developer desires to build in a particular area. It may
be difficult to find a farmer or rancher that is willing to sell at the
appropriate time. Even if a dealer can locate a willing seller, the avail-
able parcel may not be of the optimum size. Conversely, assume that a
farmer desired to sell out to a developer at a handsome profit. He may
be unable to locate a developer with the means and desire to purchase
the land at that time. Thus, the dealer can perform a beneficial service
to both parties by being prepared to buy or sell at any time. In short, it
is the dealer that assumes the risk of holding the land. 6 4
The dealer performs a second important function by assembling land
into parcels of optimum, or at least desirable, size for development. 65
The dealer may perform this function either by acquiring small parcels
directly from the several adjacent owners or by trading among them-
61. Id. at 62.
62. Id. at 103. Clawson has estimated that farmers realize about half of the total
increase in the value of land with the other half being distributed among the various
interim owners and dealers. Id. (citing A. SCHMID, CONVERTING LAND FROM RURAL
TO URBAN USES (1968)).
63. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 62.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 62-63.
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selves.6 6 Considering the increase in the size of many subdivision de-
velopments in recent years, the assembly function has become more
important.6 7
To be successful, the land dealer must possess knowledge, not only
of what land local governments will rezone, but also of what land is
ripe for rezoning. The dealer may gain this knowledge by studying
growth trends, by familiarizing himself with the local zoning process as
well as with individual board members, and by actively lobbying for
zoning changes.6" Where the land is unzoned or zoned for agricultural
use, a zoning change is essential to a successful development. Thus,
dealers often purchase raw land conditioned upon obtaining specific
rezoning. 69 Accordingly, although the land dealer and developer are in
direct competition for ultimate profits during the negotiation stage,
they become "staunch allies in the subsequent dealings with. . . local
officials" as soon as the contract has been signed.7 °
Perhaps the most important function that the land dealer may per-
form is that of financing the purchase of the land. Because developers
typically are undercapitalized,7 it is unlikely that developers can
purchase the land with cash. Land dealers, therefore, offer a variety of
financing methods to enable the development to proceed. Of the three
basic forms of financing available to the developer, the purchase money
mortgage is the most common.72 The land dealer takes a small per-
centage of the total purchase price in cash and accepts the developer's
note and mortgage for the balance. As the developer improves and
sells lots, the land dealer releases these lots from the mortgage,7 3 and
receives a pro rata portion of the outstanding indebtedness from the
sale proceeds.7 4
A similar result is obtained by use of the land contract of sale.
66. Id. at 102.
67. Id. at 63.
68. Id. at 102-03.
69. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 22.
70. Id.
71. M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 71.
72. M. MADISON & J. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING 9.01[1]
(1981); ef R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 25 (describing purchase
money mortgages) (quoting S. MAISEL, FINANCING REAL ESTATE 315-18 (1965)).
73. For a discussion of some of the problems associated with the release of lots, see
infra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
74. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 25 (quoting S. MAISEL, FI-
NANCING REAL ESTATE 315-18 (1965)).
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Under this method of financing, the developer contracts to purchase
the land, but the seller retains title to the entire parcel. As lots are
developed and sold, the seller transfers title directly to the lot- or
home-buyer and receives payment from the proceeds.75
A third method, while not strictly a financing technique, neverthe-
less has a similar effect in that it allows the developer to tie up a large
parcel of land with a minimum of capital. Basically, the developer
buys one section of the tract, either for cash or by some form of seller
financing, and also obtains options to purchase other sections as
needed.76 Although this technique may enable a developer to control
vast parcels of land, recent escalations in land values have increased
option prices beyond the reach of many developers.77
With respect to all types of seller financing, two general observations
may be made. First, the developer almost certainly will need addi-
tional financing in order to improve the lots and construct houses. Be-
cause development financing is extremely risky, the lender will require
that the developer secure the loan with the land.78 Accordingly, the
seller must subordinate the mortgage on the land to the later develop-
ment loan.79 The second observation is that regardless of the method
of land financing used, the developer will increase the price of the land
as he passes on to homebuyers the cost of financing his purchase. 0
2. The Developer
The developer can be distinguished from the builder. Strictly speak-
ing, the developer acquires raw land, subdivides it, and installs im-
provements such as streets, curbs, sidewalks, sewers, and water
75. Id. at 24-25.
76. Id. at 24.
77. Id
78. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 72, 1 9.01[l][d]. The land seller will
give up his priority only if the developer assures him that he actually will use the pro-
ceeds from the subsequent development loan to improve the land. Thus, while the
seller's lien will be in a junior position, the infusion of funds from the development loan
should result in an increase in the value of the property sufficient to offset the amount of
the new first lien. Id.
79. I.d
80. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 25 (quoting S. MAISEL, FI-
NANCING REAL ESTATE 315-18 (1965)). The additional cost factor may be mitigated
somewhat by Internal Revenue Code § 453, which allows installment sellers to defer
recognition of gain for federal income tax purposes until the tax year in which the
proceeds actually are received. I.R.C. § 453A (1982).
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mains." The builder, on the other hand, ordinarily acquires already
subdivided and improved lots and constructs houses on them. 2 This
distinction has become less important in recent years and, at present,
most developers perform both functions.83
Developers come in many shapes and sizes, but they all have one
overriding common interest: they are engaged in the business to make
a profit. In order to maximize his profit potential, the successful devel-
oper must acquire the best land and the most credit at the lowest cost,
minimize his tax liabilities, take advantage of the most favorable gov-
ernment programs, design and construct an attractive product, and
market that product quickly and efficiently. A more detailed discus-
sion of each aspect of the developer's function suggests some of the
reasons for subdivision failures, the necessity for adequate security to
assure the completion of required subdivision improvements, and the
impact that subdivision requirements have on the development process.
The developer's first goal is to acquire a suitable parcel of land.
Although the developer often will desire a tract of a certain size and in
a particular area, the acquisition of land usually is based on an ad hoc
decision that turns primarily on the price at which he may acquire the
available land. 4 Because most land ripe for development is held by
relatively few land dealers, 5 the successful developer must be able to
perform a two-tier negotiating and decision-making function. First,
the objective data-the demand for housing, cost of credit, and availa-
bility of mortgage financing-must be considered. Second, the devel-
oper must consider the goals of the particular land dealer and the
impact that the sale will have on the price and availability of land that
he may need to acquire in the future.8 6
81. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 22.
82. S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 24.
83. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 22. In a recent survey, 61%
of all responding firms indicated that they were active in both land development and
building. S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 24-25 (citing CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY RE-
SEARCH, SURVEY OF THE HOME BUILDER INDUSTRY (1976)). Although various
terms, such as "operative builder" and "merchant builder," are used to describe firms
engaged in both the development and building phases of the process, see M. CLAWSON,
supra note 3, at 86-87, this Article uses the terms "developer" and "builder"
interchangeably.
84, See M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 60.
85. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
86. Clawson has suggested that the relationship between developers and land deal-
ers may be characterized more accurately as "gamesmanship" than as true competition.
M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 79.
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Assuming that the developer can acquire a suitable parcel of land
and obtain financing, he then must arrange for a development loan.
87
For a variety of reasons, developers have tended to be substantially
under capitalized.88 Low capitalization gives the developer a great deal
of leverage, which may result in high profits if the project is successful.
Leverage, however, may work in the opposite direction as well; conse-
quently, an apparently solid developer can be wiped out almost over-
night because he has no ready cash with which to meet unforeseen
expenses.8 9
The high risk of loss for the developer translates directly into a high
risk for the development lender.90 Thus, the developer faces a two-fold
problem in obtaining financing: first, credit may not be available at any
price for inexperienced developers or for those whose track record is
weak; and second, regardless of its availability, the cost of credit will be
high. 91
In addition to the land acquisition loan and the development loan,
the developer that also intends to build must secure a construction loan
and arrange for suitable take-out financing.92 Thus, the most success-
ful developers often are those that can arrange the most attractive
financing.
93
The third basic function of the developer is designing and building.
94
87. The development loan constitutes the funds necessary to install off-site improve-
ments and is distinguishable from the construction loan, which is used to finance the
actual construction of the houses. Often, however, the installation of off-site improve-
ments and the construction of houses are carried on concurrently and are financed to-
gether. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 25 (quoting S. MAISEL,
FINANCING REAL ESTATE 318 (1965)).
88. M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 71. Clawson has suggested that the lack of size
of development firms, the use of capital for quick expansion, and the relative lack of
outside equity capital are reasons for low capitalization rates in the development indus-
try. Id.
89. See id.
90. M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 72, t 9.01. In addition to the risk of loss
caused by an unsuccessful development, the lender also may risk delays in receiving his
payments because of the developer's lack of a steady income stream. Id.
91. Development and construction loans at 20% interest or more are not uncom-
mon. R. ELLICESON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting S. MAISEL, FINANC-
ING REAL ESTATE 316 (1965)).
92. The take-out loan, the ultimate owner's permanent financing, is commonly ar-
ranged simultaneously with or before the construction loan is obtained.
93. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 72.
94. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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While the development process begins with the developer's vision of
the completed project, the details necessarily will be altered by the to-
pography and value of the land,95 the availability and cost of credit,
labor and materials, and the perceived nature and strength of the de-
mand for the finished product. It is also at this stage that the local
government unit has its greatest impact.96
Recognizing that he is subject to external forces beyond his control,
the developer, nevertheless, has room to exercise his creativity and in-
novation in the design and construction phase.9 7 Streets may be laid
out in a grid or with curves and cul-de-sacs; the houses may be sepa-
rate, attached, or clustered; the architectural style may be varied or
standardized;98 interior appointments may range from the bare bones
to the luxurious; and common amenities may include swimming pools,
tennis courts, and golf courses.
The success with which he has carried out the design and construc-
tion phase has a direct relationship to the developer's final function,
that of the merchant. This is perhaps the most stressful phase of the
entire development process. The developer has acquired the land, ar-
ranged financing and spent funds, purchased or ordered materials,
hired labor, completed off-site improvements, or nearly so, and perhaps
has begun construction on a number of houses.99 Moreover, because
95. M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 60.
96. A partial list of the various types of regulations imposed at the local level in-
cludes: Bonding requirements, building codes, energy codes, engineering inspection, en-
vironmental impact reviews, mechanical codes, plat review, sewer connection approval
and fees, landscaping requirements and tree removal permits, site plan review, soil test-
ing, utility connection fees, water connection approval and fees, and zoning. S. SEIDEL,
supra note 1, at 20. Thirty-eight percent of responding builders and developers cited the
cumulative burden of these regulations as the "most significant problem in doing busi-
ness." Id. at 27 (citing M. SUMICHRAST & S. FRANKEL, PROFILE OF THE BUILDER
AND His INDUSTRY 95 (1970)).
97. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 74-75. One has only to compare the drab-
ness of the tract housing of the immediate post-war era with the wide variety of housing
currently available to realize the amount of innovation that actually has occurred.
98. Developers easily can achieve a remarkable variation in the exterior appearance
of houses in a modern subdivision. In a typical medium-size or large subdivision, the
developer may utilize, for example, five standard floor plans and offer a choice of three
exterior finished materials. Moreover, the developer may reverse each plan. Thus, a
tour through the completed subdivision may disclose as many as thirty apparently dif-
ferent homes.
99. In the larger subdivisions, the developer will have constructed a sales office and
from one to six model homes. These, of course, usually are fully completed, landscaped,
decorated, and furnished at considerable expense.
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the development process is lengthy, the market conditions may have
changed radically. At this point, however, there is little that the devel-
oper can do except wait and hope that the purchasers will buy. °°
In short, the development process is one in which the land seller, the
developer, and the lender may have invested millions of dollars before
they have received a single dollar in return. Nevertheless, the devel-
oper must service the loans and pay for labor, materials, and overhead.
Thus, if the houses sell quickly, the developer stands to earn a profit
commensurate with the risk. If the houses fail to sell, default virtually
is certain.
3. Lenders
The institutions that finance the various phases of the development
process include insurance companies, commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, and mortgage companies. 1 On the whole, they
tend to be large-much larger, certainly than the clientele that they
serve.12 Typically, institutional lenders make loans at every stage of
the process, for such purposes as land acquisition, subdivision improve-
ments, construction, security, and the purchase of the finished
product. 103
Because of the relatively large size of the institutional lenders and
the pervasiveness of the need for financing, lenders have a major im-
pact on the development decision-making process. 1" This impact is
enhanced by the fact that the lender occupies a position on the periph-
ery of the industry. 10 5 While land development may be the developer's
sole business, development and construction loans often will account
100. Developers build a large number of subdivision homes speculatively-that is,
they are built completely, or nearly so, prior to the time of sale. These homes represent
a tremendous amount of borrowed capital for which there is little or no hope of repay-
ment prior to the sale. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 4-40.
101. Id. at 1-4 to 1-5. Some of the largest developers achieve significant financing
cost savings by arranging lines of unsecured bank credit or by issuing various corporate
debt instruments. L ELLiCKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 26.
102. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 100.
103. R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 3-4. Some lenders prefer to participate in only one
phase of the development process, while others prefer to participate in the entire project.
For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of "total project financing," see id.
at 4-34 to 4-35.
104. M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 71 (citing C. HAAR, FEDERAL CREDIT AND
PRIVATE HOUSING (1960); S. MAISEL, FINANCING REAL ESTATE (1965)).
105. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 40, at 117.
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for only a small portion of the lender's business. Thus, the lender is in
a uniquely powerful position to control the development process.
10 6
The lender's overriding concern is for the security of the loan. Be-
cause of low capitalization at every stage of the process, I0 7 developers
are highly leveraged; consequently the risk of developer failure is
high."18 In an attempt to minimize its risk, the lender may exert its
control and influence in a number of ways. First, the lender may with-
draw funds from the development process. Because the lender has in-
vestment options unrelated to the development industry, it is not
compelled to lend if the risks seem inordinately high. Even if the
lender has funds allocated for development, it still will make its pres-
ence felt by exacting a high rate of interest for the loans. I09 Thus, the
lender can influence both the availability and the cost of new housing.
The lender also exerts its influence by determining which of the
many potential developers will receive the necessary financing. High
risk development loans require massive amounts of security in the form
of collateral and guarantees. The lender virtually always will secure
liens on the development property.l10 In addition, the lender may re-
quire security interests in the developer's other real or personal prop-
erty. Lenders will require guarantees from corporate sureties, in the
form of payment and performance bonds, or from the developer's part-
ners or principal shareholders and their spouses." 1' Lenders also look
to the developer's track record and the experience of his key personnel
for a measure of intangible security." 2 These potentially stringent re-
quirements effectively bar the smaller and less experienced develop-
ment firms from the process.
The lender also can exert its influence on the development decision-
making process more directly. An experienced development loan de-
partment, for example, can offer the developer a wide range of assist-
ance and expertise in areas ranging from site selection to design, and in
106. See id.
107. M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 100 (quoting S. MAISEL, FINANCING REAL
ESTATE 315-16 (1965)).
108. Id. Developers often borrow from 80% to more than 100% of the value of the
completed development project. Id.
109. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 1-5, 3-6. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMIT-
TEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 40, at 131-33 (discussing various problems related
to the cost and availability of construction and mortgage financing).
110. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 3-9.
111. See id. at 4-90 to 4-92.
112. See id. at 3-12.
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marketing of the final product. This assistance is in the best interest of
all concerned if it enables the developer to avoid making the types of
mistakes that result in failure. The large institutional lender, however,
tends to be conservative." 3 For the sake of security, it tends toward
the safe and the familiar. Thus, in the name of "sound lending," the
lender can dominate the development process. At its best, that domi-
nation can result in the increased viability of the project and availabil-
ity of the product. At its worst, it can result in the perpetuation of
mediocrity, stagnation, and social stratification.114
4. Buyers
Buyers are the essential final link in the development process. Re-
gardless of what has transpired previously, the development will fail if
potential buyers are unwilling to borrow funds and purchase homes.
To some extent, the developer can stimulate demand for his product
through his choice of location and design, and by his ability to hold
costs down. Nevertheless, the purchasing decision is largely a function
of the characteristics of the buyers, the need for new housing, and the
level of interest rates." 5
The need for a particular type of housing is dependent upon a variety
of characteristics including age, marital status, number of children, oc-
cupation, education, and income." 6 Although new home buyers obvi-
ously are a diverse lot, certain common characteristics stand out:
typical purchasers of new suburban homes tend to be young or middle-
aged couples with children, caucasian, and with average or above aver-
age incomes." 17
The factors leading to the purchasing decision are varied: 1) dissat-
isfaction with present housing because of its physical condition or loca-
tion; 2) the need or desire for additional space; 3) an increase in
income; and 4) a job transfer." 8 Significantly, none of the factors that
ordinarily result in the purchase of a home-with the exception of a job
transfer-necessarily compels such a decision. Moreover, none of the
factors, including a job transfer, requires buyers to purchase new sub-
113. M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 72.
114. Id. at 101.
115. See id. at 72.
116. Id. at 73.
117. Id. at 80-81.
118. Id. at 80.
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urban homes. Thus, in a very real sense, buyers have it within their
collective power to ensure the success of a development or to cause it to
fail.
Fortunately, for the other actors in the development process, a
number of factors improve their prospects. First, Americans are mo-
bile. Not only do they move frequently,' 19 but also they lack signifi-
cant emotional or psychological ties to a particular neighborhood or
city. 12 ° Second, public policy favors owning rather than renting. 121 A
third factor acts as a more direct inducement for buyers to purchase
new suburban homes. It is estimated that eighty-five to ninety percent
of all homebuyers must finance their purchases. 122 Rightly or wrongly,
lenders generally are willing to offer better financing for new homes
than for used homes. 123 Finally, most buyers seem to buy new subur-
ban homes because that is what they prefer. It is indisputable that the
quality of subdivision developments can be improved. It is equally in-
disputable that large numbers of used homes are available in all price
ranges.' 2 4 Thus, homebuyers clearly have a choice. To the extent that
the development process results in quality homes at affordable prices
this process should be encouraged, and any decision that may ad-
versely affect the process should be based upon an awareness of its po-
tential effect and made with care.
B. The Public Sector: Subdivision Approval
Although the private sector initiates land development, the public
sector is intimately involved in the subdivision of land as a result of an
almost bewildering array of state and local regulations. Subdivision
improvement requirements and guarantees are an integral part of the
subdivision approval process that is the focus of this section.
1. Parties and Their Interests
The public side of subdivision development consists of a number of
119. Id. at 79.
120. Id. at 73.
121. Id at 79.
122. Id. at 99.
123. Because mortgage loans are secured by the property being purchased, two fac-
tors of significance to the lender are the age and condition of the house. U.S. CONFER-
ENCE OF MAYORS, NAT'L COMMUNITY DEV. ASS'N, URBAN LAND INST., THE
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 7 (1979).
124. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 3, at 74.
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persons and agencies. Sophisticated local governments might have
professional planning staffs that are principally responsible for the
technical evaluation of a subdivision proposal. 125 Government engi-
neers also evaluate subdivision proposals, making recommendations
and imposing requirements concerning subdivision improvements. 126
A variety of local and state agencies might be required to review the
subdivision proposal, each with a particular mission to fulfill or exist-
ence to justify. Planning commissioners may be appointed or elected
and, in some instances, are the officials of the local governing body. 127
Each person or agency brings to the subdivision approval process a
certain professional bias that will be reflected in the controls that they
seek to impose on the developer.
2. Subdivision Control Laws in Review
a. State Enabling Laws
Local governments enact subdivision control laws pursuant to state
enabling legislation. 128 Because the states have not adopted a uniform
model code for subdivision regulation, a great amount of variation ex-
ists among state laws. 129 Some states, such as Oregon, 130 Montana,13 1
and Washington, 132 have adopted comprehensive codes for subdivision
125. See id. at 91-99.
126. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 424 (discussing the role of
engineers and their "rivalry" with planners).
127. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.05.
128. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 138. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 9.22.
Home rule governments present a different situation because their powers may be
greater than those of local governments that derive their powers from enabling statutes.
See Moore v. City of Boulder, 29 Colo. App. 248, 253-54, 484 P.2d 134, 136-37 (1971)
(local home rule zoning powers were greater than those granted in the state enabling
statute). Although express enabling language may not be necessary before a local gov-
ernment can regulate subdivisions, a local government must pass local regulations
before it can control subdivisions. See R. FREILICH & P. LEvI, supra note 1, at 28.
129. See R. FREILICH & P. LEvI, supra note 1, at 2-3. Several model codes in
addition to the Standard City Planning Enabling Act have been promulgated: The Mu-
nicipal Planning Enabling Act by Bassett and Williams; The Municipal Subdivision
Regulation Act by Bettman; Model Regulations for the Control of Land Subdivision by
Freilich and Levi; and the Model Land Development Code by the American Law Insti-
tute. The various models are discussed in R. FREILICH & P. LEvi, supra note 1, at 3.
130. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 92.010-.990 (1983).
131. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-101 to -614 (1983).
132. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 58.17.010-.920 (Supp. 1984).
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regulation, while others, such as Texas, 13 3 Utah, 13 4 and Alaska,135
have enacted relatively few provisions that often are scattered through-
out their codes. State enabling statutes may set maximum standards
that can be applied to subdivisions; or conversely, minimum standards
that permit local governments to regulate more restrictively.
1 3 6
b. Purposes of Subdivision Control
Subdivision control laws are designed to serve a variety of purposes.
The original purpose of subdivision regulations, still found in all state
laws, is the proper mapping and recordation of subdivided lands.
137
Thus, the basic element of subdivision regulation is that no land within
any subdivision may be transferred without first recording a subdivi-
sion plat. 3 ' The developer, however, may not record the plat until the
local planning authority or governing body, or both, approve the subdi-
vision. ' The proper recordation of subdivision plats should facilitate
land transfers and government real property taxation. 14°
A second early purpose of subdivision control laws that continues
today is the proper laying out of streets and roads."' Some state stat-
utes evidence this purpose of subdivision control by requiring approval
of a subdivision plat only if the local government has adopted a master
street plan.' 42 Local codes also manifest the concern for streets and
roads with elaborate standards for the grading, paving, and widening of
subdivision roads.
133. See TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 6626 (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1984); art. 974a
(Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1982); art. 970a (Vernon 1963).
134. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-25 to -30 (1977 & Supp. 1983); § 17-21-8
(1973); §§ 17-27-1 to -27 (1973 & Supp. 1983); §§ 57-5-1 to -8 (1974).
135. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 40.15.010-.190 (1971 & Supp. 1984).
136. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66411 (Deering 1979) (authorizing local govern-
ments to regulate subdivisions other than those defined in the Subdivision Map Act, but
any regulations cannot be more restrictive than those found in the Act).
137. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 9.2; Note, Platting, Planning & Protec-
tion-A Summary ofSubdivision Statutes, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (1961).
138. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.04; TEXAS STAT. ANN. art. 6626
(Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1984).
139. See Note, Land Subdivision Control, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1235 (1952);
ALASKA STAT. § 40.15.010 (1971).
140. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 134.
141. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.32; D. MANDELKER, supra note 1,
§ 92.
142. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 135; UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-25 (1977).
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A third and more recent purpose of subdivision regulations is the
assurance of quality development and avoidance of environmental deg-
radation. Subdivision improvement requirements are imposed in part
to guarantee an adequate infrastructure for the residential development
and, in part, to ensure that the development does not present environ-
mental hazards. 4 3 Thus, for example, assurances by the developer
that he will provide an adequate central water system ensure that the
homebuyer will have a water supply while also permitting appropriate
government agencies to protect water quality. Subdivision regulations
consequently protect both homebuyers and their neighbors. 144
Finally, subdivision control laws, particularly improvement require-
ments, permit local governments to shift the cost of providing public
improvements from themselves to developers and, ultimately, to the
homebuyers in the development. The imposition of subdivision im-
provement costs on the developer, along with the frequent performance
guarantee requirements, represent a continuation of local government
reaction to the harmful consequences of premature subdivision that be-
fell them in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather than limit subdivison devel-
opment altogether, a potentially unconstitutional option, 145 local
governments generally have permitted growth, but shifted the cost of
capital improvement to the developer.14
6
143. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 18-19; Melli, supra note 41, at 392-95.
144. See R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra note 1, at 7-8; COLO. REv. STAT. § 30-28-
133(6)(a) (1973 & Supp. 1982).
145. See 1 P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 4.01[3].
146. A more subtle purpose of subdivision control laws is business regulation. See
R. YEARwooD, supra note 1, at 59-60, 120-21; McPherson, supra note 32, at 477. Sub-
division control laws impose financial burdens that only financially stable developers
can meet. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 3. Additionally, these laws establish a bu-
reaucratic structure in which those that successfully "politicize" the process can obtain
more from government officials than can outsiders. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK,
supra note 2, at 236-38 (discussing lobbyists and dealmaking in zoning decisions). Con-
trols on developers also can have a positive effect. They encourage the developer to
come up with better cost information on the development, which, in turn, should en-
courage the developer to understand better the likelihood of successfully marketing his
development. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 124-25. An argument also can be made
that controls limit development to those businesses that are most likely to complete a
quality project. See R. YEARWOOD, supra note 1, at 121-22; T. PATTERSON, supra note
35, at 93. The fact that many developers may be precluded from entering the market
because of financial barriers also means that persons in the market may be insulated
from the effects of competition.
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c. Constitutionality of Subdivision Control
In general, the courts have upheld the constitutionality of subdivi-
sion control laws.147 The three most frequent challenges to these laws
are that they deny a landowner due process of law, they effect a taking
of property without just compensation, and that they violate equal pro-
tection guarantees. The due process challenge is predicated on the the-
ory that any governmental regulation must bear at least a reasonable
relationship to the purpose of the legislation and that the local regula-
tion, on its face or as applied, is unreasonable.' 48 The taking argument
is based either on the loss in value to the developer if he is forced to
incur significant costs in installing improvements or on the required
dedication of otherwise private improvements.1 49  Equal protection
guarantees are raised when only a given class of land development is
subject to regulation or when several classes are treated differently.'50
Courts experience little difficulty in rejecting the constitutional argu-
ments in most challenges to subdivision control laws.11
147. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 2. See generally Note, supra note 17, at 279-
94.
148. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 17, §§ 9.01[3], 9.02.
149. See R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra note 1, at 15-16; R. ELLICKSON & A.
TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 63.
150. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 9.02.
151. Some commentators assert that the government has authority under the police
power to regulate property for the benefit of public health, welfare, and safety. See 4 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.04; R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra note 1, at 9. Thus,
subdivision regulations are constitutional even though they diminish the value of a per-
son's property because they are a reasonable means for promoting public welfare. See
R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra note 1, at 10-11. The regulations do not effect a taking of
property simply because they diminish the value of the developer's property. As Justice
Holmes stressed in his classic statement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), government hardly could continue if it had to compensate a property owner
every time a government regulation diminished the value of his property. Id. at 413.
The taking of property is a legal conclusion based on the nature of the government
regulation, the loss in value to the property owner, and the public benefit gained from
the regulation. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980). The equal
protection challenge also is unavailing because, with no suspect classes or fundamental
rights involved, the classification only must be a rational means for accomplishing the
purposes of the legislation. See Delight, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 624 F.2d 12, 14 (4th
Cir. 1980) (subdivision regulations did not involve an inherently suspect distinction).
Admittedly, dedication requirements and off-site improvement requirements have
given the courts more difficulty than any other aspect of subdivision control. Off-site
improvements refer to improvements that are not within the boundaries of the subdivi-
sion. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.36. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1,
§ 9.12. Dedications or in lieu fees are discussed in Comment, supra note 17, at 319-20.
Rather than relying on a straightforward recognition that the police power is a sufficient
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d. The Relationship Between Planning and Zoning
Subdivision control laws are related to zoning, but serve different
purposes. While zoning establishes districts in which various uses of
land may be made, subdivision control is concerned more with the
manner in which a given use is made. 52 Thus, although zoning regu-
lations may establish height, floor space, density, and set-back require-
ments, subdivision controls regulate more particularized features of
development such as landscaping, road surfaces, drainage require-
ments, and access. 153 Because many subdivision proposals implicate
both zoning and subdivision controls, a planning commission may have
the authority to modify minor zoning requirements to facilitate more
sensible development.154 A subdivision proposal, however, also may
justification for these requirements, the courts have fashioned more sophisticated, or
sophistic, theories. First, some commentators argue that the subdivision of land is a
privilege that the local government can bestow conditionally on a landowner. See John-
ston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 871, 881-85 (1967). But see D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 136 (arguing
that privilege theory is illusory); Note, supra note 17, at 283, 289 (asserting that the
privilege test is inadequate). Thus, the assumption is made that a landowner has no
inherent right to develop his property and that the government must grant such a right.
In truth, an intrinsic right to develop land exists and in jurisdictions with no subdivision
control authority, the government cannot impinge on the developer's right. See Bella
Vista Ranches, Inc. v. City of Sierra Vista, 126 Ariz. 142, 143, 613 P.2d 302, 303 (Ariz.
App. 1980). The right is not absolute, however, and the government, acting pursuant to
validly enacted legislation, can limit the developer's right for the public welfare. See R.
YEARWOOD, supra note 1, at 84.
A second theory supporting subdivision controls, similar to the first, is that the subdi-
vision of land is a voluntary act and that no taking occurs because a landowner can
avoid the regulations by declining to subdivide. See Johnston, supra, at 876-81. That
theory justifies any government regulation of business because the businessman volunta-
rily entered the market and can just as easily have avoided the regulations by abstaining
from the regulated business. A regulation is not constitutional simply because a person
can abstain from engaging in the regulated conduct. The regulation still must be rea-
sonable and relate to promotion of the public welfare. The failings of the privilege and
voluntary act theories led the courts to shift their emphasis to the police power as a
sufficient basis for upholding subdivision regulations. See Note, supra note 139, at
1232-33; Note, supra note 17, at 282-88. The merging of the theories is based on the
fact that the courts will not uphold a regulation if they perceive it as being unreasona-
ble. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 138. To determine the reasonableness of a regula-
tion it is necessary to compare the private interests of the developer with the public
interests sought to be served by the legislation. See Reps & Smith, Control of Urban
Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 405, 406 (1963).
152. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 135; Note, supra note 17, at 270 n.6.
153. D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 135.
154. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.22. Sections 14 and 16 of the Standard
City Planning Enabling Act actually provide planning authorities with control over
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necessitate changes in zoning classification-for example, from single-
family to multiple-family dwellings. In these instances, some jurisdic-
tions provide a consolidated procedure for considering both the zoning
change and the subdivision proposal.
e. Master Plans and Subdivision Control
Many jurisdictions have established master plans that serve as a
blueprint to guide community growth and development.15 5 The major-
ity of these jurisdictions do not require that a developer's subdivision
decisions conform strictly with the master plan.' 5 6 Thus, the local gov-
ernment has some flexibility to deal with particular situations as they
arise. If a government establishes a pattern for dealing with develop-
ers, however, a significant deviation from this pattern may lead to a
successful challenge by the affected developer.
3. The Subdivision Approval Process
Subdivision improvement requirements are imposed on the devel-
oper during the subdivision approval process. Although many varia-
tions exist among state laws and local practices, some generalizations
about the process can be made. The essence of subdivision control is
that the developer cannot convey subdivided land without recording a
subdivision plat, and that the developer cannot record the subdivision
plat until it has been approved by the local planning commission or
government body, or by both.15
7
matters also dealt with by zoning authorities. See Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Develop-
ment: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 47, 84-85 (1965).
155. See Nelson, The Master Plan and Subdivision Control, 16 ME. L. REV. 107,
107 (1964).
156. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 135.
157. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.05. Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 9-463.01.H, 11-806.0l.B (1977 & Supp. 1983) (authority vested in legislative body)
with OR. REV. STAT. § 92.044(2)(a) (1983) (authority vested in planning commission
with right of appeal to the legislative body). The authority of a city government to
control subdivision development generally extends beyond municipal boundaries and
into the unincorporated areas of the county. The most common extraterritorial reach is
three miles. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.04 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 278.340 (1981). Other jurisdictions extend extraterritorial power to six miles. See,
e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 92.042 (1983). Still others extend extraterritorial powers on the
basis of the size of the city. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-20-5.A (1978); TEX. STAT.
ANN. art. 970a, 3A(l)-(5) (Vernon 1963). Extraterritorial power is significant because
it provides cities with control over areas that they eventually may annex. See 5 N.
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 156.03. Extraterritorial authority, however, may place the
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a. Defining a Subdivision
Subdivision controls are triggered, not surprisingly, when a devel-
oper subdivides or proposes to subdivide land. Subdivision is the pro-
cess of dividing a tract of land into a number of lots, parcels, sub-tracts
or other similar units. 15 8 Some state laws define subdivision to include
division into two or more parts,159 while others require three, four, or
even five parts to initiate the approval process. 60 Not all subdivisions
fall within the purview of control laws. Generally, local governments
limit subdivision controls to divisions for the purpose of immediate or
future sale or building development, and, even further, to divisions for
residential use.'61 Several states have adopted broader definitions that
encompass the leasing of subdivided lands, and the development of
condominiums and cooperative apartments.
162
Some states except certain subdivisions from control laws if they re-
sult in large tracts or are used for certain designated purposes such as
agriculture or commercial development. 163 Exceptions also may exist
for conveyances resulting from testamentary dispositions, 164 financing
agreements, 165 transfers of mineral interests,166 and boundary line ad-
city in conflict with the county government that also regulates subdivision development.
A scheme then must be provided to work out such conflicts. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra
note 5, § 23.06. Additionally, an overlap of authority may exist between or among city
governments. Often the state allows the city with the greatest population to control the
subdivision. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-20-5.B (1978).
158. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 9.5. The use of terms other than "lot" is
important because the term "lot" may be given a restrictive meaning, allowing other
subdivisions to evade the effect of the law. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.02.
159. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.02 (1977) (law applies to division
into two or more lots if a new road will be created); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-20-1 (1983)
(law applies to division into two or more lots if done for one of five listed purposes).
160. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 278.320 (1981) (five or more lots); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 92.010(12) (1983) (four or more lots); Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-501(iii) (1977) (three or
more lots). Montana has an interesting provision defining subdivision to include a divi-
sion of land into one or more parcels of less than 20 acres. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-103(15) (1983).
161. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 50-1301.3 (1980).
162. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-103(15) (1983) (including any conveyance
for purposes including condominiums, camping, and mobile homes).
163. See, eg., Wyo. STAT. § 18-5-303 (1977).
164. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.040(3) (1983).
165. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(2) (1983).
166. Id. § 76-3-201(3).
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justments. 167 State law and local ordinances may make partial excep-
tions by subjecting minor subdivisions to expedited approval and to
less stringent requirements than are imposed on other subdivisions. 168
b. Stages in the Approval Process
Although most state statutes outline a two-step process for subdivi-
sion approval, 169 many local governments include an additional pre-
liminary step. When a developer proposes to subdivide land, local
governments may require him to give notice to the local planning com-
mission for the purpose of conducting a preapplication conference.170
In that conference the planning commission will familiarize the devel-
oper with local regulations, and the developer will provide the commis-
sion with a basic idea of the proposed development project. The
planning commission and the developer can work out obvious
problems at this informal stage in the approval process.
The first formal stage in subdivision approval is the submission of a
preliminary plat. State law and local ordinances require that the devel-
oper submit a drawing of the proposed development that conforms to a
variety of mapping and survey requirements.1 71 The developer must
include necessary improvements on the plat and must indicate which
improvements he will dedicate to public use. 172 The planning commis-
sion and its staff, if it exists, review the plat and refer it to several state
167. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.02.C.1 (1977).
168. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-505 (1983) (five or fewer parcels); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 278.461-.462 (1981) (four or fewer lots); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-26
(1983) (10 or fewer lots). Provisions for small subdivisions are important, but care must
be taken so that the provisions are not used to avoid the more stringent requirements
applied to larger subdivisions. Many statutes note that exceptions to the subdivision
control laws do not apply if the exception is used to evade the law. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 30-28-101(10)(c) (1982).
169. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.11; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9-463.0l.C.I-.2 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-133(3) (1973 & Supp. 1982).
Other states allow the local government to determine the process for subdivision ap-
proval. See IDAHO CODE § 67-6513 (1980).
170. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 9.4. Preapplication is largely a creation of
the local government. See TETON COUNTY, WYO., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND IM-
PLEMENTATION PROGRAM ch. 11, §§ 2, 3 (1980) (providing for an informal conference
before submission of a preliminary plat).
171. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 50-1303, -1304 (1980).
172. See, e.g., PHOENIX SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE art. 11, §§ 32-22, -23 (requiring
submission of "Proposed Conditions Data," which include designation of all land that
the developer will dedicate or reserve, and "Proposed Utility Methods").
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and local agencies.' 73 These agencies may require the developer to ob-
tain a number of certificates regarding the adequacy of the proposed
development's infrastructure.' 74 The planning commission or local
governing body then may approve, disapprove, or conditionally ap-
prove the preliminary plat after a properly noticed hearing. 175 State
statutes usually require that reasons for disapproval be noted on the
record. 176 Additionally, the final decision, whether made by the plan-
ning commission or local governing body, is subject to judicial re-
view. 177  At this stage, the planning commission or local governing
body imposes subdivision requirements, and conditions final approval
upon either completion of the improvements or the developer's posting
of a surety bond or other security to guarantee completion after final
approval.
Following preliminary plat approval, the developer generally has one
year within which to submit a final plat for approval. ' The final plat
must conform substantially to the preliminary plat and any conditions
that the planning commission or local governing body imposed on the
developer.179 Most often, the developer need only comply with regula-
tions and ordinances that were in effect at the time of preliminary ap-
173. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-136(1) (1973) (requiring the Board of
County Commissioners to submit a preliminary plat for review by appropriate school
districts; counties and municipalities within two miles of the proposed development;
utility, local improvement, and special service districts; the Colorado State Forest Ser-
vice as applicable; as well as five other agencies when applicable).
174. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.011 (1983) (requiring a certificate of
assured water supply when the proposed subdivision is in a groundwater active manage-
ment area).
175. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.12. Some statutes clearly specify a
hearing on the preliminary plat, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.090 (1983), while
others do not. See ALASKA STAT. § 40.15.100 (1971), repealed by § 1, ch. 118 S.L.A.
(1972). Due process may require notice and an opportunity to be heard even when not
required by statute. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 588, 507
P.2d 23, 30 (1973).
176. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.15; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-
806.01.D (1983) (mandating a decision on the record of the Board of County Supervi-
sors when a plat is approved or refused).
177. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.180 (1983) (permitting any city,
town, or county property owner who is injured by a decision approving or disapproving
a subdivision plat to bring an action).
178. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.360(1) (1981) (permitting, however, a one
year extension); id. § 278.360(3).
179. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-61 l(1)(a) (1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 92.040 (1983).
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proval,' s° but a few states require that the developer's final plat must
comply with all laws in effect at the time that the final plat is ap-
proved.1"' Thus, the developer in the latter group of states does not
obtain any vested right to develop after preliminary plat approval.
18 2
If the final plat is approved, the developer may record the plat and he
then is legally entitled to convey property in the subdivision.
Several states set time limits within which the local government
180. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-610(2) (1983) (after tentative approval the
government can impose no new requirements on the developer); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 92.040 (1983) (the final plat must be accepted if it conforms to preliminary plat);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.170 (1983) (the final plat must comply with all regula-
tions in effect at time of preliminary plat approval). Washington also provides that after
final approval the subdivision will be protected for a period of five years from changes in
statutes, ordinances, and regulations unless the subdivision poses a serious threat to
public health and safety. Id.
181. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.380 (1981) (the final plat must comply with
regulations in effect at the time of final approval).
182. Unless otherwise provided, the general rule appears to be that the local govern-
ment can force the developer to comply with changes in statutes, ordinances, or regula-
tions that occur after preliminary approval. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.23.
Many statutes and local ordinances do not specify clearly the effect of preliminary plat
approval. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 152, at 95. Thus, the courts usually require
that the developer has made a substantial investment in the project or has begun con-
struction before the courts will find a vested right to develop free from the effects of
changed laws. See Reps & Smith, supra note 151, at 412-13. Vesting is a legal conclu-
sion based on a balancing of public and private interests. Presumably, one purpose of a
preliminary plat is to inform the developer of what he must do and pay to gain govern-
ment approval. The developer makes predictions concerning his expected profit margin
on the basis of the requirements imposed during preliminary approval. On the other
hand, the government has an interest in promoting the public health and safety and
should not permit a subdivision project that will endanger the public. A balancing of
these interests should permit the government to impose new conditions on the developer
after preliminary approval so long as substantial reliance in the form of a monetary
investment has not occurred. Even after vesting, however, the government can impose
new conditions if required by the public health and safety, but then the government
should compensate the developer for any loss.
In Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court fashioned one of the most prodevelopment vesting rules when the court
held that a developer acquired a vested right if: 1) He filed a substantially conforming
development plan prior to a change in the law; 2) application of the change is not neces-
sary to protect public health and safety; and 3) the change was not pending when the
developer filed his plan. The right to develop vests without any substantial investment
or initiation of construction by the developer. If the plan will jeopardize public health
and safety, however, the right does not vest. It is this last aspect of the Utah test that is
troublesome because it suggests that a local government can deny a developer the right
to develop without compensation even though he has incurred significant expenses. See
Grow & Johnson, Vested Rights and Land Planning Process, 9 UTAH PLANNER, Nov.
1983, at 3.
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must act on preliminary and final plats; if the local government takes
no action, the plat is deemed approved."8 3 Approval of the preliminary
or final plat does not constitute an acceptance by the local government
of dedicated improvements.184 That acceptance occurs when the local
government makes a formal decision to accept the dedication. At this
time the local government becomes responsible for maintaining the
improvements.185
c. Enforcement Methods
Subdivision controls are enforced by several methods. The devel-
oper or his agent will be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine
or a jail term, or both, for each lot that they convey in violation of the
law. 86 In addition, the local government can enjoin transfers. 1 7 The
local government may remove subdivision plats that are recorded ille-
gally from the records' 88 and may sanction the local recorder for re-
cording an unapproved subdivision. 89 In some jurisdictions, a
purchaser of a lot or home in an unapproved subdivision may rescind
the sale or seek damages from the seller.' 90 The government may re-
fuse to issue building permits or certificates of occupancy and even may
abate illegal structures unless the home or lot purchaser is a bona fide
purchaser without notice of the subdivision's illegal status.' 91 Simi-
larly, the government may refuse to extend utilities to the illegal
subdivision.' 92
183. See, eg., NEv. REV. STAT. § 278.350 (1981). Most statutes provide that a plat
will be "deemed" approved. It is doubtful, however, that a court will permit a subdivi-
sion project to proceed if it will seriously jeopardize public health and safety.
184. See R. YEARWOOD, supra note 1, at 92.
185. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 140.
186. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-26-14 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-511 (1977).
187. Id. Several states permit the developer to sell lots after preliminary approval,
but the buyer must be given notice that final approval has not been received and the
purchase price may have to be escrowed pending final approval. See NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 278.353 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.205 (1983).
188. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.190 (1983) (permitting an action by
the prosecuting attorney to remove an unapproved plat from the records).
189. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-21-8 (1977).
190. See, eg., OR. REV. STAT. § 92.018 (1983).
191. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-23-216.5 (1982). See also D. MANDELCER,
supra note 1, § 9.8 (discussing the legality of these measures).
192. See, eg., TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 974a, § 8 (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1982). Occa-
sionally, subdividers attempt to avoid subdivision requirements by transferring land by
a metes and bounds description rather than by reference to a subdivision plat. Thus,
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4. Subdivision Improvement Requirements and Guarantees
a. Required Improvements
Although a developer may obtain approval of a final plat if all subdi-
vision improvements are completed, normally the local government ac-
cepts a surety bond or other security to guarantee completion of the
improvements after final approval. Improvements that the local gov-
ernment requires the developer to construct and install include roads,
drainage facilities, water and sewage systems, landscaping, utilities, fire
protection equipment, and street signs. The number and types of sub-
division improvements that a local government can require a developer
to complete are limited only by the imaginations of the members of the
planning commission and the local governing body.' 93 Most recently,
local governments have required developers to undertake off-site im-
provements' 94 and, when necessary, to obtain easements across adjoin-
many states now prohibit transfer by a metes and bounds description if the subdivision
has not been approved. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-20-14 (1978).
193. See 7 P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 45.04[8]. In order to constrain local govern-
ment action and prevent an unconstitutional delegation of power, standards should exist
for determining what improvements the local government can require. See 4 R. AN-
DERSON, supra note 5, § 23.08. Occasionally, state statutes specify the improvements
that local governments can require. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-501 (1983)
(lists numerous types of requirements that local government may require). In other
instances, the state grants broad authority to the local government. See, e.g., NEV.
REV. STAT. § 278.462.2 (1983) (local government may require such improvements as
are "reasonably necessary" for small subdivisions). Most often the local government
must infer the list of permissible improvements from the purposes of the state statute.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-19-6.B(4) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.110
(1983).
Local ordinances also vary in the number and degree of specificity regarding im-
provements. Compare ASPEN, COLO., CODE § 20-16(a) (Supp. 15 & 11) (listing 16 re-
quired improvements) with THORNTON, COLO., CODE §§ 62-13.B, .C (1983) (which
appears to limit required improvements to street improvements, water and sewer mains,
and fire hydrants). Because state law and the local ordinance must authorize any given
improvement, a "catch-all" provision may be included in the law. See SUMMIT
COUNTY, UTAH, DEVELOPMENT CODE ch. 13.5(12) (1982) (authorizing the planning
commission to require any other reasonable improvement). Such a provision may be
constitutionally defective for failing to give a developer adequate notice of what is re-
quired of him and for failing to constrain government action. A developer may not
challenge the government's action, however, because he has an incentive to comply if he
wants to avoid delays and possible future harassment by the government. See D.
HAGMAN, supra note 1, § 138.
194. See, e.g., 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.36. The term "off-site improve-
ment" is used in two different ways: off the subdivision site or off the lots in the subdivi-
sion. For purposes of this Article, off-site improvements refer to those improvements
not within the boundaries of the subdivision. See id. Note, supra note 17, at 276-77.
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ing land.' 95 The developer must design improvements according to
government standards and specifications, and these will not be ac-
cepted unless approved by a local engineer.196 Some jurisdictions per-
mit variances from required improvements when the requirements will
result in extreme hardship to the developer and the variance will not
threaten the public interest. 197
b. Security Methods
Acceptable security methods vary by jurisdiction with the most com-
mon requirement being a corporate surety bond "or other adequate
security." '98 Because the subdivision is subject to approval by a
number of agencies, the developer may be required to post more than
one bond. 19 9 Most jurisdictions, however, permit a consolidated bond
for all of the required improvements. The usual term of the bond or
security agreement is two years,"°° meaning that the developer has two
years within which to complete the improvements. If, after two years,
the developer fails to complete the improvements, the local government
may declare a default unless the parties extend the term of the bond or
agreement.2z ' Other adequate security includes cash or property es-
Several local governments have adopted provisions to reimburse the developer for off-
site improvements that others will use or for excess capacity improvements, such as a
water main. See PROVO, UTAH, SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS § 15.18.040 (1978).
195. See, ag., SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, DEVELOPMENT CODE ch. 13.5(3) (1982)
(requiring easements for local public utilities).
196. See, e.g., TETON COUNTY, WYO., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION PROGRAM ch. IV, § 3 (1980) (requiring a signed statement by the county engineer
or other authorized individual that improvements meet local standards).
197. See, e.g., SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, DEVELOPMENT CODE ch. 13.5(13) (1982)
(permitting variances where, because of topographical or other "extreme physical con-
ditions," unnecessary hardship would result). See also D. MANDELKER, supra note 1,
§ 9.10. Although variances are necessary to deal with unforeseen difficulties, local gov-
ernments must subject them to standards and grant them only in extreme circum-
stances. See R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra note 1, at 30.
198. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.01.C.8 (1983) (requiring the posting
of "performance bonds, assurances or such other security as may be appropriate").
Similarly, language in local ordinances may be vague. See WASATCH COUNTY, UTAH,
DEVELOPMENT CODE 91 (requiring a "bond or other financial assurance satisfactory to
the Board of County Commissioners").
199. See, eg., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 92.090(4)(b), (5)(b) (1983) (requiring a bond for
water improvement and a bond for sewerage improvement). See also S. SEIDEL, supra
note 1, at 21 (Maryland developer required to obtain four bonds).
200. See, e.g., WASATCH COUNTY, UTAH, DEVELOPMENT CODE 92.
201. Id.
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crows, letters of credit, or commitments of funds by lenders.2 °2 The
developer also may use a sequential approval process by which the de-
veloper can record only those portions of the development for which
improvements are completed on a final plat.2" 3 Thus, the developer
does not, in fact, provide security except to the extent that the local
government will not approve the balance of the subdivision if the devel-
oper does not complete the improvements.
c. The Amount of Security
The local government bases the amount of the bond or other security
on a cost estimate of the required improvements and may predicate
that figure on the developer's estimates after review by the planning
authority. 2" Some jurisdictions provide for a margin of error by re-
quiring that the bond or security be equal to one hundred ten or one
hundred twenty percent of the projected cost of improvements.2 °5 As
the developer completes improvements, the amount of the bond or se-
curity may be reduced, usually to a minimum of ten percent of the
security.206 Thus, the developer avoids the cost of tying up large sums
of money and the local government retains some security in case of an
ultimate default.
d. Maintenance Bonds and Other Fees
The local government also may require a maintenance bond to en-
sure that the improvements are sound and to pay for any maintenance
costs for a limited time after the local government accepts the improve-
ments.2 °7 Most governments require the developer to pay fees to offset
202. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-101(11) (1973) (listing variety of assur-
ance methods); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-19-6.C (1978) (listing three methods to assure
completion of improvements including installation by the government and an assess-
ment of lots). A local government may limit the acceptable security, possibly indicating
a past bad experience with other forms. See THORNTON, COLO., CODE § 62-13.A
(1983) (requiring a surety bond or sequential approval); ASPEN, COLO., CODE § 20-
16(c)(1) (Supp. 11) (requiring cash escrow, a sight draft, or letter of commitment).
203. See THORNTON, COLO., CODE § 62-13.A (1983); S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at
136
204. See, e.g., WASATCH COUNTY, UTAH, DEVELOPMENT CODE 92 (bond amount
determined by the Board of County Commissioners based on the developer's estimated
cost of construction).
205. Id. (110%); SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, DEVELOPMENT CODE ch. 13.4(7)(3)
(1982) (120%).
206. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-137(1) (1973).
207. See Freilich & Levi, Model Regulations for the Control of Land Subdivision, 36
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the cost of inspecting improvements during construction and installa-
tion of the improvements and prior to acceptance.2 °8 After the devel-
oper notifies the government that improvements are complete, the
improvements will be inspected and, if acceptable to the local govern-
ment, the security will be released within a few days.209
e. Government Supervision and Acceptance of Improvements
Regardless of the form chosen to secure completion of subdivision
improvements, the local government must perform a supervisory func-
tion to assure itself that the developer has constructed and completed
the improvements in compliance with applicable regulations and speci-
fications. 2 '0 This supervisory function usually constitutes a three-step
process that includes inspection, approval, and acceptance of the
improvements.21'
When the developer completes or substantially completes all or part
of the required improvements, he may notify the municipal engineer
and request an inspection. 212 The engineer then must perform a site
inspection and prepare a detailed report.213 Ordinarily, the inspection
must be made within a specified time after a request is submitted.21 4
The engineer's report indicates whether the improvements are ap-
proved, partially approved, or rejected and can be used to serve several
Mo. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1973). As an alternative to a bond, the local government may
retain a percentage of the security after completion of improvements to guard against
defects in workmanship. See SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, DEVELOPMENT CODE ch.
13.4(7)(3) (1982) (retaining 10% of the land or escrow as security).
208. See SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, DEVELOPMENT CODE ch. 13.10 (1982) (author-
izing reasonable fees). Fees must bear a reasonable relationship to the cost of adminis-
tration and inspection. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 23.45.
209. See, eg., TETON COUNTY, WYO., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION PROGRAM ch. IV, § 4 (1980) (requiring release of security within seven days of
inspection if improvements meet standards).
210. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
211. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 11.
212. E.g., Township of Barnegat v. DCA of N.J., Inc., 181 N.J. Super. 394, 397, 437
A.2d 909, 910 (App. Div. 1981); Mertz v. Lakatos, 33 Pa. Commw. 230, 233-34, 381
A.2d 497, 499 (1978).
213. The municipality ordinarily will charge an inspection fee of 1% to 2% of the
estimated value of the improvements.
214. E.g., Township of Barnegat v. DCA of N.J., Inc., 181 N.J. Super. 394, 397, 437
A.2d 909, 910 (App. Div. 1981) (inspection and report must be made within 65 days);
Mertz v. Lakatos, 33 Pa. Commw. 230, 236, 381 A.2d 497, 499 (1978) (inspection and
report must be made within 40 days).
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purposes. If the engineer rejects any of the improvements, the report
sets out the reasons for rejection and the steps necessary to gain ap-
proval. Additionally, the report serves to notify the surety, lender, or
escrow agent that a portion of the improvements have been accepted,
thus permitting the partial release of the bond or escrowed funds, or
the disbursement of set-aside funds.215 Finally, the engineer forwards a
copy of the report to the municipal agency charged with accepting ded-
ication of the completed improvements. Generally, neither the ap-
proval itself nor the release or partial release of security constitutes an
acceptance of dedication.2" 6 A complete failure to approve or reject in
some cases, however, may result in automatic approval.
2 17
Acceptance of dedication constitutes the final step in the supervisory
process and results in the transfer of title from the developer to the
local governmental unit.21 8 Ordinarily, acceptance is accomplished by
ordinance, but it also may result from the municipality's exercise of
dominion and control over the improvements. 219 State law may re-
quire the municipality to accept each part of the improvements as they
are completed.220 Certainly it is likely that if the improvements are
unrelated or easily separable, the municipality will be unable to refuse a
requested partial acceptance.2 2 1
The significance of the acceptance of dedication is that it results in
the transfer of ownership of the improvements. After the date of ac-
ceptance, the burden of maintaining and repairing the improvements
falls upon the municipality.
C. The Securing Process
One of the most significant areas in which the local government can
exercise flexibility in the subdivision development process is in securing
215. See infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
216. E.g., Home Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Evesham, 182
N.J. Super. 357, 360, 440 A.2d 1361, 1363 (App. Div. 1981).
217. E.g., Mertz v. Lakatos, 33 Pa. Commw. 230, 236, 381 A.2d 497, 500 (1978).
218. The municipality must exercise a second type of "inspection" right to ensure
that it is receiving clear title to all dedicated improvements. See B. ROGAL, supra note
12, at 11.
219. Home Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Evesham, 182 N.J.
Super. 357, 360, 440 A.2d 1361, 1363 (App. Div. 1981).
220. See, e.g., County of Kern v. Edgemont Dev. Corp., 222 Cal. App. 2d 874, 877,
35 Cal. Rptr. 629, 631 (1963) (specifying four requirements for partial acceptance).
221. See id. (arbitrary refusal of request for partial acceptance may be improper).
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the completion of subdivision improvements. Although most state en-
abling acts permit the use of a variety of security devices, little is
known about how, why, or under what circumstances the various de-
vices are chosen to secure improvements in specific developments.
Nevertheless, each form of security presents its own particular set of
advantages and disadvantages that the local government should con-
sider in light of the overall purposes of subdivision regulation.
1. Surety Bond
The corporate surety bond undoubtedly is the most widely permitted
security device under existing law for assuring the completion of re-
quired subdivision improvements.222 On its face, the bond is a decep-
tively simple instrument. It usually includes a joint and several
promise by the developer, as principal, and the surety company, as ob-
ligor, to pay a specified penal sum to the local government unit, as
obligee.223 The bond then provides that if the developer performs all of
the obligations of his underlying agreement with the obligee,224 the
bond shall become null and void.225
At the outset, it is important to note that surety bonds differ from
insurance in several respects.226 Moreover, these differences may have
far reaching implications with respect to the developer's ability to ob-
tain a bond as well as to the obligee's ability to collect on the bond in
the event of a default.
Unlike insurance, a surety bond is always a three-party instru-
ment.227 Thus, the developer is not insuring himself in case he cannot
complete the specified improvements. Rather, he has paid a fee to a
corporate surety in consideration for the surety's promise to guarantee
the completion of the improvements for the benefit of the obligee.228
The determination of the amount of the fee, or premium, is a func-
222. S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 136 (1978) (citing CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY
RESEARCH, SURVEY OF MUNICIPALITIES (1976)).
223. Gorton, Surety Bonds, in HANDBOOK OF CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND
ORGANIZATION 86 (J. Frein ed. 1980).
224. The developer's agreement with the municipality to complete required im-
provements is included in the bond either by express reference or by implication.
225. Gorton, supra note 223, at 86.
226. W. CONNERS, CALIFORNIA SURETY AND FIDELITY BOND PRACTICE § 1.4
(1969).
227. Id.
228. Gorton, supra note 223, at 83.
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tion of another important difference between insurance and suretyship.
An insurance company underwrites many thousands of policies. It
knows to a statistical certainty that it will be called upon to pay off on a
certain percentage of these policies, and it, therefore, can spread its risk
of loss over its entire portfolio. Accordingly, the premium charged for
insurance tends to reflect the average risk of loss rather than the spe-
cific risk associated with the single insured.229
In contrast, the surety underwrites relatively few bonds. To the ex-
tent possible, and consistent with business realities, he hopes that he
never will be called upon to pay any claims against his bonds.230 Thus,
the surety must assure himself that the developer has both the techni-
cal and the financial capacity to perform his obligations to the local
governmental unit. 231 Accordingly, the bond premium is a function of
the risk of loss with respect to each individual developer and each par-
ticular project.232
Before he can even begin to determine the amount of the premium,
the surety first must qualify the developer.233 The qualifying process
entails a two-part analysis similar to what a lender makes before ap-
proving a loan. The first part includes an assessment of the developer's
financial condition, focusing primarily on his net quick worth.23' The
second part of the analysis attempts to judge the developer's experience
or track record in the industry.23 5 The surety will undertake to guar-
antee performance only if he is satisfied with respect to both parts of
the qualifying procedure. Because of heavy losses sustained in the re-
cent past, corporate sureties increasingly have become reluctant to un-
derwrite bonds guaranteeing subdivision improvements. As a result,
only the largest, most credit-worthy developers can obtain surety
bonds.2 36
Assuming that the surety is willing to bond a particular project, he
229. W. CONNERS, supra note 226, § 1.4.
230. See id.
231. See Gorton, supra note 223, at 83, 87.
232. See id. at 83, 91; W. CONNERS, supra note 226, § 1.4.
233. Gorton, supra note 223, at 87.
234. In simple terms, net quick worth is the difference between the developer's as-
sets that are immediately convertible to cash and his liabilities that are due within one
year. For a more detailed explanation of net quick worth, see id at 89-90.
235. Id. at 87.
236. R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-15; M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 72, at
9.11; B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 1, 3 (1974); S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 135.
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may demand a variety of other inducements in addition to his pre-
mium. These inducements usually take the form of collateral and
promises by various individuals, companies, and lenders to indemnify
the surety in the event that he is required to pay on the bond. It is
virtually, universally required that the developer himself indemnify the
surety.2 37 If the developer is a partnership or corporation, all general
partners or major shareholders and their spouses also may be required
to indemnify the surety.238 In addition, the development lender occa-
sionally may be asked either to lend the collateral funds or to issue its
letter of credit securing the bonding company.239
As one may expect, the surety bond, when available at all, may be
prohibitively expensive. Even when the cost is within acceptable lim-
its, the bond imposes an inordinately heavy cost burden on the pro-
ject,2'" especially when the lender is asked to lend additional funds or
to provide a letter of credit for the benefit of the surety. The additional
security will result in higher costs to the developer, which he must pay
in addition to the bond premium.24' When the lender is willing to ex-
tend the additional security, it legitimately may be asked why that se-
curity cannot be directed to the benefit of the local governmental unit
rather than to the surety, thus eliminating the bond and saving the cost
of the premium.242
In the event of the developer's default, the municipality will call
upon the surety to perform his obligation under the bond. Depending
upon the language of the bond, the surety might have a number of
237. See Gorton, supra note 223, at 90.
238. Id
239. R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-15.
240. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 6. When the developer can obtain surety
bonds only at an exorbitant cost, the municipality's insistence upon their use may effec-
tively eliminate the small developer from the development process. Id. at 3. See also
Gorton, supra note 223, at 84 (surety companies to assume the burden of weeding out
unworthy and irresponsible bidders). In a broader sense, the cost of the surety bond
constitutes part of the overall cost of subdivision regulation. While the municipality has
an obvious interest in securing the completion of quality subdivision improvements, the
added cost of regulation, nevertheless, may have the effect of excluding those in low to
moderate income brackets from the housing market. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at
125. Some commentators, however, argue that strict bonding requirements should be
used as a direct tool to upgrade the quality of land planning and development. McPher-
son, supra note 32, at 476-77; Yearwood, Performance Bonding for Subdivision Improve-
ments, 46 J. URB. L. 67, 68 (1968).
241. R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-15.
242. Id.; S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 135.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/2
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
options."' If the project is close to completion, the surety might ad-
vance necessary funds directly to the defaulting developer. 2" Sureties
rarely invoke this option because the funds advanced do not directly
reduce the stated bond amount or the surety's potential liability on the
bond.2 4 Nevertheless, this may reduce the surety's ultimate liability to
the extent that the developer actually uses the funds to complete the
required improvements. Thus, when the surety has had a long-stand-
ing relationship with the developer and the default is not the result of
bad faith,24 6 the surety may find it in his best interest to finance the
defaulting developer.24 7
As a second option, the surety either may hire another contractor or
permit the defaulting developer to hire another contractor to complete
the work.24 This option has the advantage of permitting the surety to
maintain direct control over the project and, in addition, places the
work in the hands of a new contractor that is in a stronger financial
condition and that may be bonded as well. Thus, while hiring a new
contractor often results in some loss to the surety, the risk of a substan-
tial or total loss is spread to at least two additional parties-the new
contractor and his surety.24 9
243. In general, suretyship contracts should be construed according to ordinary
contract principles rather than construed strictly against the surety as in the case of an
insurance contract. W. CONNERS, supra note 226, § 1.5.
244. Id. § 12.8.
245. Id. § 12.9; Gorton, supra note 223, at 91.
246. Although some defaults result from theft or diversion of progress payments,
the major factors that contribute to developer failures are cost overruns, unanticipated
delays attributable to poor weather conditions, labor or material shortages, and poor
sales. See Gorton, supra note 223, at 85. See also R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 6-5 to 6-7
(discussing signs indicating impending default).
247. Financing the defaulting developer may be favorable to the surety if the default
is the result of a temporary problem, the project is nearly complete, the developer prob-
ably can work through the situation, and penalties may be saved. W. CONNORS, supra
note 226, § 12.10.
248. Id. § 12.6.
249. The loss-spreading benefit of hiring a new contractor to complete required im-
provements depends, of course, on the surety's success in finding a bonded contractor
that is willing to assume all of the outstanding obligations. Id With respect to the
municipality that is the obligee, however, the surety loses his position as surety when he
undertakes to complete improvements. Id. The municipality will hold the surety liable
for all of the principal's obligations without regard to the face amount of the bond. Id
Thus, before undertaking the completion of any job, the surety always must attempt to
reach an agreement with the municipality concerning the exact nature and extent of the
defaulting principal's outstanding obligations. See id.
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Both of the surety's options detailed above suffer from one common
and significant deficiency. If the surety chooses to undertake the actual
completion of the improvements, either by financing the developer or
by hiring a new contractor, he risks becoming liable as a principal for
completion of the required improvements. Thus, the municipality may
hold the surety to full performance of the defaulted developer's out-
standing obligations without regard to the penal sum of the bond."'
To eliminate the potential risk of liability beyond the face amount of
the bond, the surety may attempt to induce the local governmental unit
to complete the improvements for a fixed amount by way of a settle-
ment agreement.251 Under such an agreement, the municipality and
the surety estimate the amount necessary to complete the improve-
ments, and the surety pays that amount in exchange for a release of all
further liability.2 2 While the settlement agreement also may release
the developer, especially when it is intended to do so and when the
developer knows of and consents to the settlement negotiations,253 the
surety must be careful to avoid releasing any of the developer's rights
or defenses. Unless the surety clearly establishes liability, the surety
will not be entitled to reimbursement from the developer under the
indemnity agreement.254
Primarily because of the substantial risk of excess liability that may
250. Caron v. Andrew, 133 Cal. App. 2d 402, 410-11, 284 P.2d 544, 549-50 (1955)
(surety remained responsible for performance of its assumed obligation when the surety
assumed contractor's obligations); Copeland Sand & Gravel v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 40 Or. App. 832, 836, 596 P.2d 623, 625 (1979) (surety liable for damages flowing
from its breach where it under took to complete the prinepal's obligations), rev'd, 288
Or. 325, 607 P.2d 718 (1980).
251. See W. CONNERS, supra note 226, § 12.7. Ordinarily, the municipality uses the
settlement funds to hire its own contractor to complete the improvements. See id. In
some circumstances, however, the municipality may be able to utilize its own mainte-
nance or construction crews.
252. See M. Zerman Realty & Bldg. Corp. v. Borough of Westwood, 64 N.J. 590,
591-92, 319 A.2d 441, 441-42 (1974).
253. See id. In M. Zerman Realty, the surety entered into a settlement agreement
with the borough with the knowledge and consent of the principal. Later, the principal
sought to avoid his'own discharge in order to attempt to recover a portion of the
amount paid by the surety that allegedly was in excess of the amount necessary to com-
plete the improvements. Id. at 591, 319 A.2d at 442.
254. The surety need not submit to suit in all cases in order to protect his right to
reimbursement by the principal. When the surety makes payment without submitting
to suit, however, the courts will allow reimbursement only when the surety clearly can
establish liability and prove that the suit would have been a mere formality. Ragghianti
v. Sherwin, 196 Cal. App. 2d 345, 351, 16 Cal. Rptr. 583, 587 (1961).
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result if the surety undertakes to complete the improvements for the
defaulting developer, sureties, in most instances, will elect to rest on
the bond and prepare to pay damages up to the stated amount.2 55 Un-
fortunately, this election generates a tremendous amount of
litigation.256
The local governmental unit generally will succeed in its suit against
the surety if it can establish five elements: 1) it had authority to exact
improvements from the developer;257 2) the developer agreed to com-
plete the improvements; 58 3) the local government had authority to
require the developer to secure a bond;2 59 4) the developer failed to
255. W. CONNERS, supra note 226, § 3.8. Although denoted as a penalty, courts
ordinarily hold that the face amount of the bond is the limit of the surety's liability
rather than a forfeiture amount. Id. § 2.3. See, ag., Board of Supervisors v. Ecology
One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 36, 245 S.E.2d 425, 430 (1978) (nothing in the bond, statute, or
ordinance indicated an intent to create a forfeiture bond). See also City of Rye v. Public
Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 473, 315 N.E.2d 458, 459, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393
(1974) (without statutory authority, agreement providing for forfeiture is
unenforceable).
256. In addition to protecting his right of reimbursement, see supra note 254, the
surety also will be inclined to litigate the issue of damages. See General Ins. Co. of Am.
v. City of Colorado Springs, 638 P.2d 752, 759 (Colo. 1981).
257. E.g., Bella Vista Ranches, Inc. v. City of Sierra Vista, 126 Ariz. 142, 143, 613
P.2d 302, 303 (Ariz. App. 1980) (city lacked authority to regulate subdivisions in ab-
sence of an enabling statute); Anderson v. Pima County, 27 Ariz. App. 786, 788, 558
P.2d 981, 983 (1976) (in absence of an enabling statute, county lacked authority to
require security for completion of improvements); Wood Bros. Homes v. City of Colo-
rado Springs, 193 Colo. 543, 547-48, 568 P.2d 487, 490-91 (1977) (requirement that the
developer bear the entire cost of an off-site improvement exceeded the authority granted
by ordinance); Hylton Enters. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 441, 258 S.E.2d
577, 581 (1979) (neither statute nor ordinance granted the county express or implied
authority to require improvements to public highways abutting subdivision).
258. E.g., Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. County of Sacramento, 179 Cal. App. 2d
319, 322, 3 Cal. Rptr. 607, 608 (1960) (county's acceptance of subdivision map and
bond created a contract to complete improvements required by statute); Indian River
County v. Vero Beach Dev. Inc., 201 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (agree-
ment to make improvements includes implied agreement to comply with specifications
required in subdivision regulations); Township of Hampden v. Termy, 32 Pa. Commw.
301, 307-08, 379 A.2d 635, 638 (1977) (agreement to include improvements as a condi-
tion of subdivision approval implies agreement to complete improvements or to reim-
burse township for costs of completion).
259. E.g., Pacific County v. Sherwood Pac., Inc., 17 Wash. App. 790, 795, 567 P.2d
642, 647 (1977) (authority to require completion bond necessarily implied from statu-
tory powers expressly granted to county). See Genesee County Bd. of Road Comm'rs v.
North Am. Dev. Co., 369 Mich. 229, 235-36, 119 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1963) (when devel-
oper voluntarily agreed to make nonrequired off-site improvements in exchange for the
Board's assurances to the FHA, the bond securing the developer's performance was
enforceable on contract theory). But see Anderson v. Pima County, 27 Ariz. App. 786,
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complete the improvements; 260 and 5) the local government conse-
quently was damaged in a reasonably ascertainable amount.261
The surety may escape all or part of its liability by successfully at-
tacking any one of the five essential elements. In addition, the surety
may interpose a number of defenses, either directly or on behalf of the
developer. The various defenses that sureties assert include, among
others: 1) the cause of action has not yet accrued;2 62 2) the limitation
period has expired;263 3) the government's action is barred for want of
prosecution;2 4 4) the surety is discharged because of modification of
the underlying agreement;2 65 5) the local government fails to perform a
788, 558 P.2d 981, 983 (1976) (county lacked authority to require bonds or other secur-
ity in absence of an enabling act).
260. Generally, completion includes the municipality's approval and acceptance of
dedication. When no building activity has begun, however, the courts may bar the mu-
nicipality from collecting on the bond. Town of New Windsor v. Inbro Dev. Corp., 112
Misc. 2d 983, 984, 448 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); cf County of Yuba v.
Central Valley Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 109, 112, 97 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371-72 (1971)
(recovery on letter of credit barred when the developer commenced no activity). But cf
Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 38 (Colo. 1981) (court
permitted recovery on letter of credit even though the developer commenced no
activity).
261. When the purpose of the bond is to secure completion of required improve-
ments, the usual measure of damages is the cost of completion. General Ins. Co. of Am.
v. City of Colorado Springs, 638 P.2d 752, 758-59 (Colo. 1981); Board of Supervisors v.
Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 36-37, 245 S.E. 2d 425, 429-30 (1978); Pacific County v.
Sherwood Pac., Inc., 17 Wash. App. 790, 796, 567 P.2d 642, 648-49 (1977).
262. See City of Norman v. Liddell, 596 P.2d 879 (Okla. 1979). In Liddell, the
ordinance required the city to initiate a suit to recover for non-completion "prior to the
expiration of the bond." Id. at 881. The developer had agreed to complete all improve-
ments within two years, and the bond's expiration date was the last day of the two year
period. The court held, however, that the developer would not have been in breach
prior to the expiration of the full two year period, and, therefore, the cause of action
could not arise until that time had elapsed. Id. See also Sherwood Forest No. 2 Corp.
v. City of Norman, 632 P.2d 368, 369-70 (Okla. 1980) (construing same ordinance).
But see Board of Supervisors v. Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 34, 245 S.E.2d 425, 428
(1978) (county permitted to maintain action prior to the completion date when evidence
indicated that the developer had abandoned the contract).
263. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Mark C. Smith and Sons, Inc., 339 So. 2d 321,
322 (La. 1976) (applying a five year limitation period for actions on contract rather than
the shorter limitation period pertaining to "public works" contracts).
264. E.g., City of Los Angeles v. Gleneagle Dev. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 543, 564, 133
Cal. Rptr. 212, 225 (1976) (dismissing an action against the surety for want of
prosecution).
265. E.g., Pacific County v. Sherwood Pac., Inc., 17 Wash. App. 790, 800, 567 P.2d
642, 649-50 (1977) (modification of specifications and extension of time for performance
did not discharge surety when the bond secured completion "to the satisfaction of the
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condition precedent to the surety's obligation;2 66 6) the government
has accepted the improvements, either expressly,2 67 impliedly,26 8 or by
operation of law;2 69 and 7) the bond payment provision constitutes an
unenforceable penalty.
2 70
Use of the corporate surety bond to secure the completion of re-
quired subdivision improvements undoubtedly provides many advan-
tages over the two historic alternatives of either requiring no security at
all or requiring that the developer complete the improvements before
he can transfer title to any lots. Its functional utility, however, may
not be as great as once was thought. To the developer, it represents an
onerous and arguably unnecessary cost; to the lot or homebuyer, it re-
sults in an additional cost that must be financed and eventually paid
for; and to the local governmental unit, it may provide nothing more
than an illusory sense of security and a real source of litigation. Fortu-
nately, various other security devices are available that may, to some
extent, offset or minimize the disadvantages of the surety bond.
2. Cash Escrow
In its simplest form, the cash escrow consists of the developer's de-
County Road Engineer," within a specified time unless "extended at the option of the
County Road Engineer").
266. E.g., City of Medford v. Fellsmere Realty Co., 345 Mass. 477, 480-81, 187
N.E.2d 849, 852 (1963) (surety not liable when the city failed to perform condition
precedent to the developer's obligation).
267. See County of Kern v. Edgemont Dev. Corp., 222 Cal. App. 2d 874, 877, 35
Cal. Rptr. 629, 631 (1963) (developer obligated to maintain improvements after comple-
tion, inspection, and approval by the county when the developer failed to apply for
partial acceptance).
268. E.g., Anne Arundel County v. Lichtenberg, 263 Md. 398, 407, 283 A.2d 782,
787 (1971) (county's recordation of deeds does not waive the requirement of formal
written acceptance); Home Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Evesham,
182 N.J. Super. 357, 360, 440 A.2d 1361, 1363 (App. Div. 1981) (township's release of
bond was not an exercise of dominion and control resulting in acceptance of
dedication).
269. Compare Mertz v. Lakatos, 33 Pa. Commw. 230, 236, 381 A.2d 497, 500
(1978) (township's failure to approve or disapprove within the statutory period resulted
in deemed approval and release of liability) with Township of Barnegat v. DCA of N.J.,
Inc., 181 N.J. Super. 394, 400-03, 437 A.2d 909, 912 (App. Div. 1981) (when the town-
ship failed to approve or disapprove within the statutory period, deemed approval
would not result unless improvements were in fact substantially complete at the time of
notice of completion).
270. City of Rye v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 472-73, 315 N.E.2d
458, 459, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (1974).
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posit with an escrow agent of a specified sum of money, usually the
estimated cost of the required improvements. If the improvements are
completed by the developer and accepted by the government, the agent
releases the escrowed funds to the developer. If, however, the devel-
oper fails to complete the improvements as required, the agent releases
the funds to the government." 1 Obviously, the simple cash escrow
may be every bit as onerous to the developer as if he were required to
construct all of the improvements in advance of any sales.272 Thus,
when the government requires the developer to keep the full amount on
deposit until he has completed all of the improvements, the result is
that that portion of the project must be double-funded because the
work still must be paid for as it progresses. 2 " Accordingly, the parties
have adopted various adaptations in an attempt to alleviate some of the
more burdensome aspects of cash escrows.
The first variation consists of periodic releases of portions of the es-
crowed funds as the project progresses. 4 While the periodic release of
funds mitigates the double-funding problem to an extent, it fails to
eliminate the problem altogether. Before the local government releases
any funds, the government must assure itself that the developer has
completed a portion of the improvements and that the developer has
paid all parties and removed all liens. Thus, the project will be double-
funded at least in an amount equal to the amount of each release.275
Nevertheless, provided that the government acts with all due dispatch
in inspecting, approving, and accepting completed improvements, and
in ordering the release of funds, the amount of the double-funding may
be limited.276
The government also must take care that it does not permit the re-
lease of too great a portion of the escrowed funds. This is particularly
important when the total deposit is less than the value of all of the
improvements, when the cost of labor and material is escalating rap-
idly, or when the value of the improvements is underestimated at the
outset. In the event of the developer's default, the government may
271. B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 6-7.
272. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 135.
273. R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-18.
274. See id.; S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 135.
275. R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-18.
276. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 136. The results of one survey indicate that
most municipalities release bonds or escrowed funds within 65 days of completion. Id.
at 156 n.32.
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find itself with an escrow fund that is insufficient to cover the cost of
completing the required improvements.27 7
A second variation on the cash escrow theme arises from a recogni-
tion that the cash deposited ordinarily constitutes part of the proceeds
of the development loan.27 Accordingly, the lender itself may be in-
duced to segregate or set aside funds from the loan proceeds in an
amount sufficient to complete the required improvements.2 7 9 In this
situation, the lender will issue a set-aside letter to the municipality
agreeing to segregate funds and to disburse these funds only after the
developer has completed the improvements, and the government has
approved and accepted them.28 °
The lender must make certain that the set-aside funds actually are
held in reserve to ensure that these funds are available in case of de-
fault,2"' but to the extent that these funds are retained, the set-aside
will result in the same double-funding problem present in the ordinary
cash escrow. 282 The lender also must take care that it does not release
set-aside funds to the developer prior to the government's approval of
the release. The lender's premature release of funds may result in the
lender's liability to the government in the event of the developer's
default. 28
3
Irrespective of the deficiencies of the set-aside method of securing
the completion of required improvements, this method actually may be
structured to the lender's advantage. The lender has a substantial
stake in the success of the overall project. Not only will the lender look
to the developer for repayment of the loan from the sales proceeds, but
277. If the escrow fund proves insufficient to cover the cost of completion, the mu-
nicipality may not be able to withhold building permits or certificates of occupancy in
an attempt to force completion. Cf. Key Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anne Arundel
County, 54 Md. App. 633, 641, 460 A.2d 86, 91-92 (1983) (when the county exacted
completion bond as condition of plat approval, it could not subsequently withhold
building permits or occupancy certificates pending completion); Incorporated Village of
Northport v. Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d 344, 347, 384 N.Y.S.2d
923, 926 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (village could not withhold a certificate of occupancy
after accepting a bond as security for completion of the required improvements).
278. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-18.
279. M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 72, § 9-11.
280. Id.
281. Id. § 9-12.
282. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
283. The loan documents should specify that any funds subsequently paid to the
municipality because of a shortage in the set-aside fund will be added to the developer's
original loan amount. M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 72, § 9-12.
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also the lender must count on its security interest in the lots in the
event of default. To the extent that the developer has completed the
required improvements, the value of the lots will increase. Conse-
quently, it is to the lender's advantage to ensure that the developer
completes the improvements. The set-aside fund offers the lender con-
trol over the completion of the improvements. Thus, regardless of the
government's inspection and approval process, the lender also may in-
spect and approve construction prior to disbursement of set-aside
funds.2 84
Additionally, the lender may require that the government inspect
completed improvements and approve or disapprove the release of set-
aside funds within a reasonable time after the developer's request. 28 S
This tends to increase cash flow to the project and minimizes the
double-funding overlap problem.286
Finally, the lender may retain the option to complete the required
improvements if the developer defaults. 287 Although this can entail the
expenditure of funds in excess of the set-aside amount, it may be justi-
fied as an effort to enhance the value and marketability of the
collateral.
3. Property Escrow
The property escrow is structured in much the same way as a cash
escrow. If the developer defaults, the local government gains access to
the property and can sell the land to raise the funds necessary to com-
plete the required improvements. Among the various types of property
that the government can escrow are stocks and bonds, personal prop-
erty such as the developer's equipment, and the developer's real
property.
The first difficulty with the property escrow is determining the value
of the property.288 Because the developer usually must escrow prop-
erty in an amount sufficient to meet the estimated cost of the improve-
284. See id. at app. B-206, form 9.2.
285. Id. § 9-11. State statutes also may require approval within a specific time. See
Township of Barnegat v. DCA of N.J., Inc., 181 N.J. Super. 394, 397, 437 A.2d 909,
910 (App. Div. 1981); Mertz v. Lakotos, 33 Pa. Commw. 230, 233-34, 381 A.2d 497,
499-500 (1978).
286. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-18.
287. M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 72, § 9-11.
288. B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 7.
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ments, 289 the property must be appraised with care. When stocks or
bonds are escrowed, the initial valuation may be relatively simple.
Stocks and bonds, however, frequently fluctuate in value and are prone
to wide swings in market price. 2 °
Determining the realistic value of the developer's equipment can be
extremely difficult. The equipment is likely to have been used prior to
the development; therefore its aggregate value will depend upon the
condition of each piece. Moreover, the developer almost certainly will
use the equipment during the course of the development. Thus, even if
its value is readily ascertainable at the outset, there is no guarantee that
the equipment will have any value at the time of default.
Real property also presents genuine valuation problems, especially if
the land is undeveloped. Land is susceptible to wide fluctuations in
value caused by factors beyond the control of either the developer or
the local government. Moreover, the value of a particular parcel of
land will be attributable, in part, to the very fact that that developer
owns it. In other words, the mere expectation of development of the
developer's other land in the immediate vicinity bolsters the value of a
particular parcel. Clearly, some of the inflated value will evaporate if
the developer defaults on his present development.
The second major problem with the property escrow derives from
the relative lack of the escrowed property's marketability. The purpose
of requiring security for the developer's promise to complete the re-
quired improvements is to ensure that the developer, in fact, will con-
struct the improvements at no cost to the government. Thus, if the
developer defaults, the government must sell the property to raise the
funds necessary to complete the improvements. 29 1 After the devel-
oper's default, the local government may be faced with two equally
unattractive alternatives: it either may prepare to expend substantial
289. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
290. In one recent survey, approximately 9% of the responding municipalities indi-
cated that the property escrow was an acceptable form of security. S. SEIDEL, supra
note 1, at 136 (citing CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH, SURVEY OF MUNICI-
PALITIES (1976)). Apparently, the acceptance of stocks and bonds by these municipali-
ties for use in the property escrow is fairly common. B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 7.
The potentially wide fluctuations in value of most marketable securities, however, tend
to make them unsuitable as an effective source of sufficient funds to enable the munici-
pality to complete improvements upon the developer's default. S. SEIDEL, supra note 1,
at 135.
291. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 7-8.
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time and effort in order to sell the property at or near its appraised
value, or it may sell the property quickly, sometimes at a sacrifice.
Valuation and marketability represent the first tier of problems en-
countered in any property escrow. A second level of problems also will
be evident with a relatively small or undercapitalized developer.292
The typical small or medium-size developer probably will not own a
sufficient amount of property to satisfy the requirements of a property
escrow. In fact, most of the developer's property will consist of the
land that he proposes to develop. This land, however, is apt to be sub-
ject to prior liens in favor of the original seller, the development lender,
or both. Moreover, because the developer usually is highly leveraged,
his equity position will be minimal. Thus, in order for the government
to be adequately secured, the senior lienors must subordinate their liens
for the local government to be able to obtain the property free of en-
cumbrances upon the developer's default.293
When the lender subordinates its lien on the subdivison property to
the government's claim, the lender's security is accordingly dimin-
ished. Consequently, the lender will require periodic releases of por-
tions of the property as the developer installs the required
improvements.294 Like any partial release of security, cost efficiency
demands the prompt release of the security. When the subdivision
property is involved, however, the local government must consider a
number of factors in addition to the mere determination that the devel-
oper has completed a portion of the improvements.
In order for the subdivision project to be successful, the developer
must sell lots or homes during the course of the project. The buyers, of
course, will expect to take title free of prior encumbrances. Therefore,
the government is subject, to a certain degree, to the whims of the mar-
ketplace in its choice of which lots to release. Unfortunately, the lots
that the developer sells first often are in the most desirable part of the
subdivision. Thus, for example, the local government may find itself,
after the developer's default, holding seventy percent of the total
number of lots that represent only thirty percent of the total land
value.
A related problem occurs if the local government permits the hap-
hazard release of lots scattered about the subdivision.295 If the devel-
292. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 135.
293. R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-19. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 7.
294. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-19 to 2-20.
295. M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 72, § 9-5.
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oper defaults after he has sold a substantial number of lots, the
government may be left with a number of individual lots rather than
with one or a few larger parcels. Unless the government can locate a
buyer that is willing to purchase all of the lots, they will have to be sold,
on a piecemeal basis, possibly resulting in increased delays and costs to
the government. Furthermore, even if the government can locate a sin-
gle buyer, the overall price probably will be lower than the price of
contiguous lots.
4. Letter of Credit
The letter of credit provides a direct means by which the develop-
ment lender can support the developer's promise to complete required
subdivision improvements. Initially, letters of credit were devised to
facilitate the sale of goods in international commerce.296 In recent
years, however, "standby" or "guarantee" letters of credit have been
used to secure or guarantee a bank customer's performance of contrac-
tual obligations to a third party.29 7
Basically, three separate and distinct contractual relationships exist
in any letter of credit transaction.298 First, an underlying agreement
exists-for example, between the developer and the government. Sec-
ond, the bank's customer, the developer, and the issuer of the letter of
credit, the bank, enter into an agreement.299 Finally, the letter of
credit creates an agreement between the issuer, the bank, and the bene-
ficiary, the local government."
The fundamental distinction between a letter of credit and other
types of security devices is that the letter of credit imposes an obliga-
tion on the issuer to honor a demand for payment that is completely
independent of the underlying agreement between the customer and
the beneficiary.3"' Thus, the bank may not dishonor a letter of credit
even if it knows that the developer never began construction and that
296. Joseph, Letters of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing Functions,
94 BANKING L.J. 816, 816 (1977).
297. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36 (Colo.
1981).
298. Id.
299. See U.C.C. § 5-103, 2A U.L.A. 229-30 (1977).
300. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36 (Colo.
1981). But see Joseph, supra note 296, at 850 (relationship between insurer and benefici-
ary not strictly contractual).
301. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1), 2A U.L.A. 259 (1977); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36 (Colo. 1981).
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the local government, therefore, suffered no damage, or that the gov-
ernment did not intend to use the proceeds from the letter of credit to
complete the required improvements.
302
Because of the independent nature of the bank's obligation on a let-
ter of credit, it is vitally important that any conditions that the devel-
ops or lender seeks to attach to collection or use of the funds be
included in the terms of the letter of credit.30 3 Often banks will issue
letters of credit conditioned only upon a statement by a proper local
official that the developer has not completed improvements in compli-
ance with the developer's agreement with the local government.3 4
Upon the production of the letter of credit and the required notice, the
bank has no alternative but to pay the draft.30 5 In other words, the
lender, by making the initial development loan, has signified its faith in
the developer's ability to perform all of his contractual obligations.
Thus, there may be a tendency for the lender to be lulled to sleep.
Therefore, the lender clearly must take steps to protect himself in the
event of a default. First, the lender should add the amount of credit
issued to the amount of the development loan for the purpose of deter-
mining the developer's financial qualifications.306 Second, the loan
document should specify that if any funds are drawn against the credit,
the lender will add that amount to the development loan balance and
302. Proof of damage on an obligation to complete required improvements should
be included as a condition of the letter of credit. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-24 to
2-25; U.C.C. § 5-114(2), 2A U.L.A. 259 (1977); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 38 (Colo. 1981). Generally, however, the lender and
developer expressly must include such conditions in the credit document itself. Com-
pare id. at 38-39 (terms of underlying agreement irrelevant to issuer's liability) with
County of Yuba v. Central Valley Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 109, 113, 97 Cal. Rptr.
369, 372 (1971) (purpose of the underlying agreement incorporated by implication into
credit document).
303. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-25 to 2-26, form 2.4.
304. E.g., Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 38
(Colo. 1981).
305. The Uniform Commercial Code provides: "(1) An issurer must honor a draft
or demand for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless
of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other
contract between the customer and the beneficiary." U.C.C.§ 5-114(1), 2A U.L.A. 259
(1977). The issuer, however, may "defer honor until the close of the third banking day
following receipt of the documents." Id. § 5-112(1)(a), 2A U.L.A. at 253.
306. See Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty, Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REV.
716, 723 (1973). See also Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit,
4 U.C.C. L.J. 251, 258 (1972).
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the same collateral will secure the funds drawn against the credit.30 7
Third, the lender should condition the letter of credit upon proof of
actual damage to the local government 3°s and upon the government's
promise to apply the funds to the completion of the improvements.30 9
Finally, the letter of credit should provide that the government should
return to the lender all funds that the government draws against the
credit, but fails to expend.310
Obviously, as the lender attempts to impose conditions upon pay-
ment of the letter of credit, the local government will, or should, be-
come less inclined to accept it as security for the completion of
required improvements. The tension created by the apparently con-
flicting needs of the parties stems from the fact that the letter of credit
is fundamentally a payment device. Nonetheless, both the lender and
the local government have an interest in seeing that the improvements
are, in fact, completed. The letter of credit, however, is ill-suited to
allocating the wide-ranging responsibilities for completion.
5. Subdivision Improvement Agreement
The subdivision improvement agreement is a comprehensive three-
party agreement in which the lender promises to fund a specified
amount of money to the developer for the purpose of constructing re-
quired improvements, the developer promises to use these funds to
complete the improvements, and the local government promises to ac-
cept the dedication of the completed improvements.3 x1 The security
307. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-22. Although the issuer is entitled to imme-
diate reimbursement of any payment made under the credit, U.C.C. § 5-114(3), 2A
U.L.A. 259 (1977), it is unlikely that the defaulting developer will be able to repay the
issuer.
308. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-24. See also County of Yuba v. Central
Valley Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 109, 113-14, 97 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372 (1971) (recovery
denied when the county suffered no damage).
309. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-25. A condition obligating the municipality
to use the letter of credit proceeds to complete the improvements is especially important
to the issuer because completion will enhance the value of the collateral. Id. Without
an express condition to this effect, however, it may prove difficult for the lender to
compel the municipality to complete the improvements. See Colorado Nat'l Bank v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 39 (Colo. 1981).
310. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-26, form 2.4. The requirement for the return
of unused funds is a method of limiting the local governmental unit's recovery to its
actual damage when the amount necessary to complete the improvements cannot be
determined accurately prior to completion.
311. Id. at 2-27 to 2-31, form 2.5.
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aspect of the agreement arises from the lender's direct promise to the
government to continue funding the improvement portion of the loan
even after the developer defaults.312 In essence, the subdivision im-
provement agreement is an attempt to incorporate the benefits and
eliminate the burdens of the various other security methods. There are
seven potential benefits of this type of agreement: 1) the removal of
surety bond barriers to smaller developers; 2) the savings of bond pre-
miums; 3) the elimination of suretyship defenses; 4) the elimination of
the inflexibility of the letter of credit; 5) the increase of control over
security funds by a party with an economic interest in completing the
improvements; 6) the decrease in the likelihood of litigation; and 7) the
probability that the developer or lender actually will construct the sub-
division improvements.31 3
The major barrier to the successful use of the subdivision improve-
ment agreement arises from the fact that few, if any, statutes or ordi-
nances expressly provide for acceptance of this type of security.
Although the agreement cannot be termed a bond, escrow deposit, or
letter of credit, those jurisdictions governed by statutes or ordinances
that permit the use of "other forms of security" may sanction its use.314
Even in these jurisdictions, however, it remains to be seen whether offi-
cials of a particular local government have the requisite "administra-
tive flexibility" to accept such an agreement.315
A well-drafted subdivision improvement agreement should provide
that, upon the developer's default, the lender will disburse no further
funds to or at the direction of the developer. The lender then should
retain the option to cure the default by completing the improvements
itself. If the lender elects not to complete the improvements, it may
disburse funds directly to the local government as required. It is, of
course, necessary that the government actually apply the funds re-
leased to it to improvement construction. For the lender's protection,
the agreement also should provide that all funds that the lender ex-
pends or disburses to the government shall constitute advances made
under the initial loan instrument in order for the developer's collateral
to secure the advances made.316
312. Id. at 2-26. This obligation may be limited to the loan amount originally budg-
eted for municipally-required improvements or the undisbursed portion of that amount.
313. Id.
314. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
315. R. HARRIs, supra note 4, at 2-27.
316. See generally id. at 2-27 to 2-31, form 2.5.
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The primary advantage to the lender of this form of agreement is
that the lender retains the right to control the expenditure of improve-
ment funds in the event of the developer's default.3 17 This control ele-
ment is especially important because the lender has a financial stake in
the subdivision lots, which constitute collateral for the development
loan. Thus, each dollar spent by the lender in improving these lots has
a direct effect on the value and ultimate marketability of the lots.3 18
The local government appears to have an enhanced prospect of actu-
ally having the improvements completed without any significant in-
crease in its own obligations.3 19 If the lender elects to proceed with the
improvement construction, the government must do no more than was
previously required-that is, to inspect, approve, and accept the im-
provements.320 Moreover, because the ultimate obligation rests on a
direct promise from a financially interested party, the local government
will less likely be forced to resort to litigation in order to secure
performance. 321
From the developer's point of view, the subdivision improvement
agreement also offers a number of advantages over other security meth-
ods. First, the agreement may eliminate the delay and expense associ-
ated with qualifying for a surety bond. 2 2 Second, the agreement can
eliminate the cost of the bond premium.3 23 Third, the agreement may
avoid the conflicts of attempting to satisfy the multiple collateral re-
quirements of both the lender and the surety324 or escrow fund.325 Fi-nally, and especially important for the smaller developer, the
317. See id. at 2-26.
318. The injection of additional funds into a project actually may not increase the
net gain to the lender. For example, an expenditure of $100,000 to complete improve-
ments might increase the market value of the land only by that amount or less. Never-
theless, it is clear that a completely improved tract of land will be more marketable than
a partially improved tract.
319. Because of the lender's economic incentive, it is likely that it will exercise its
option to take over the completion of the improvements. In contrast, if the local gov-
ernmental unit is successful in collecting the proceeds of a surety bond, escrow account,
or letter of credit, the administrative and managerial burden of completing the improve-
ments will fall upon the local government.
320. See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-29, form 2.5.
32 1. Compare the lender's incentive to complete the improvements with the surety's
incentive to litigate.
322. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
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subdivision improvement agreement enables the developer to finance
and secure the entire development package from one local lender. 26
6. Sequential Approval
Sequential approval, or staged development, although technically
not a security device, nevertheless offers a means by which a local gov-
ernment ostensibly can assure itself that the developer will complete
the required improvements. Basically, a relatively large subdivision
will be broken up into smaller sections with approval of each section
conditioned upon the completion of all required improvements in the
previous section. 27 Thus, the risk of nonapproval of each succeeding
section theoretically provides the developer with a sufficient incentive
to complete the improvements. 328
Because no bond is required, some commentators have suggested
that the sequential approval method may be ideal for the small devel-
oper.329 It is doubtful, however, that this method will provide a useful
alternative for the smallest developers. In order for the sequential ap-
proval method to work effectively, the subdivision must be sufficiently
large to enable division into feasible smaller sections. It may be eco-
nomically impractical, for example, to split a twenty lot subdivision
into two or more sections. Development of larger subdivisions, how-
ever, requires massive infusions of borrowed capital at every stage of
the project, and the prospects of the smaller developer obtaining these
loans is remote. Thus, the more likely it is that the sequential approval
technique will work, the more likely it is that the smaller developer will
not be involved.
A potential barrier to the effective use of the sequential approval
method arises from the very nature of the required improvements.
When, as in years past, the required subdivision improvements were
limited to the paving of streets and the installation of water and sewer
lines, improvements easily could be extended on a piecemeal basis as
the project progressed. At present, however, local governments require
developers to install numerous and varied improvements, many of
which do not lend themselves to piecemeal construction. For example,
326. Cf R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 4-34 (discussing advantages to the developer of
total project financing).
327. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 8. A municipality may require a surety bond
or other type of financial security before it approves the final section. Id.
328. See id
329. lra; S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 136.
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it will be risky from a security standpoint to permit the developer of a
ten-stage development project to begin the second stage of improve-
ments after completion of one-tenth of a required sewer plant. To re-
quire completion of the entire plant before approval of the second
stage, however, will destroy the benefit of the sequential approval
method.
A further significant deficiency of the sequential approval process is
its lack of flexibility. Because approval of each stage of a development
is dependent upon the prior completion of all improvements in the pre-
vious stages, each stage is necessarily a complete mini-subdivision.
Thus, the method may restrict or eliminate economies of scale. More-
over, the developer will lack the flexibility to make certain tactical deci-
sions with respect to the day-to-day progression of the project.
As may be expected, a large subdivision can take from several
months to two years or more to complete. During this time, any
number of events may occur that require adjustments in the building
schedules: one or more types of material may be unavailable; labor
strikes can affect certain trades; and soil or weather conditions can dic-
tate that construction emphasis be moved from one portion of the sub-
division to another. If these or other events require a significant
modification of the construction sequence that cannot be obtained
within a particular stage, the developer will be faced with two alterna-
tives: he either may halt or slow construction in anticipation of an
early resolution of the problem and accept the resultant on-going inter-
est costs, or he may attempt to pressure the local government into ap-
proving construction in a subsequent stage of the subdivision. The
latter alternative probably is the most palatable and promising to the
developer. Moreover, the government may find it extremely difficult to
deny a requested approval. Given a sufficiently high level of ongoing
costs, the developer may face severe financial difficulty in a relatively
short time. Thus, the local government unit may deem it more prudent
to permit the premature approval of subsequent stages rather than face
the prospect of a potential, imminent default.
The sequential approval method of assuring the completion of re-
quired subdivision improvements is advantageous to the developer be-
cause it does not impose any additional layer of costs on the
development process. For this very reason, however, no independent
third parties exist from whom the local government may seek financial
relief.33 0 Although strict adherence to sequential release tends to re-
330. B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 8; S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 136.
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duce the local government's exposure to risk of loss, a defaulted subdi-
vision virtually is certain to result in at least some uninsured loss. 33
1
This survey of security methods reveals the tension between the fi-
nancial needs of the developer and the concern of the government for
assuring quality development. Understandably, the private and public
sectors of the development process do not always see eye to eye, with
the result that the courts are called upon to resolve many disputes.
IV. THE LAW OF SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENT REQUIREMENTS
AND GUARANTEES
The volume of case law regarding subdivision controls and subdivi-
sion improvement requirements reflects the importance of these laws as
a means for regulating subdivision development. The lack of uniform-
ity that appears in the cases can be explained by two major factors:
differences in state statutes and local ordinances, and differences in the
courts' conceptions of good public policy. Part IV of this Article be-
gins by examining the basic power of local governments to regulate
subdivisions and enforce subdivision improvement requirements. This
section subsequently reviews suits against the government brought by
purchasers in or neighbors of the subdivision; suits brought by the gov-
ernment to enforce promises to complete improvements; suits by third
parties that claim some right under the bond or other security agree-
ment; defenses available to the surety and the developer; and, finally,
developer remedies against the government.
A. The Power of the Local Government to Regulate Subdivision
Development
1. The General Powers of Local Government
Local governments possess no inherent power to regulate subdivi-
sion development and lacking a state enabling statute, local regulation
is void.3 32 Even when enabling legislation exists, local authority is lim-
ited to the extent permitted by state law.3 3 3 Although differences may
331. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 8; S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 136.
332. See Bella Vista Ranches, Inc. v. City of Sierra Vista, 126 Ariz. 142, 143, 613
P.2d 302, 303 (Ariz. App. 1980); El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 89 N.M. 313, 317, 551 P.2d 1360, 1367 (1976).
333. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Cochise County, 26 Ariz. App. 323, 326, 548
P.2d 416, 421 (1976) (county was without power to regulate division of land into parcels
of more than 35 acres).
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exist in the political nature of cities and counties,33 4 both governmental
units possess only such powers delegated to them by the state legisla-
ture and those that are necessarily implied. 35 In addition, when a lo-
cal government attempts to regulate subdivision development, it must
enact its regulations pursuant to the proper state law and in the man-
ner prescribed by that law.3 36 Thus, a local government may not enact
planning regulations to accomplish zoning purposes because state en-
abling statutes limit the purposes for which planning regulations can be
used. 33
7
When state statutes prescribe a procedure by which local govern-
ments exercise their power, generally they are not free to deviate from
that procedure. 33' Thus, if state law permits the local government to
accept a bond in lieu of improvements, the government may not re-
quire a cash escrow. 339 Likewise, if the law requires that the developer
complete improvements or tender a performance bond prior to final
plat approval, the local government cannot agree with the developer
that it will install the improvements and assess the costs against the
lots in the subdivision. 3" Finally, if state law permits the local govern-
ment to require the developer to improve and dedicate a road within
the subdivision, the government cannot require the developer to re-
serve a right-of-way for future use as a road.341
A local government possesses more than express statutory power-it
334. See id. (a county is a mere arm of the state government while a city is a volun-
tary organization).
335. See El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 89 N.M. 313,
317, 551 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1976) (referring to counties).
336. See Anderson v. Pima County, 27 Ariz. App. 786, 788, 558 P.2d 981, 983
(1976) (county could not enact security methods for subdivision improvements as an
interim zoning measure without strict compliance with state law); Magnolia Dev. Co. v.
Coles, 10 N.J. 223, 228, 89 A.2d 664, 667 (1952) (city only could regulate subdivisions
by adopting regulations according to mandate of state law, including notice and
hearing).
337. Kaufman & Gold Constr. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 298 S.E.2d 148,
153-57 (W. Va. 1982); Singer v. Davenport, 264 S.E.2d 637, 640-42 (W. Va. 1980).
338. El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 89 N.M. 313, 318,
551 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1976).
339. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Village of Brookfield, 95 Ill. App. 3d 765, 769, 420
N.E.2d 819, 821-22 (1981).
340. Friends of the Pine Bush v. Planning Bd., 86 A.D.2d 246, 249, 450 N.Y.S.2d
966, 968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
341. Brazer v. Borough of Mountainside, 55 N.J. 456, 471, 262 A.2d 857, 865
(1970).
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also possesses powers that are necessarily implied to permit the govern-
ment to accomplish the purposes of the state legislation. The courts
vary in the breadth that they give to the notion of "necessarily im-
plied" powers. Jurisdictions that continue to follow Dillon's rule342
construe local powers narrowly,343 while other jurisdictions liberally
construe municipal authority.3" Thus, courts have upheld the author-
ity to require a nonstatutory bond when the requirement assisted the
developer in qualifying for government guaranteed financing.
345
Courts also have permitted local governments to require a cash deposit
in addition to the statutorily required bond,346 to require a mainte-
nance bond guaranteeing against defects in the improvements, 347 and
to require the payment of inspection fees.348 Flexible regulations are
helpful to the local government and the developer because subdivision
improvements can be related more effectively to the needs of the partic-
ular type of development. Courts have upheld a system of classifying
developments as being within the power of the local government to
provide reasonable regulations for development.349
In addition to the limitations imposed by state law, a local govern-
ment's power is limited by its own ordinances and regulations. Local
governments must base any decision to approve or disapprove a subdi-
vision or to require certain improvements on factors that can be found
in the local regulations, 350 and the reviewing authority cannot rely on
342. See B. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 36-37 (discussing the doc-
trine that narrowly construes local government powers and is named for its advocate,
Judge Dillon). See also D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH, & P. SALSICH, STATE AND Lo-
CAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 83-89 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing Dillon's
Rule).
343. See Hylton Enters., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 441, 258 S.E.2d
577, 581 (1979) (finding no power to require off-site road improvements).
344. See Savonich v. Township of Lawrence, 91 N.J. Super. 228, 295, 219 A.2d 902,
906 (Law Div. 1966) (applying the New Jersey Constitution).
345. Genesee County Bd. of Road Comm'rs v. North Am. Dev. Co., 369 Mich. 229,
235, 119 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Law Div. 1963).
346. Savonich v. Township of Lawrence, 91 N.J. Super. 288, 295, 219 A.2d 902, 906
(Law Div. 1966).
347. Legion Manor, Inc. v. Municipal Council, 49 N.J. 420, 424, 231 A.2d 201,204
(1967).
348. Economy Enters., Inc. v. Township Comm., 104 N.J. Super. 373, 379, 250
A.2d 139, 142 (App. Div. 1969) (holding, however, the requirement in this case invalid
for lack of standards).
349. Delight, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 624 F.2d 12, 14-15 (4th Cir. 1980).
350. Canter v. Planning Bd., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 306, 309, 347 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1976)
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facts not in the record when rendering its decision.351
2. On-Site Subdivision Improvement Requirements
The authority to require subdivision improvements derives from
state statutes and local ordinances. These laws have two essential fea-
tures: they require the developer to make certain improvements and
they require or presume that the developer will dedicate the improve-
ments to the local government, which eventually will take responsibil-
ity for maintaining the improvements. Most subdivision improvement
requirements are for on-site improvements, those within the bounda-
ries of the subdivision; local governments, however, more frequently
are requiring off-site improvements in addition. Some question exists
whether a local government may require on-site improvements that the
developer will not dedicate to the public, but will remain in private
hands. For example, may the local government require the developer
to pave roads if the government will never take responsibility for these
roads? May the government require construction of a clubhouse for a
homeowners' association? Assuming that the government may man-
date such requirements, it is questionable whether the local govern-
ment may require a bond to secure completion of private
improvements and common amenities. That authority must be found
within the state enabling statute or necessarily implied from it.
Subdivision control constitutes an economic regulation that is sub-
ject to a low level of scrutiny by the courts.352 Thus, a subdivision
improvement requirement is valid when it has a reasonable relationship
to the promotion of public health, safety, and welfare.353 A reasonable
nexus also must exist between the requirements imposed on the devel-
oper and the demands created by his subdivision.354 In fact, neither
requirement imposes a very significant barrier for upholding on-site im-
(local government could not refuse to approve subdivision because of access and traffic
problems when local ordinances did not include these factors as a basis for decision).
351. Kaufman & Gold Constr. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 298 S.E.2d 148,
155-56 (W. Va. 1982).
352. Delight, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 475 F. Supp. 754, 758-59 (D. Md. 1979),
aft'd, 624 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1980).
353. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 246, 137 N.E.2d 371, 379 (1956)
(upholding road improvement requirements).
354. See, e.g., Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28
N.J. 423, 442, 141 A.2d 28, 39 (1958) (the court struck down on-site water main re-
quirements because the government had no standards for determining whether the im-
provements were required by the particular development).
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provements that generally are necessary to provide an adequate infra-
structure for the development.
The courts have upheld nearly all of the great array of on-site im-
provements required of developers. Road improvement requirements
were the earliest concern of the subdivision control scheme, and the
courts upheld requirements for widening, grading, paving, and dedicat-
ing roads within the subdivision. 5 Surprisingly, litigation over road
,improvement requirements continues and the courts continue to up-
hold these requirements.356 Courts have not been as receptive to re-
quirements that developers reserve right-of-ways for future road
construction, reasoning that the present development fails to generate
future needs.357 Another major requirement for most subdivisions is a
water system. Consequently, courts have upheld requirements that the
developer construct and install central water mains,358 as well as cen-
tral water systems.359 Similarly, courts have upheld requirements that
355. See Los Angeles County v. Margulis, 6 Cal. App. 2d 57, 59, 44 P.2d 608, 609
(1935) (upholding improvement requirements for dedicated roads on the theory that the
government would be liable for injuries sustained on the roads); Ridgefield Land Co. v.
City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 472-73, 217 N.W.2d 58, 59 (1928) (upholding road
improvement and dedication requirements on a theory of privilege and voluntariness);
Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 171, 106 N.E.2d 503, 507 109 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (1952)
(upholding access improvements before a building permit could issue).
356. See Township of Hampden v. Tenny, 32 Pa. Commw. 301, 307, 379 A.2d 635,
638 (1977); City of Bellefontaine Neighbors v. J.J. Kelley Realty & Bldg. Co., 460
S.W.2d 298, 304 (Mo. App. 1970).
357. See, eg., Brazer v. Borough of Mountainside, 55 N.J. 456, 466, 262 A.2d 857,
862 (1970); 181, Inc. v. Salem County Planning Bd., 133 N.J. Super. 350, 360, 336 A.2d
501, 505 (Law Div. 1975). But see Krieger v. Planning Comm'n, 224 Md. 320, 323, 167
A.2d 885, 886-87 (1961) (upholding a requirement that a developer's plan take into
account the widening of an unlimited access road).
358. See, e.g., Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 433 S.W.2d 448, 459
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (upholding a requirement that the subdivision developer install
on-site water mains).
359. Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 108, 100 N.W.2d 359, 364
(1960). Crownhill and Zastrow relied on two earlier cases in which the courts held that
the government was not required to compensate developers for the costs of central im-
provements, including water systems, after annexing the subdivisions and taking over
operation of the improvements. Trentman v. City and County of Denver, 236 F.2d 951,
954 (10th Cir. 1956); City of Danville v. Forest Hills Dev. Corp., 165 Va. 425, 431, 182
S.E. 548, 551 (1935). In each case, the court reasoned that the improvements already
had been dedicated to the beneficial use of the citizens in the subdivision and that the
developer suffered no damages when the city took control of the improvements.
Trentman, 236 F.2d at 954; City of Danville, 165 Va. at 432, 182 S.E. at 551.
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developers construct sewers360 and even have suggested that the mu-
nicipality can require the developer to establish a sewer district.
361
Other requirements that courts have upheld include storm drains,
3 62
curbs and gutters, 363 sidewalks,3M6 landscaping, 365 and fire protection
systems.3 66 The courts even have upheld requirements that subdivi-
sions obtain easements for the purposes of access 367 and drainage.
368
3. Standards for On-Site Improvements
Unambiguous standards for imposing subdivision improvement re-
quirements serve two purposes. First, the standards place the devel-
oper on notice as to what the government probably will require of him
if he intends to secure approval of his subdivision. Second, standards
constrain official action, limiting the opportunity for arbitrary and dis-
criminatory decision-making. Thus, the courts generally have held
that subdivision regulations must set reasonable standards to restrain
the discretion of decision-makers and must be reasonably definite in
order for property owners to know in advance what is required of
them.36 9 General standards are permissible if they can be applied to
concrete fact situations and are sufficient to limit discretion.37°
Stating the test for sufficient standards is easier than applying it to
360. See City of Bellefontaine Neighbors v. J.J. Kelley Realty & Bldg. Co., 460
S.W.2d 298, 304 (Mo. App. 1970).
361. Medine v. Bums, 29 Misc. 2d 890, 896, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1960).
362. Delight, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 475 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Md. 1979), afid,
624 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1980).
363. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 245, 137 N.E.2d 371, 378 (1956).
364. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors v. J.J. Kelley Realty & Bldg. Co., 460 S.W.2d
298, 304 (Mo. App. 1970).
365. Mac-Rich Realty Constr., Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Southborough, 4 Mass. App.
Ct 79, 87, 341 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1976).
366. Town of Wheatland v. Allison, 577 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Wyo. 1978) (construing a
local ordinance).
367 Town of Stoneham v. Savelo, 341 Mass. 456, 459, 170 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1960)
(enforcing the obligation of a developer to access a public road when the developer was
unable to obtain an easement across neighboring property).
368. County Council v. Lee, 219 Md. 209, 216, 148 A.2d 568, 572 (1959).
369. See Singer v. Davenport, 264 S.E.2d 637, 642 (W. Va. 1980); Sonn v. Planning
Comm'n, 172 Conn. 156, 159, 374 A.2d 159, 161 (1976).
370. Parker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 93 N.M. 641, 643, 603 P.2d 1098, 1100
(1979) (citing City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 417, 389 P.2d 13,
18 (1964)).
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actual situations. Courts have invalidated subdivision regulations as
being too vague when they required that a subdivision have adequate
access, 371 or mandated "harmonious development,, 372 or permitted
parallel streets in cases of "unusual topography, '3 73 or simply failed to
place the developer on adequate notice that the government would im-
pose water and drainage requirements.374 On the other hand, the
courts have upheld a state law requiring "sufficient and adequate
roads," a "well-planned" development and "sufficient information" to
be submitted to the planning authority,375 as well as a local ordinance
where the planning authority "might" require extra-wide streets and
bituminous concrete berms. 37
6
4. Off-Site and Excess Capacity Improvements
Although subdivision improvement requirements originally focused
on on-site construction of the infrastructure of the development, local
governments increasingly have attempted to require developers to con-
struct off-site improvements and on-site improvements of an excess ca-
pacity that are capable of serving areas other than the subdivision. Off-
site and excess capacity improvement requirements create analytical
problems for the courts, which generally have held that the govern-
ment must relate the required improvement to the demands created by
the development.377 This nexus obviously exists when improvements
are constructed for the exclusive use and benefit of persons in the sub-
division, but the nexus becomes attenuated when off-site and excess
capacity improvements are involved. The problem is similar to that
posed by many dedication and in lieu fee systems.
The courts have enunciated several standards for determining
whether a given improvement, dedication, or in lieu fee is sufficiently
371. North Landers Corp. v. Planning Bd., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 193, 195, 400 N.E.2d
273, 275 (1980).
372. Kaufman & Gold Constr. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 298 S.E.2d 148,
154-55 (W. Va. 1982).
373. Sonn v. Planning Comm'n, 172 Conn. 156, 160, 374 A.2d 159, 161 (1976).
374. Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park & Planning Bd., 344 Mass. 329, 334, 182 N.E.2d
540, 545 (1962).
375. Parker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 93 N.M. 641, 643, 603 P.2d 1098, 1100
(1979).
376. Mac-Rich Realty Constr., Inc. v. Planning Bd., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 79, 83, 341
N.E.2d 916, 919 (1976).
377. See, e.g., Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28
N.J. 423, 441, 147 A.2d 28, 39 (1958).
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related to the demands created by the subdivision. The Illinois
Supreme Court established the most grudging test in Pioneer Trust &
Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect.78 The court declared that
a dedication requirement must be related to a demand that was "specif-
ically and uniquely attributable" to the subdivision.379 More com-
monly, the courts state that the subdivision requirement must be
"reasonably related" to the needs created by the subdivision.380 The
California courts apply the least restrictive test for subdivision require-
ments and uphold requirements as a condition on the privilege to sub-
divide land even when the subdivision creates no new demand.381
378. 22 I11. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
379. Id. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802,
380. See, eg., Collis v, City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 13, 246 N.W.2d 19, 23-24
(1976) (in lieu fees for parks and playgrounds); Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of
Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 823, 379 A.2d 200, 204 (1977) (off-site road improvements);
Jordan v. Menomenee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617-18, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (1965) (fees
for school, park, and recreation needs), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
381. See, e.g., Norsco Enters. v. City of Fremont, 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 495, 126
Cal. Rptr. 659, 663 (1976) (upholding land dedication and in lieu fee requirements for
condominium conversion even though no new residents were generated). California
case law manifests the difficulty that all courts have experienced in developing managea-
ble standards for subdivision requirements. In the leading case of Ayres v. City Coun-
cd, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949), the California Supreme Court upheld dedication
requirements for street expansion as a reasonable exercise of the police power. The
court reasoned that the subdivision of land was a privilege that was voluntarily exer-
cised and the government could require "compliance with reasonable conditions for
design, dedication, improvement and restrictive use of the land so as to conform to the
safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the subdivision and of the public." Id at
42, 207 P.2d at 7. Several years later, the California District Court of Appeals struck
down a fee system by which a municipality collected money for the development of
parks and schools and collected an in lieu fee for development of drainage projects.
Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 638, 318 P.2d 561, 565 (1958). The
court stated: "It rather clearly appears that these fee provisions are fund raising meth-
ods for the purpose of helping to meet the future needs of the entire city. . . and are
not reasonable requirements for the design and improvements of the subdivision itself."
Id. at 638, 318 P.2d at 565. In Wine v. Council of City of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App.
2d 157, 170-71, 2 Cal. Rptr. 94, 103-04 (1960), a California appellate court followed
Kelber when it held that the City of Los Angeles could not require off-site road im-
provements. In City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 66-67, 8 Cal. Rptr.
674, 678-79 (1960), however, a California appellate court distinguished Kelber when it
held that fees for the construction of a drainage facility were valid because the facility
was designed for the direct benefit of residents in the subdivision.
A second major decision of the California Supreme Court altered the history of subdi-
vision control law in that state. In Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971), the court upheld dedication and in lieu fees for the preservation of open space
and recreation areas. The court rejected a test based on a specific nexus to the need
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Road improvements have been the most litigated off-site requirement
as local governments attempt to shift the cost of upgrading roads that
residents in the subdivision will use. Several courts, ruling on statutory
grounds, have held that local governments have no authority to require
developers to improve roads outside the boundaries of the subdivi-
sion.38 2 Other courts, applying a rational nexus test, have rendered
both favorable and unfavorable opinions concerning the right of the
government to impose off-site road improvement requirements.3 83 The
results in these cases turn on whether the local government can demon-
strate that the need for road improvement is attributable largely to the
increased demand created by the subdivision.384 One court has upheld
a trial court's determination that a municipal zoning commission could
not force a developer to acquire off-site rights-of-way, although the
commission could require him to improve an off-site road.385
generated by new subdivision and stressed subdivision requirements as a legitimate exer-
cise of the police power. 4 Cal. 3d at 640, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634. The
California Court of Appeal subsequently has upheld fee requirements for a condomin-
ium conversion project under the state's subdivision control laws even though no new
demand was created and no open space area was depleted. Norsco Enters. v. City of
Freemont, 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 495, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659, 663 (1976). For an excellent
discussion of the judicial standards used in subdivision requirement cases, see generally
Note, supra note 17.
382. Arrowhead Dev. Co. v. Livingston County Road Comm'n, 413 Mich. 505,
512-13, 322 N.W.2d 702, 707 (1982); Medine v. Burns, 29 Misc. 2d 890, 892, 208
N.Y.S.2d 12, 14-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); Hylton Enters., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors,
220 Va. 435, 440-41, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1979) (affirming adherence to Dillon's Rule).
See also Wine v. Council of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 170-71, 2 Cal. Rptr. 94,
103-04 (1960) (the court held that a municipality could not require off-site road im-
provements but was unclear concerning the basis for its decision).
383. Compare KBW, Inc. v. Town of Bennington, 115 N.H. 392, 395, 342 A.2d
653, 655 (1975) (upholding an off-site requirement) with Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v.
Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 823, 379 A.2d 200, 205 (1977) (off-site requirement
invalidated).
384. In Land/Vest, the New Hampshire Supreme Court distinguished its earlier
opinion in KBW on the grounds that in KBW the road that the municipality required
the developer to improve served no other residents and only fronted the developer's
property, while in Land/Vest the road served two residences and three lots not owned
by the developer and improvements would extend beyond the proposed subdivision's
frontage. 117 N.H. at 822, 379 A.2d at 203. Land/Vest is one of many decisions in
which courts analogize road improvements to special assessments. 117 N.H. at 823, 379
A.2d at 204. The courts reason that if the local government could have constructed the
improvement and assessed the benefited property to recoup its costs, it can require the
developer to undertake the improvements and pass the costs along to lot and
homebuyers in the subdivision.
385. Robert Mueller Assocs. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 30 Pa. Commw. 386, 389-90,
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A second problem area for the courts concerns drainage require-
ments. The Colorado Supreme Court held that a municipality could
not force a developer to pay for the entire cost of a drainage system
that would serve an area larger than the proposed subdivision.386 In a
similar case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a municipal
planning commission could not require a developer to pay twenty
thousand dollars toward the cost of an off-site drainage facility based
on the benefit of the facility to the developer's property when general
revenues were to pay for the balance of the project.38 7
373 A.2d 1173, 1174-75 (1977). The Robert Mueller court offered this justification for
off-site improvements:
The rationale for imposing off-site costs is not to transfer all costs of development
from municipalities to private developers. The primary responsibility for providing
these services lies with local governments. The purpose of imposing reasonable off-
site costs on developers is to cushion municipalities from the effect of rapid, large-
scale development.
30 Pa. Commw. at 389-90, 373 A.2d at 1175. Although the local government can con-
struct and install all improvements and assess the eventual property owners in the sub-
division, the government will run the risk that the development may fail and it will be
unable to recoup its costs.
386. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 193 Colo. 543, 548, 568
P.2d 487, 490-91 (1977). The facts in Wood Brothers revealed that the city would have
required the developer to construct a drainage channel that would have benefited an
area of the city at a cost of $282,000. Id. at 547, 568 P.2d at 489. Although the trial
court held the requirement unconstitutional, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled only
that the language in the local ordinances did not permit the city to apply the require-
ment to the facts of the case. Id. at 546, 568 P.2d at 490.
387. Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 603, 334 A.2d 30, 41(1975).
The Divan court developed a more sophisticated approach to determining the propor-
tion of costs for off-site or excess capacity improvements that a municipality can force a
developer to assume. The court reasoned that the government can require the developer
to pay costs based on the extent to which the improvement has benefited the property-
as long as the municipality assesses other benefited property-plus the difference in the
total cost of the improvement and the aggregate value to all benefited property. Id. at
602, 334 A.2d at 40. The court reasoned that it was fair to require the developer to pay
the difference because the subdivision created the need for the off-site improvement.
Id., at 602, 334 A.2d at 40. In truth, the "need" was no more created by the subdivision
than by those that used city services before the new subdivision; the developer's pro-
posed use merely creates a demand that existing systems cannot satisfy. Thus, it is
questionable whether the municipality should force the developer to pay the additional
cost of constructing improvements simply because he is "the last one in." A more prag-
matic justification is that because the local government lacks the capital resources to
increase the capacity of city services and because the development-probably residen-
tial-is unlikely to pay for itself through generating tax revenues, it is reasonable to
require the developer to pay for the cost of improvements up front. Although a perfect
match does not exist between the costs that the developer incurs and benefits that he
receives, the requirement should withstand constitutional scrutiny. Theoretically, the
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Developers probably will continue to call upon the courts to deter-
mine the legitimate proportion of off-site and excess improvement costs
that municipalities can shift to developers as the local governments at-
tempt to avoid repeating the financial disasters of the 1920s and 1930s.
It remains unlikely, however, that the various state courts will reach a
concensus as to the proper standards to apply.
5. Post-Approval Requirements and Vested Rights
Somewhere in the subdivision approval process the developer or pur-
chaser in the subdivision acquires a right to construct or occupy build-
ings that the local government cannot deny or modify. The difficulty is
determining exactly when these rights "vest." Vesting is a difficult sub-
ject because it remains unclear whether the vesting of rights is based on
state statutory laws, equity, constitutional law, or some combination of
the three. It is more certain that vesting involves a balancing of public
and private interests. This section explores several issues related to
vested rights: the effect of a unilateral filing of a subdivision plat; addi-
tional or modified requirements that the government can impose on a
developer after preliminary approval and after final approval; and the
requirements that the government can impose on purchasers in a
subdivision.
The few cases that have resolved the issue agree that subdivision
plats filed prior to enactment of a subdivision control law are subject to
the new regulations so long as no substantial construction has taken
place.3"8 Unilateral plat filings occurred at a time when approval of
the local government was not required before the developer could con-
vey lots in the subdivision. The right to record a plat to facilitate con-
veyancing, however, was not meant to vest any building right in the
person filing the plat or a person purchasing a lot in the subdivision. 89
developer will recoup his costs by passing them through to lot and homebuyers. If he
cannot recoup all of his costs, this means only that the developer's profit margin will be
reduced and such a diminution in value, standing alone, is insufficient to invalidate on
constitutional grounds the off-site or excess capacity improvement requirement. Of
course, the risk exists that the requirements may deter development, cause the develop-
ment to fail, or force the price of housing beyond the financial capabilities of many
potential homebuyers.
388. See Dawe v. City of Scottsdale, 119 Ariz. 486, 487, 581 P.2d 1136, 1137
(1978); Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423,
437, 147 A.2d 28, 37 (1958).
389. See Dawe v. City of Scottsdale, 119 Ariz. 486, 487, 581 P.2d 1136, 1137
(1978); Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423,
433, 147 A.2d 28, 33 (1958).
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A more difficult problem arises when the subdivision proposal has
received at least preliminary approval from the local government.
Most courts agree that the government cannot require the developer to
construct additional improvements after it has granted final approval
and accepted a bond to secure the developer's performance; 390 how-
ever, the rights acquired by preliminary approval of a subdivision plat
are less clear. Most of the case law arose out of New Jersey when state
law provided that the general terms and conditions of subdivision ap-
proval could not be modified for three years after preliminary approval.
State law, however, appeared to permit the local government to in-
crease improvement requirements after preliminary approval, but
before final approval. In a series of cases, the New Jersey Supreme
Court determined that minimum lot size was a term or condition of
approval,39 1 while paving requirements,39 2 the existence of sidewalks,
and the width of streets393 were improvements that a local government
could impose after preliminary approval.
The extent to which development rights vest after preliminary ap-
proval poses a difficult problem because of the clash between public
and private interests. On the one hand, the developer must determine
the costs of development before committing himself to a project.3 94 At
the same time, the government must protect the health and safety of its
citizens and should not be forced to permit the developer to construct
inadequate improvements. 9 5 Under many state laws and local ordi-
nances, however, the local government may not require additional or
materially different improvements after preliminary approval unless it
pays for the modification.
390. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Arthur T. McIntosh & Co., 50 Il1. App. 2d 370, 378,
200 N.E.2d 138, 143 (1964); City of Summit v. Horton Corp., 70 N.J. Super. 529, 540,
176 A.2d 34, 46 (Ch. Div. 1961), affid, 76 N.J. Super. 346, 14 A.2d 539 (App. Div.
1962). But see Slagle Constr. Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 67 Cal. App. 3d 559, 564,
136 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750 (1977) (developer does not have a vested right to a building
permit after final plat approval).
391. Hilton Acres v. Klein, 35 N.J. 570, 577-78, 174 A.2d 465, 469 (1961).
392. Levin v. Township of Livingston, 35 N.J. 500, 520, 173 A.2d 391, 400 (1961).
See also Ridgemont Dev. Co. v. City of E. Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 397, 100 N.W.2d
301, 306 (1960).
393. Pennyton Homes, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 41 N.J. 578, 583, 197 A.2d 870, 872
(1964).
394. See Levin v. Township of Livingston, 35 N.J. 500, 512, 173 A.2d 391, 397
(1961).
395. Pennyton Homes, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 41 N.J. 578, 584, 197 A.2d 870, 873
(1964)
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After final subdivision approval and acceptance of a performance
bond by the local government, the government cannot deny purchasers
in a subdivision certificates of occupancy because the developer de-
faults on the subdivision improvement agreement; rather, the govern-
ment's remedy is limited to recovery under the bond.3 96 Similarly,
when individuals purchase lots in a subdivision that was not approved
as required by law, the government cannot require these purchasers to
comply with subdivision regulations.397
B. Suits Against the Government by Purchasers in or Neighbors of
the Subdivision
1. Suits to Require a Bond
Relatively few cases discuss the general duty of the local government
to obtain a bond or other security to assure completion of subdivision
improvements. Possibly, governments rarely may fail to obtain secur-
ity or parties that may be affected by the failure do not receive notice
until it is too late to object. At some later date, the government may be
required to complete improvements at its own expense if the developer
fails to complete the project and security was not obtained. One court
has held that a local government is not free to complete improvements
and assess the costs to lot owners when state law requires completion
of improvements or a bond before final approval.3 98
396. Key Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Anne Arundel County, 54 Md. App. 633, 642,
460 A.2d 86, 91 (1983); J.D. Land Corp. v. Allen, 114 N.J. Super. 503, 509, 277 A.2d
404, 408 (App. Div. 1971); Incorporated Village of Northport v. Guardian Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d 344, 347, 384 N.Y.S.2d 923, 926 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
397. See Munns v. Stenman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 343, 352, 314 P.2d 67, 73 (1957)
(even if purchasers had bought into an illegal subdivision, the government could not
require them to join together to construct subdivision improvements because persons
that needed the improvements would be at the mercy of lot owners that were not inter-
ested in completing improvements). Cf Keizer v. Adams, 2 Cal. 3d 976, 980-81, 471
P.2d 983, 986, 88 Cal. Rptr. 183, 185-86 (1970) (the municipality could not deny build-
ing permits to persons who purchased lots in an illegal subdivision, but the municipality
could require the purchasers to comply with reasonable requirements, including the
construction of improvements, before the permits would issue; thus, although the strict
letter of California's Subdivision Map Act was not followed, its basic purpose was
served). But cf Slagle Constr. Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 67 Cal. App. 3d 559,
564, 136 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750 (1977) (developer could not sue the county for failure to
issue building permits after final plat approval).
398. Friends of the Pine Bush v. Planning Bd., 86 A.D.2d 246, 249, 450 N.Y.S.2d
966, 968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). Although the result in this case is correct, it is curious
because the holding reverses the traditional model of government provision of services
in favor of developer provided services. While most cases question whether the govern-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/2
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
When the local government fails to obtain a bond to secure perform-
ance by the developer or obtains an inadequate bond, residents in the
subdivision may be able to force the government to construct or com-
plete the improvements. 399 Apparently, the government may not as-
sess the costs of improvements against lot owners.4o°
2. Government Liability Regarding Improvements
Because local governments require improvements and review their
adequacy, they may be sued when the improvements cause injury to
others. States that follow the doctrine of immunity for governmental
functions or discretionary acts provide a shield against local liabil-
ity."° A court also may refuse to hold liable a local government for
injuries caused by improvements because the government has no duty
to protect persons living outside the government's jurisdiction.4 2 Con-
versely, a local government is not liable when it fails to expand its
ment can require the developer to make improvements, Pine Bush holds that the gov-
ernment cannot do this in the case of a new subdivision.
399. See Safford v. Board of Comm'rs, 35 Pa. Commw. 631, 638, 387 A.2d 177, 182
(1978). See also Kennedy v. Lehman Township, 74 Pa. Commw. 377, 379, 459 A.2d
921 922, (1983) (suggesting that the plaintiff may be able to bring himself within the
rule of Safford).
400. The Safford court stressed that the local government was required to complete
improvements "at its own expense." 35 Pa. Commw. at 638, 387 A.2d at 180. The city
likely would have a cause of action against the developer if the city obligated the devel-
oper to construct improvements even though the developer obtained no bond. The de-
veloper, however, may be judgment-proof. Although it appears reasonable to permit
the government to assess costs against property in the subdivision if it is assumed that
lot owners did not already pay for improvements, it is likely that the developer incorpo-
rated the estimated cost of improvements into the selling price of lots or homes and then
failed to construct improvements. If the government is permitted to assess property
owners for its cost of construction, they will have paid for the improvements twice.
As an alternative to suing the government to force it to complete improvements, one
plaintiff sought to collect under her title insurance policy when local officials refused to
issue a building permit because the developer failed to complete improvements in the
subdivision. Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal. 2d 644, 645, 234 P.2d 625, 626
(1951). Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the court found that the developer's failure did
not affect the marketability of the plaintiff's title. Id. at 652, 234 P.2d at 629.
401. See, e.g., Panepinto v. Edmart, Inc., 129 N.J. Super. 319, 325, 323 A.2d 533,
536-37 (App. Div. 1974) (good faith decisions made as part of discretionary functions
and duties cannot be the basis for liability); Brenner v. Township of Jackson, 94 N.J.
Super. 445, 450, 228 A.2d 721, 724 (App. Div. 1967) (discretionary functions arising
out of planning activities are immune from liability).
402. See Breiner v. C&P Home Builders, Inc., 536 F.2d 27, 32-33 (3d Cir. 1976).
The court determined that the local ordinance that required a drainage system for the
proposed subdivision did not create a duty to protect persons that lived outside the
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sewer plant to keep pace with growth resulting in injury to various
residents in the city." 3
In Sheffet v. County of Los Angeles,' ° a California appellate court
held that a local government may be liable when approved subdivision
improvements cause injury to others. As a result of governmentally
required road improvements, the plaintiff's land was subjected to an
increased flow of surface water that consequently diminished the value
of his land." The court held that an action for inverse condemnation
would lie against the government and that the plaintiff could obtain an
injunction to remedy poorly designed landscaping.4"6
3. Suits to Require the Government to Enforce Its Rights
Although no cases exist where citizens successfully have required a
local government to exercise its rights against a developer or surety
after a default, one case does report that citizens successfully forced a
local government to complete improvements after a default by a
bonded developer.4°7 One only can presume that the government exer-
borough. The court stated: "[W]e are satisfied that the ordinance imposed no duty on
the Borough to protect land in adjacent areas from surface water drainage." Id. at 32.
403. Barney's Furniture Warehouse of Newark, Inc. v. City of Newark, 62 N.J.
456, 469, 303 A.2d 76, 83 (1973). The court's holding in Barney's Furniture Warehouse
is important because it suggests that a local government cannot be liable for failure to
impose improvement requirements on the subdivision developer when that failure re-
sults in overtaxing municipal services and injury to others. The court did not decide
Barney's Furniture Warehouse on the issue of immunity, but on the basis of a lack of
duty. Id. at 469, 303 A.2d at 83.
404. 3 Cal. App. 3d 720, 735, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11, 21-22 (1970).
405. Id. at 727, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
406. Id. at 739, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 23. But see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d
266, 277, 598 P.2d 25, 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979), affid, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
(rejecting a claim of inverse condemnation for down zoning). For a discussion of Agins
and subsequent developments, see generally Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems, Pit-
falls and a Better Way, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1983). Although in-
junctive relief may be appropriate to require local governments to correct improperly
designed improvements for which they have assumed responsibility, public policy cau-
tions against permitting damage actions against municipalities because of the enormous
potential liability. The courts that boldly declare that the government had no duty to
the injured party probably are influenced by the policy consideration without clearly
articulating it.
407. Norton v. First Fed. Say., 128 Ariz. 176, 179, 624 P.2d 854, 855-56 (1981).
See also Gordon v. Robinson Homes, Inc., 342 Mass. 529, 533, 174 N.E.2d 381, 384
(1961) (suggesting that lot owners mandamus the local government to enforce their
rights).
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cised its rights under the bond.4° 8
C. Government Suits on Default
1. Accrual of the Cause of Action
When the government accepts a bond or other security to guarantee
the completion of subdivision improvements, the government sets a
deadline for completion, the typical period being two years. The gov-
ernment may declare a default at the end of the specified period if the
improvements are not completed' or are otherwise defective.410 It is
not necessary that the developer and the government enter into an un-
derlying written contract before the duty of the surety will arise be-
cause, on the basis of the bond, the courts will find an implied in fact
contract.4"1 When it is clear that the developer has abandoned the
project and cannot possibly complete improvements within the permit-
ted time, the government may declare an anticipatory breach.412
When the developer receives preliminary plat approval, he is under
no obligation to complete the development or any improvements in the
development. He simply will be unable to convey any lots in the devel-
408. Assuming that citizens forced the government to complete improvements prior
to obtaining a judgment against the developer or surety, the city could be left with the
costs of completion if a successful defense is available to the developer or surety. Public
policy cautions against imposing a duty on the government until it has had an opportu-
nity to litigate its claim. Thus, the original question is whether it is discretionary to
exercise one's right under a performance bond or if the government is under a duty to
attempt to collect a judgment after the developer's default.
409. See Sherwood Forest No. 2 Corp. v. City of Norman, 632 P.2d 368, 370 (Okla.
1980) (cause of action accrues on the expiration of the two year period in the bond);
City of Norman v. Liddell, 596 P.2d 879, 882 (Okla. 1979) (action may be brought on
expiration of the two year period set for completion).
410. See Town of Brookfield v. Greenridge, Inc., 177 Conn. 527, 532, 418 A.2d 907,
911 (1979) (implied obligation to construct improvements according to industry stan-
dards). Town of Brookfield also demonstrates that the bond constitutes a sufficient basis
for the surety's obligation and no express contract for completion of improvements is
required to create the surety's duty to pay on default. Id. at 530, 418 A.2d at 909.
Moreover, a bond will incorporate the minimum requirements reflected in the local
subdivision regulations and the courts will charge the surety with knowledge of these
regulations. See Indian River County v. Vero Beach Dev., Inc., 201 So. 2d 922, 924
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); City of Medina v. Holdridge, 46 Ohio. App. 2d 152, 156, 346
N.E.2d 339, 342 (1970).
411. See Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. County of Sacramento, 179 Cal. App. 2d
319, 321-22, 3 Cal. Rptr. 607, 608 (1960). See also supra note 410.
412. Board of Supervisors v. Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 32-33, 245 S.E.2d 425,
427 (1978).
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opment because he has not obtained the government's final approval.
The situation becomes more complicated when the developer posts
bond to secure completion of improvements and receives final plat ap-
proval. One may expect that the duty to complete improvements arises
with final approval and that the government has a right to receive per-
formance. Nevertheless, at least two courts have held that commence-
ment of development is a condition precedent to the developer's duty
to complete improvements. In County of Yuba v. Central Valley Na-
tional Bank, Inc.,a" the court found an implied condition in the letter
of credit issued by the bank that secured completion of improvements
that development had to commence before the bank's liability could
arise.414 In Town of New Windsor v. Inbro Development Corp. ,415 the
court held that commencement of development was a prerequisite to
the obligation to complete improvements based on the language of the
local ordinance.416 The requirement that the developer commence ac-
tivities before the duty to complete improvements arises apparently is
not a condition implied in law, rather the duty is implied in fact, based
on the agreement of the parties, or is express, based on state laws or
local ordinances.417
One settled point is that the local government need not complete
413. 20 Cal. App. 3d 109, 97 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1971).
414. Id. at 112-13, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72. But cf. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36-39 (Colo. 1981) (mere failure of the developer to
construct improvements triggered the banks obligation under the letter of credit).
415. 112 Misc. 2d 983, 448 N.Y.S.2d 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
416. Id. at 984, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The local ordinance, following state law, pro-
vided that the government could collect bond proceeds on the developer's default only
to the extent that the developer had begun construction in the development project. Id.
at 983, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 99. Although the court speaks of a condition precedent, the
issue actually is one of a lack of damages. See also Commonwealth v. Reliance Dev.
Corp., 258 Pa. Super. 276, 279-80, 392 A.2d 792, 793 (1978) (the developer was obli-
gated only to construct improvements as he developed and sold lots; therefore when the
developer defaulted, he was obligated only for improvements required by the one lot
that he had sold).
417. See Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. County of Sacramento, 179 Cal. App. 2d
319, 322, 3 Cal. Rptr. 607, 608-09 (1960). In Fireman's Fund, although the parties
stipulated that the developer had done no work in the subdivision, the surety was liable
for the developer's default. County of Yuba v. Central Valley Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App.
3d 109, 97 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1971), makes no reference to Fireman's Fund. In General
Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of Colorado Springs, 638 P.2d 752, (Colo. 1981), the Colorado
Supreme Court distinguished County of Yuba, noting that in General Insurance the
parties to the bond "did not condition their obligation on the development of any land
adjacent to the street extensions." Id. at 758-59 n.7. The court continued: "[The par-
ties] intended to secure to the city the construction and installation of the street exten-
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improvements before it commences an action on a bond or other secur-
ity."' This rule is sensible because the purpose of the bond or other
security arrangement is to protect the government from completing im-
provements at its own expense. The government should not be forced
to spend general revenues or incur indebtedness prior to bringing an
action on the security agreement.419
2. Measure of Damages
The courts unanimously have held that the bond securing comple-
tion of subdivision improvements is an indemnification bond; it is not a
penal bond that will permit the government to claim the entire bond
proceeds irrespective of the costs of completion.42 The measure of the
sions up to the amount of the bond, irrespective of the commencement of actual
construction of road improvements or partial completion thereof." Id.
418. See Los Angeles County v. Margulis, 6 Cal. App. 2d 57, 60, 44 P.2d 608, 609
(1935); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of Colorado Springs, 638 P.2d 752, 759 (Colo.
1981); Pacific County v. Sherwood Pac., Inc., 17 Wash. App. 790, 797, 567 P.2d 642,
648 (1977).
419. If the government does borrow funds to complete improvements, the surety
remains liable to the government because the government's damages did not disappear
when it borrowed funds. Although this liability appears to be obvious, in City of Ames
v. Schill Builders, Inc., 274 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Iowa 1979), a surety attempted to avoid
its obligation because the city borrowed funds to complete improvements. See also City
of Sacramento v. Trans Pac. Indus., Inc., 98 Cal. App. 3d 389, 397, 159 Cal. Rptr. 514,
518 (1979) (holding that the city's damages continued even though a subsequent devel-
oper completed improvements in exchange for an assignment of proceeds obtained in
the city's action against the surety).
420. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of Colorado Springs, 638 P.2d 752, 758
(Colo. 1981); Board of Supervisors v. Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 36-37, 245 S.E.2d
425, 430 (1978); Pacific County v. Sherwood Pac., Inc., 17 Wash. App. 790, 798, 567
P.2d 642, 648 (1977). In Genessee County Bd. of Road Comm'rs v. North Am. Dev.
Co., 369 Mich. 229, 236, 119 N.W.2d 593, 597-98 (1963), however, the court did up-
hold the bond amount as liquidated damages; therefore permitting the government to
collect the face amount of the bond. Most courts probably will require the government
to refund any excess funds after completing the improvements unless the government
establishes that the amount of the funds constituted a settlement of the government's
claim against the developer and surety. See M. Zerman Realty & Bldg. Corp. v. Bor-
ough of Westwood, 64 N.J. 590, 591-92, 319 A.2d 441, 442 (1974) (holding that the
developer was not entitled to recover excess funds after the city completed improve-
ments because the city established the amount of the funds in settling its claim).
Although the courts construe performance bonds to constitute indemnification bonds,
local governments constitutionally may require a penal bond so long as the requirement
is rationally related to the purposes of the statute. See City of Rye v. Public Serv. Mut.
Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 473, 315 N.E.2d 458, 459, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (1974) (stat-
ing in dictum that the court would uphold a contractor's penal bond if permitted by
statute).
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government's damages constitutes the reasonable cost of completing
the improvements itself or through a third party.421 Although the
proper measure of damages is easy to state, the rule is difficult to apply
because the extent to which improvements must be completed is not
always clear. For example, if no development has taken place, the de-
veloper can assert that the government has no need to complete im-
provements for a nonexistent subdivision.422 Occasionally, the
agreement with the developer,423 the local ordinance, or state law4
24
limits the obligation to complete improvements to a degree commensu-
rate with actual development. When the parties fail to agree to the
contrary or when the law includes no prohibition, the local government
apparently is entitled to demand completion of subdivision improve-
ments after the developer's default if he has commenced development.
Equity may dictate that the government only complete the improve-
ments reasonably necessary for the portions of the development that
the developer completed. Nevertheless, law and policy should permit
the government to complete all improvements for which the developer
had been obligated. First, the developer's pledge to construct and in-
stall improvements constitutes consideration for obtaining the right to
subdivide his property and convey lot and homes. The government did
not promise that the development would be financially successful, nor
did the developer promise conditional performance. When the govern-
ment demands performance, it only requires "payment" of the consid-
eration that it exacted in exchange for the right to subdivide. Second,
421. Los Angeles County v. Margulis, 6 Cal. App. 2d 53, 60, 44 P.2d 608, 609
(1935); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of Colorado Springs, 638 P.2d 752, 759 (Colo.
1981); Town of Brookfield v. Greenridge, Inc., 177 Conn. 527, 537, 418 A.2d 907, 913
(1979); Pacific County v. Sherwood Pac., Inc., 17 Wash. App. 790, 798, 567 P.2d 642,
648 (1977).
422. See County of Yuba v. Central Valley Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 109, 112, 97
Cal. Rptr. 369, 371-72 (1971) (holding that commencement of development is a condi-
tion precedent to the developer's duty to complete improvements).
423. See Commonwealth ey- rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Reliance Dev. Corp., 258 Pa.
Super. 276, 278, 392 A.2d 792, 793 (1978) (the agreement with the developer only re-
quired the developer to complete improvements when he developed and sold lots).
424. See Town of New Windsor v. Inbro Dev. Corp., 112 Misc. 2d 983, 983, 448
N.Y.S.2d 99, 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). In Town of New Windsor, state law limited
collection of bond proceeds to an amount necessary to complete improvements to an
extent commensurate with building development. Id. New York law also limits the
expenditures of the government to the amount of the bond to avoid placing the burden
for completing improvements on the local citizenry. See Village of Warwick v. Repub-
lic Ins. Co., 104 Misc. 2d 514, 517-18, 488 N.Y.S.2d 589, 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980)
(concerning New York's Village Law).
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although the government exacted the promise to construct improve-
ments so that it would not bear the expense of extending services to
new residents, the government is harmed if the development remains
incomplete-the land is subdivided, but will lie vacant generating little
tax revenue. Moreover, constructing improvements only for the few
homes that exist in the abandoned subdivision might be logistically im-
possible. Finally, the government retains an interest in promoting the
marketability of the land to facilitate its full development. If it can
secure performance by a subsequent developer by assigning bond pro-
ceeds in exchange for completing improvements, the government can
obtain the performance that it desired. The subsequent developer may
obtain an economic advantage at the cost of the original developer, but
that advantage might be necessary to encourage completion of a foun-
dered development.
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the liability of the developer is
not limited to the amount of the bond, a result based either on state
statutory law425 or common law.426 The bond only secures the devel-
oper's promise to complete improvements and if the developer is sol-
vent, the government can collect the full amount of its damages after
his breach. On the other hand, the government is limited to the face
amount of the bond if it brings an action on the bond.427 The govern-
ment, however, may pursue its rights against either the principal or the
425. See Safford v. Board of Comm'rs, 35 Pa. Commw. 631, 641-42, 387 A.2d 177,
182 (1978) (the local ordinance specifically provided that the developer would be liable
for the cost of completion if it exceeded the amount of the bond).
426. See Town of Brookfield v. Greenridge, Inc., 177 Conn. 527, 534,418 A.2d 907,
912-13 (1979) (the court explained that the government's claim was in two counts, one
on the bond and one on the developer's agreement to construct improvements). See also
City of Bellefontaine Neighbors v. J.J. Kelley Realty & Bldg. Co., 460 S.W.2d 298, 300
(Mo. App. 1970) (the city's complaint was in two counts, one on the contract with the
developer and one on the bond).
427. See Board of Supervisors v. Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 35, 245 S.E.2d 425,
429 (1978) (holding that a recovery on the bond is limited to the amount of the bond).
Because the bond is only security for the developer's promise to perform, no reason
exists why the bond should limit recovery on his promise. The government should be
able to collect the cost of completion unless it has agreed that the amount of the bond is
liquidated damages. See Town of Stoneham v. Savelo, 341 Mass. 456, 459 170 N.E.2d
417, 419 (1960) (reasonable cost of completion is the measure of damages). In practice,
the bond may act as the limit of the government's recovery because the defaulting devel-
oper is judgment proof. Between coprincipals on a bond, the owner of the property will
have primary liability in the case of default. See Dick Kelchner Excavating, Inc. v.
Gene Zimmerman, Inc., 25 Ohio Misc. 133, 139, 264 N.E.2d 918, 923 (1970)
(coprincipal who is owner of the property must indemnify the other principal who is the
contractor).
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surety because the principal always remains liable on the bond.42 8
D. Third Party Rights on Subdivision Improvement Guarantees
Subdivision improvement guarantees have several purposes: protec-
tion of the community from the cost of completing subdivision im-
provements, protection of homebuyers in the subdivision from
incomplete or inadequate improvements; and protection of neighbors
of the subdivision that may be injured if improvements are incomplete
or inadequate. A fourth group that often seeks protection from subdi-
vision improvement guarantees consists of contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, and laborers that work on the subdivision. The courts hold,
virtually unanimously, that only the government can maintain a cause
of action on an improvement guarantee. A number of courts, however,
have permitted the government to assign either its cause of action or
any proceeds that it might collect under the guarantee to a third party
when the third party completes subdivision improvements.
1. Suits by Lot-Owners and Homeowners
A third party suit on the subdivision improvement guarantee is pred-
icated on the theory that the local government and developer intended
the guarantee to benefit the third party. Consequently, the third party
should be entitled to sue in his own name as a third party beneficiary.
Lot owners and homeowners in the subdivision retain the strongest ar-
gument for bringing suit because they are intended beneficiaries of the
improvement guarantee. Despite rhetoric that may give lot owners and
homeowners encouragement, 429 nearly all courts have held that con-
sumers in a subdivision may not maintain an action as third party ben-
eficiaries of a subdivision improvement guarantee.430 A lot owner's
428. Dick Kelchner Excavating, Inc. v. Gene Zimmerman, Inc., 25 Ohio Misc. 133,
139, 264 N.E.2d 918, 922 (1970).
429. See, eg., Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 169, 106 N.E.2d 503, 506, 118
N.Y.S.2d 164, 169 (1952) (subdivision regulations benefit the consumer in the subdivi-
sion and the community at large). See also Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Cochise
County, 26 Ariz. App. 323, 327, 548 P.2d 416, 420 (1976) (purpose of subdivision regu-
lations "is to ensure that consumers who purchase lots in residential developments are
provided with adequate streets, utilities, drainage, and generally pleasant, healthy, and
livable surroundings"). But see Norton v. First Fed. Say., 128 Ariz. 176, 179, 624 P.2d
854, 857 (1981) (a general purpose for a statute did not create a specific legal right in a
group of persons whom the statute was designed to protect).
430. See, eg., Norton v. First Fed. Say., 128 Ariz. 176, 180, 624 P.2d 854, 858
(1981) (lot owners were not third party beneficiaries of the performance bond or con-
tract to post the performance bond); Gordon v. Robinson Homes, Inc., 342 Mass. 529,
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inability to maintain a cause of action on a bond applies even though
the bond states that it is for the purpose of protecting consumers in the
subdivision; the courts hold that the government acts beyond its statu-
tory authority when it attempts to create a cause of action in third
431parties.
The courts' reasoning is not always clear in these cases. In City of
University City ex rel Mackey v. Frank Miceli & Son Realty & Building
Co.,43z the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that
third parties had no right under a performance bond433 when, in fact,
the actual reason for denying recovery was that the nature of the injury
fell outside the scope of the bond.434 In Fleck v. National Property
Management, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court correctly addressed the
532-33, 174 N.E.2d 381, 382-83 (1961); City of University City ex reL Machey v. Frank
Miceli & Sons Realty & Bldg. Co., 347 S.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Mo. 1961); Fleck v. Na-
tional Property Management, Inc., 590 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1979) (Hall, J.,
concurring).
431. See Gordon v. Robinson Homes, Inc., 342 Mass. 529, 531, 174 N.E.2d 381,
382 (1961). Although the bond recited that it was for the use and benefit of persons that
may purchase lots in the subdivision, the court held that the lot owner could not main-
tain an action because the local planning authority was the primary authority for en-
forcing subdivision regulations. Id. at 531, 174 N.E.2d at 383. Thus, the local
government acted beyond its statutory authority when it attempted to create a specific
right in lot owners. IL at 531, 174 N.E.2d at 382. The rule enunciated in Gordon
Homes may be good policy, but it is bad law. While subdivision improvement require-
ments and guarantees are designed to protect the community from being saddled with
the cost of completing improvements, they also serve to protect consumers. It should be
within the implied power of the local government to create a right in consumers to
enforce the guarantee. On policy grounds, it may be better to limit the right of action
under the guarantee to the local government in order for it to control the claim against
the developer or surety. Gordon Homes does suggest that lot owners may have a right
to force the government to exercise its rights under the guarantee. Id. at 533, 174
N.E.2d at 384.
432. 347 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1961).
433. Id. at 134.
434. Id. The court stated that the "contract, ordinance and bond are not reason-
ably subject to the construction that they were intended for the protection of adjoining
property owners." Id. The actual issue before the court was whether the parties in-
tended the bond to indemnify lot owners from injury occasioned by failure to complete
the improvements, or intended the bond only to secure completion. Id.
435. 590 P.2d 1254, 1255-56 (Utah 1979) (Hall, J., concurring). In Fleck, the plain-
tiffs were purchasers of lots subject to a prior lien. Id. at 1255. The subdivider had
covenanted to complete improvements in the subdivision and obtained a performance
bond to secure completion. Id Eventually, the prior lienholder foreclosed his lien and
the plaintiffs lost the property at the foreclosure. Id. They asserted that the developer
had failed to complete improvements as promised, thereby diminishing the value of the
lots and making it impractical for them to purchase at the foreclosure sale. Id. Justice
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issue when it determined that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was
not foreseeable and, therefore, denied recovery.
In Town of Ogden v. Earl R. Howarth & Sons, Inc.,436 a New York
trial court granted a right of action to a lot owner as a third party
beneficiary of a contract between the developer and the municipality.
The court reasoned that the lot owner could bring himself within the
class of persons that would receive a "special benefit" from the con-
tract.43 7 Additionally, the court took notice "of the all too often evi-
denced difficulty of purchasers of homes in exacting fair compliance
with building contracts by builder-vendors.s 438
Hall, concurring, asserted that the lot owners were not third party beneficiaries irrespec-
tive of whether the injury that they suffered was foreseeable. Id. at 1256-57. He noted
that the local ordinance that set forth the bond requirement had as its main purpose
"the objective of protecting the public by assuring that before the county takes responsi-
bility for the maintenance of streets and other facilities that the required improvements
have been completed so as not to burden the public with the added expense." Id.
To declare that the government alone is vested with a right on an improvement guar-
antee is conclusory and the courts have not explained adequately the basis for this re-
sult. One concern is that third parties can deplete the guarantee before the money can
be used to complete the improvements. The purpose for which third parties can use the
money, however, should be limited to completing improvements. It then would not
matter who forced the developer or surety to complete the improvements. Of course, a
lot owner should not be permitted to collect under a guarantee if he does not use the
money for improvements. See Berman v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d,
908, 911 115 Cal. Rptr. 566, 568 (1974) (the court stated in dictum that a lot owner that
had completed improvements would have a right to intervene in a suit brought by the
government to recoup his costs of completion).
436. Town of Ogden v. Earl R. Howarth & Sons, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 213, 216, 294
N.Y.S.2d 430, 433 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
437. Id. at 216, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
438. Id. Howarth is limited to a contract between the developer and the city and
does not address the issue of a third party right of action under a performance guaran-
tee. Nevertheless, the case is significant because it contrasts the normal rule against a
third party right of action on a government contract with the situation of the developer-
government-homebuyer. The court noted that the class of persons that could sue as
third party beneficiaries would be limited and damages would be relatively minor. Id.
Thus, the court forthrightly addresses the policy considerations of its decision. See also
Berman v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 908, 115 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1974).
The court suggested that a lot owner that had completed improvements could intervene
in a suit brought by the local government to recoup his costs of completion and to avoid
a windfall to the government. Id. at 911, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 568. The court's suggestion,
however, constitutes dictum because the court held that the plaintiff's suit was barred
on res judicata grounds. Id. at 912, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 568. Apparently, the trial court in
an earlier action had held that Berman could not intervene and he failed to appeal. See
id. at 912, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
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2. Suits by Other Third Parties on the Guarantee
Laborers, materialmen, and subcontractors have faired no better in
attempting to collect under a subdivision improvement guarantee.
These parties have no right of action as third party beneficiaries of a
performance bond439 or a combined performance and payment bond
when the major purpose of the bond is to secure performance. 440
Courts also have held that subcontractors are not entitled to collect
under a letter of credit" 1 and a cash escrow agreement. 42 The fact
that the guarantee may contain language implying that third parties
have a cause of action provides no help because the courts either con-
strue the language narrowly44 3 or hold that the government's action
creating the right constitutes an ultra vires act.444
439. Evola v. Wendt Constr. Co., 170 Cal. App. 2d 21, 25, 338 P.2d 498, 501
(1959). See also J.1. Newton Co. v. Martin Dev. Co., 193 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967) (subcontractors are not entitled to reimbursement from defaulting contrac-
tor's performance bond).
440. Scales-Douwes Corp. v. Paulaura Realty Corp., 24 N.Y.2d 724, 726, 249
N.E.2d 760, 761, 301 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (1969) (holding that the paramount purpose of
the subdivision improvement bond was to secure performance and not guarantee pay-
ment to suppliers).
441. Schmidt-Tiago Constr. Co. v. City of Colorado Springs, 633 Colo. App. 533,
534, 633 P.2d 533, 534 (1981).
442. Tom Morello Constr. Co. v. Bridgeport Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 280 Pa.
Super. 329, 336, 421 A.2d 747, 751 (1980) (holding that the escrow agent was entitled to
make payments to the developer rather than to the contractor).
443. Weber v. Pacific Indemn. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 334, 338, 22 Cal. Rptr. 366,
369 (1962).
444. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson Inv. Co., 388 P.2d 300, 304 (Okla.
1963) (holding that the planning authority had no power to require a condition in the
performance bond that contractors, subcontractors, materialmen, and laborers should
be paid). Local governments in fact, do have an incentive to ensure that all work on the
improvements is paid for so that it does not accept the improvements subject to any
liens or encumbrances. At least one court has suggested that the lienor can enforce its
rights against the local government after it assumes control of the improvements. See
Scales-Douwes Corp. v. Paulaura Realty Corp., 24 N.Y.2d 724, 727, 249 N.E.2d 760,
761, 301 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (1969).
The rule against a third party right of recovery sometimes leads to harsh results. See
Ragghianti v. Sherwin, 196 Cal. App. 2d 345, 351, 16 Cal. Rptr. 583, 587 (1961). The
rather complicated facts in Ragghianti arose when a housing contractor who was con-
structing homes in a subdivision failed to pay a street contractor. The title insurance
company paid the street contractor's claim. The title insurance company subsequently
brought an action against the owner of the property who had posted a performance
bond with the local government. The owner, believing that he was liable to the third
party under the bond, paid the claim and then sought reimbursement from the housing
contractor. The court held that third parties had no claim under the bond. Id. at 351,
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When a local government receives a cash escrow from a subdivider
and the government rejects the subdivision proposal, one court has
held that a judgment creditor can attach the subdivider's funds.44
That result may mean that a local government should exercise extreme
care when it returns any cash or a security deposit to a developer if a
third party has attached the cash or security." 6
3. Assignment of the Government's Right of Action
One of the strongest cases for permitting third parties to recover
under a bond or other security occurs when the third party has com-
pleted subdivision improvements after the developer's default. The sit-
uation differs from a third party beneficiary's claim because the third
party acquires the cause of action held by the government. Morro Pali-
sades Co. v. Hartfort Accident & Indemnity Co., is a leading case
often cited for the proposition that a third party cannot recover under
an assignment of the government's cause of action following the devel-
oper's default. In Morro, however, the evidence did not reveal that the
third party had ever completed the improvements or that it intended to
do so.4" The court recited the general rule that the performance bond
runs in favor of the government and any action on the bond must be
brought in the name of the government.449
Two courts confronted by an assignment of the government's cause
of action have distinguished Morro.45° In both cases the courts
stressed the fact that the government made the assignments to fulfill
16 Cal. Rptr. at 587. The court further held that Ragghianti's payment was voluntary
and, therefore, denied him a right to reimbursement from the defendant housing con-
tractor. Id.
445. Cammarano v. Borough of Allendale, 65 N.J. Super. 240, 241, 167 A.2d 431,
432 (Ch. Div. 1961).
446. A local government should use an escrow agent so that it does not bear the risk
of returning the deposit to the wrong person. Although the government can resort to
interpleader, it will find itself in a lawsuit not of its own making. In fact, to constitute a
true escrow, a third party would be required to hold funds or other collateral securing
performance.
447. 52 Cal. 2d 397, 340 P.2d 628 (1959) (in bank).
448. Id. at 400, 340 P.2d at 628.
449. Id. at 401, 340 P.2d at 631. See also Village of Warwick v. Republic Ins. Co.,
104 Misc. 2d 514, 519, 428 N.Y.S.2d 589, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (the court in dictum
stated that an assignment of the government's right would be ineffective).
450. County of Will v. Woodhill Enters., Inc., 4 Ill. App. 3d 68, 75, 274 N.E.2d
476, 481-82 (1971); Clearwater Assocs., Inc. v. F.H. Bridge & Son, Contractors, 144
N.J. Super. 223, 226, 365 A.2d 200, 202 (App. Div. 1976).
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the purposes of the performance bond--completion of subdivision im-
provements;451 thus, the courts upheld the assignments.
4. Assignment of Bond Proceeds
To avoid the problem of failing to bring suit in the name of the gov-
ernment, several courts have considered whether a government may
assign any proceeds that it obtains in exchange for the assignee's com-
pletion of the improvements. The courts are split on the authority of
the government to make such an assignment.45 2 On the one hand, one
can argue that if the government can complete performance by em-
ploying a third party to construct the improvements, it should be able
to assign bond proceeds to that party.4 53 On the other hand, courts
may perceive that the assignee, who usually has taken over completion
of the development after a foreclosure or accepted a deed in lieu of
foreclosure, should be required to complete the improvements or post
bond just as any other developer must do.454 When the purchaser of
the development replats the property, denial of the assignment may be
proper;455 but, if the purchaser merely does what the original developer
451. For example, in Clearwater Associates, the assignee who was a 50% owner of
the development property "expressly undertook to complete the improvements" and the
improvements in fact, were completed at the time the assignee commenced the suit. 144
N.J. Super. at 228-29, 365 A.2d at 203.
452. Compare City of Sacramento v. Trans Pac. Indus., Inc., 98 Cal. App. 3d 389,
401, 159 Cal. Rptr. 514, 520 (1979) (upholding assignment) and Board of Supervisors v.
Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 35, 245 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1978) (upholding assignment)
with City of Ames v. Schil Builders, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1980) (invalidat-
ing assignment) and Village of Warwick v. Republic Ins. Co., 104 Misc. 2d 514, 519,
428 N.Y.S.2d 589, 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (invalidating assignment).
453. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 34, 245 S.E.2d
425, 429 (1978) ("The assignment ... was for the purpose of obtaining performance
guaranteed by the bond .... [Since the work was performed], we perceive no reason
for finding that the assignment was invalid.").
454. Village of Warwick v. Republic Ins. Co., 104 Misc. 2d 514, 519, 428 N.Y.S.2d
589, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) ("Having become the owners of a parcel of real property,
the bank found it ... in its interest to subdivide the property ... the bank, like any
other developer, either had to intall improvements required ... or ,post
security .. ").
455. City of Ames v. Schill Builders, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1980) (hold-
ing that the mortgagee that accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure and then replatted
property became a developer and was not entitled to an assignment of bond proceeds).
In an earlier case, the Iowa Supreme Court had upheld an arrangement by which the
mortgagee had lent the city funds in exchange for an assignment of bond proceeds. City
of Ames v. Schill Builders, Inc., 274 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Iowa 1979). When the case
came before the court the second time, the facts had changed. The mortgagee who had
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was obligated to do, he should be able to receive the bond proceeds. 456
5. Rights of Subsequent Developers Without Assignment
A similar problem occurs when a subsequent developer completes
improvements that were the obligation of the first developer and then
intervenes in the government's action against the developer.457 In
Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania Securities Commission v. Reliance
Development Corp.,4  the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the
subsequent developer was entitled to recover from the cash escrow to
recoup his cost of completing improvements that had been his prede-
cessor's obligation. In Hellam Township v. DiCicco,459 the court faced
a similar situation only two years later, but in DiCicco it was unclear
whether the subsequent developer would complete the improve-
become the owner of the property replatted a portion of the development and agreed to
complete the improvements in exchange for an assignment of bond proceeds. The court
held that this arrangement was invalid. 292 N.W.2d at 680-81.
456. See City of Sacramento v. Trans Pac. Indus., Inc., 98 Cal. App. 3d 389, 397,
159 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (1979). The court reasoned that a purchaser of lots in a finan-
cially troubled subdivision could take an assignment of bond proceeds in exchange for
his completion of the improvements. Id. The court stated: "When [the] City entered
into the agreement with Watkins. . . [the] City's damages did not magically disappear.
Watkins did not promise to construct the improvements as a gift; he extracted consider-
ation from the City in the form of [the] City's conditional promise to repay him if it
prevailed in its action against defendants." Id. The court distinguished Morro on the
grounds that the City had not alienated a "chose-in-action . . . it merely promised to
pay Watkins for his work if it was successful in the lawsuit." Id. at 401, 159 Cal. Rptr.
at 520.
457. The action may have been brought on behalf of the developer if the security
was a cash escrow. The developer or one claiming through him would seek a return of
the security.
458. 258 Pa. Super. 276, 283, 392 A.2d 792, 795 (1978). The facts in Reliance are
indicative of development problems. The original developer became insolvent after sell-
ing only one lot in his subdivision. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale and the
developer went into receivership. The receiver brought an action to recover the cash
escrow put up by the developer. The local government interpleaded the purchaser at
the sheriff's sale who had completed the improvements and the trial court held for the
government. Id. at 279, 392 A.2d at 793. On appeal, the government, which had dis-
avowed any claim to the money, failed to file a brief in support of itself. Id. at 280, 392
A.2d at 794. The appellate court determined that the purchaser of the property was
entitled to reimbursement, but only for improvements that were the obligation of the
original developer. Id. at 283, 392 A.2d at 795. Because the original developer was
obligated only to complete improvements for lots that were sold, the purchaser's recov-
ery was minimal. Id. at 283, 392 A.2d at 795.
459. 287 Pa. Super. 227, 429 A.2d 1183 (1981).
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ments." ° Thus, the court held that the surety could not reopen a con-
fessed judgment on the ground that the township would be unjustly
enriched if the subsequent developer completed the improvements.461
In fact, the court hinted that the surety might be unable to reopen the
judgment even if the subsequent developer completed the improve-
ments so that the original developer who had been obligated to com-
plete the improvements would not be unjustly enriched.462
The problems created when a subsequent developer completes im-
provements is not subject to easy resolution. The subsequent developer
is not a successor in interest because the original developer has not sold
his business; rather, the subsequent developer is often a mortgagee who
has foreclosed or accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure, a purchaser at
a foreclosure sale, or a purchaser of lots in the subdivision. Disregard-
ing the entry of these persons, it is clear that the government will be
entitled to collect under the security agreement after default by the
developer. The measure of damages will be the cost of completion.
4 63
Thus, the issue is whether the measure of damages should be less when
a subsequent developer completes the improvements for which the
original developer was responsible. Arguably, the subsequent devel-
oper only should recover to the extent the original developer sold lots
that incorporated the cost of the uncompleted improvements, thus,
avoiding unjust enrichment to the original developer. A contrary reso-
lution presumably will result in unjust enrichment to the subsequent
developer if he incorporates the cost of improvements into lots or
homes and then receives security proceeds. The key term is "unjust."
If the original developer can avoid his obligation to the government so
easily, he may readily transfer the property to another once the devel-
opment begins to sour. Then, after another party completes the im-
provements, the original developer can claim unjust enrichment. 4 "6
On strictly legal grounds, the .original developer and the surety
might have the better argument. On policy grounds, however, it can be
argued that permitting a subsequent developer to claim bond proceeds
or other security will facilitate completion of the development and the
460. Id. at 231, 429 A.2d at 1185.
461. Id. at 232, 429 A.2d at 1186.
462, Id. at 232, 429 A.2d at 1185-86.
463. See Board of Supervisors v. Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 35, 245 S.E.2d 425,
429 (1978).
464. See Hellam Township v. DiCicco, 287 Pa. Super. 227, 232, 429 A.2d 1183,
1185-86 (1981) (court expresses this concern).
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improvements for which the government had bargained. A subsequent
developer will be difficult to locate if he is faced with completing
thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars in improvements. Even
if the subsequent developer makes significant modifications in the de-
velopment to promote the project's viability, he should be entitled to
the bond proceeds or other security to the extent of the original devel-
oper's liability.4 65
E. Developer and Surety Defenses
A wide array of defenses is available to the developer and his surety
in an action on the bond or other security. First, under principles of
suretyship, all defenses available to the principal-developer also are
available to the surety. Second, the surety has additional defenses
when the underlying agreement between the developer and the local
government is modified materially without the consent of the surety.
This section examines the defenses interposed by developers and sure-
ties, revealing the extent to which the surety will litigate to avoid his
apparent obligation.
1. Statute of Limitations
A developer and his surety might escape liability for completing sub-
division improvements if the government brings an action beyond the
limitations period for actions on improvement bonds. Because of a
poorly drafted local ordinance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court dis-
cussed that state's limitations period on two occasions. 466 In Sherwood
465. It is curious that in at least two cases, the lender on the development sought to
collect bond proceeds. City of Ames v. Schill Builders, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa
1980); Village of Warwick v. Republic Ins. Co., 104 Misc. 2d 514, 428 N.Y.S.2d 589
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Typically, a lender agrees to indemnify the surety if the developer
defaults and the lender secures himself with a mortgage on the development property.
Thus, if the surety pays a claim on the bond, the lender will indemnify the surety. The
lender then will attempt to recover from the developer, hoping that the value of the
property is sufficient to satisfy his claims. When the developer's lender also is the surety
or guarantor on a project, the lender will have an incentive to complete the improve-
ments after a default by the developer because completion will enhance the value of the
property, which the lender probably will sell after he purchases at the foreclosure sale or
accepts a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The developer is ultimately responsible for any
expenditures made for improvements, but if he is insolvent, the lender should recoup his
costs when he sells the property.
466. Sherwood Forest No. 2 Corp. v. City of Norman, 632 P.2d 368, 370 (Okla.
1980); City of Norman v. Liddell, 596 P.2d 879, 881-82 (Okla. 1979). See infra notes
467-71 and accompanying text.
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Forest No. 2 Corp. v. City of Norman,4 67 the court held that the local
government could not by ordinance or contract set a shorter period of
limitations than that provided by state law.4 68 Thus, the court struck
down the two year period within which to bring an action on the bond
and applied the state's five year period for actions on written con-
tracts.4 69 Moreover, the five year period began to run at the end of the
two year bond period.47 ° In City of New Orleans v. Mark C. Smith &
Sons, Inc.,47 the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that performance
bonds and subdivision improvement agreements did not constitute
public works projects; therefore a short three year period of limitations
did not apply.
2. Release and Acceptance
Typically, when the local government accepts a dedication of the
subdivision improvements, the developer's performance is complete
and he and any surety then should be released. Similarly, one may
expect that if the government releases the performance bond, it no
longer intends to hold the developer responsible for maintenance of the
improvements. Things are never as simple as they seem. Courts have
held that a recordation of deeds to improvements and easements does
not constitute a formal acceptance of a dedication thereby releasing the
bond because the government may only have been guaranteeing itself
access to the property in case of default.472 Conversely, a release of a
bond does not equal acceptance of improvements and the developer's
obligation to maintain the improvements continues.473 Acceptance of
a dedication is a legislative act that requires an indication that the gov-
ernment intends to exercise "dominion and control" over the dedicated
property.4 74
State statutes and local ordinances often provide time periods within
467. 632 P.2d 368 (Okla. 1980).
468. Id. at 370.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. 339 So. 2d 321, 322 (La. 1976).
472. Anne Arundel County v. Lichtenberg, 263 Md. 398, 406-07, 283 A.2d 782,
786-87 (1971). See also Lichtenberg v. Anne Arundel County, 258 Md. 204, 209-11,
265 A.2d 222, 225 (1970) (same issue after remand to trial court).
473. Home Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Evesham, 182 N.J.
Super. 357, 360-61, 440 A.2d 1361, 1363-64 (App. Div. 1981).
474. Id. at 361, 440 A.2d at 1364. See also County of Kern v. Edgemont Dev.
Corp., 222 Cal. App. 2d 874, 879-80, 35 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632 (1963) (developer not
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which the government must act on the developer's offer to dedicate
improvements. The failure to act constitutes an acceptance and re-
leases the developer of any further obligation, and the government
should release any bond or other security to him.475 One court, how-
ever, in a wholly unacceptable opinion, held that failure of the govern-
ment to act within the specified time period did not constitute an
acceptance if the improvements were in any way defective,476 thus frus-
trating any purpose that the provision may have had.
3. Exoneration
A surety may claim exoneration-that is, release from its obliga-
tion-for a variety of reasons, but the surety most commonly claims
that the underlying agreement between the developer and the govern-
ment has been modified materially. Because a material modification
may increase the risk to the surety, courts generally hold that such
circumstances will exonerate the surety. The surety, however, may
waive his right to claim exoneration when the bond permits the obliga-
tion of the developer to be modified without consent of the surety.4 77
Moreover, if the modification is not material, the surety will not be
discharged.478 In one of the more unusual claims for exoneration,479 a
surety asserted that after the government completed improvements in a
development, the government obtained an equitable lien against the
property. Therefore, the surety argued the city must look to the prop-
exonerated when he completed improvements; developer exonerated only after accept-
ance, which is a discretionary act of local government).
475. See Mertz v. Lakatos, 33 Pa. Commw. 230, 236, 381 A.2d 497, 500 (1978)
(failure of the government to act within the time period constituted acceptance of roads
and cash escrow released).
476. Township of Barnegat v. DCA of N.J., Inc., 181 N.J. Super. 394, 400-01, 437
A.2d 909, 912 (App. Div. 1981). The court reasoned that the statute required the local
government to act on the offer to dedicate within 45 days after the developer gave notice
that the imlrovements were complete or substantially complete. Id. Thus, if the im-
provements were not, in fact, complete or substantially complete, the government had
no obligation to act within the requisite time period. Id. This reading of the statute
frustrates the very purpose for which the state enacts such a provision.
477. Pacific County v. Sherwood Pac., Inc., 17 Wash. App. 790, 800, 567 P.2d 642,
649-50 (1977).
478. Id. at 800, 567 P.2d at 649. The courts appear to construe bonds strictly
against the surety, which is interesting in light of the fact that the local government
often drafts the bond. Such bonds generally recite a waiver of the surety's right to
consent to material modifications in the obligation of the developer.
479. Corn Constr. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 295 F.2d 685, 689-70 (10th
Cir. 1961).
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erty of the principal on the bond. 8 ° The court rejected the surety's
twisted logic, noting that no equitable lien was created and that the
city's right was on the bond.4 8 '
The developer's obligation may be enlarged because of unforeseen
additional burdens that occur during construction of improvements. If
the developer is aware of an unusual condition that causes the perform-
ance of extra work, this knowledge will be imputed to the surety who is
called on to complete the improvements; the surety cannot reform the
bond on the grounds of unilateral mistake.4 82 When the city, however,
is obligated to undertake certain improvements as a condition prece-
dent to the developer's duty to improve roads, neither the developer
nor the surety is liable when the city fails to perform its purported
obligations.48 3
4. The Developer's Bankruptcy
The obvious reason for a performance bond or other security is to
secure the government against a default on the developer's promise to
construct improvements. Because default often is related to financial
difficulty, however, the developer's bankruptcy will threaten the gov-
ernment's security. Although bankruptcy law is still in an evolution-
ary stage, several courts have dealt with the impact of the developer's
bankruptcy on the government's security. One court has held that the
government may maintain an action against the surety of a bankrupt
developer even though the developer indemnified the surety against
any loss.4 84  In contrast, another court held that the automatic stay
480. Id.
481. Id. at 689. The surety also claimed a right of subrogation on the purported
equitable lien. Id. at 690. Thus, it was unnecessary to pay the city's claim because the
surety simply would be subrogated to the lien that the city already possessed. Id. One
only can suspect that the surety was not adequately secured against its potential
liability.
482. See City of Cypress v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 259 Cal. App. 2d 219,
224-25, 66 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360 (1968).
483. City of Medford v. Fellsmere Realty Co., 345 Mass. 477, 482, 187 N.E.2d 849,
851-52 (1963). In fact, the planning board had no authority to require improvements by
the city, but because the parties had agreed that the developer's obligation would not
arise until performance by the city, the court discharged the developer and the surety
when the city failed to perform. Id. at 481, 187 N.E.2d at 851-52.
484. In re Sta,,ndco Developers, Inc., 534 F.2d 1050, 1053-54 (2d Cir. 1976). The
court also held that a payment by the surety would not constitute a preferential pay-
ment to the government. Id. at 1054-55. But see In re Joe DeLiski Fruit Co., 11 B.R.
694, 696 (D. Minn. Bankr. 1981) (the court held that the automatic stay provisions of
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provisions of the bankruptcy code prevent the government from main-
taining an action against a cash escrow that secured the developer's
promise to complete improvements.4" Although the automatic stay
provisions exempt government actions to enforce health and safety reg-
ulations,486 courts hold that collection of proceeds under a security
agreement does not come within the scope of the exemption.487
When the bankrupt developer attempts to reorganize or liquidate his
business, the bankruptcy courts may enjoin state and local government
actions that will impede the debtor's efforts. Thus, one court held that
the bankruptcy court can order a local government to refrain from ap-
plying ordinances adopted after preliminary plat approval even though
the developer has not filed a final plat within the time allotted by
law.488 The court reasoned that the developer acquired vested rights
that could not be denied.489
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982), protected a letter of credit posted in
lieu of a payment bond by a wholesaler).
485. In re Heckler Land Dev. Corp., 15 B.R. 856, 859 (E.D. Pa. Bankr. 1981)
(holding that the cash escrow was property of the debtor's estate protected by the auto-
matic stay provisions). But see Brilliant v. Harvey Constr. Co., 212 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.
1954). The court held that the cash deposit to secure performance of the developer's
completion of improvements was not property of the debtor's estate, and, therefore, the
trustee in bankruptcy could not reach the property. Id. at 495. Because of sweeping
changes in the bankruptcy law since Brilliant, its continuing vitality is suspect.
486. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982).
487. In re Heckler Land Dev. Corp. 15 B.R. 856, 858 (E.D. Pa. Bankr. 1981). See
also In re Joe Deliski Fruit Co., 11 B.R. 694, 696-97 (D. Minn. Bankr. 1981) (exemp-
tion did not apply to collection under payment bond). The Heckler court distinguished
In re Stanndco Developers, Inc., 534 F.2d 1050, 1053-54 (2d Cir. 1976), where the court
had held that an action on a surety bond was not within the automatic stay provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code. 15 B.R. at 858-59. The Hechler court reasoned that a surety
bond involved third party liability, while collection under a cash escrow involved the
debtor himself. Id. at 858-59. If, as in Stanndco, the developer has agreed to indemnify
the surety, payment on the bond does create an indebtedness for the bankrupt debtor.
488. See San Clemente Estates v. City of San Clemente, 12 B.R. 209, 217 (S.D. Cal.
Bankr. 1981).
489. Id. at 216-17. In truth, the court believed that application of the new ordi-
nances would diminish the financial prospects of the debtor's reorganization. See id. at
211-15. The court's.analysis of the vested rights issue is subject to serious doubt. See
Slagle Constr. Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 67 Cal. App. 3d 559, 563-64, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 748, 750-51 (1970) (the court held that the developer could not sue the county for
failure to issue building permits after final plat approval because the developer refused
to bury certain utility lines).
[Vol. 28:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/2
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
F. Developer Remedies Against the Government
Often a developer will comply with the local government's initial
demands because he knows that he will be dependent on the coopera-
tion of the government for the ultimate success of the development.
Even short delays can cause the development to founder. Thus, the
issue arises regarding the right of the developer to challenge subdivi-
sion improvement requirements or other exactions after he fails to ob-
ject to the requirements during the approval process.
One line of cases holds that a developer can recover excessive pay-
ments that the government forced him to make, but which he failed to
challenge during the approval process.4 9 ° The theory allowing recov-
ery is that the developer made payment or dedicated land under eco-
nomic duress.49 1 In contrast, one court has held that the developer
cannot maintain an action against the local government on the basis of
excessive off-site improvement requirements when the developer failed
to pursue his administrative remedies.4 92 The courts' murkey rationale
is based on a combination of governmental immunity and exhaustion
of remedies principles.493
G. Summary
The 1970s and early 1980s have witnessed an explosion in case law
concerning subdivision improvement requirements and guarantees.
The litigious nature of developers and their sureties is related closely to
economic conditions. When times are good, developers will accept re-
quirements and merely pass the cost along to lot and homebuyers.
When times are adverse, developers will be more careful about what
they perceive to be unnecessary costs. Similarly, government actions to
490. See Ridgemont Dev. Co. v. City of E. Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 393-94, 100
N.W.2d 301, 304-05 (1960) (developers entitled to reconveyance of property dedicated
to the government under duress); Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582,
603-04, 334 A.2d 30, 41 (1975) (developer entitled to recover excessive payments for off-
site improvements made under duress); Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Par-
sippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 430-31, 147 A.2d 28, 33 (1958) (developer entitled to
recover excessive costs for extension of water mains).
491. See, e.g., Ridgemont Dev. Co. v. City ofE. Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 393-94, 100
N.W.2d 301, 304 (1960) (allowing recovery of dedicated lands).
492. Northwest Land & Inv., Inc. v. City of Bellingham, 31 Wash. App. 742, 744-
45, 644 P.2d 740, 741 (1982).
493. Id. A Washington statute that limited the standard of review for subdivision
approval and the time limit in which challenges could be made supported the court's
opinion. Id. at 743 n.l, 644 P.2d at 741 n.1.
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enforce bonds and other security agreements should correlate with eco-
nomic conditions because defaults are more likely during economic
downturns. At any rate, the courts have been and will continue to be
faced with a great array of issues concerning subdivision improve-
ments. While the courts will resolve some of these issues on statutory
grounds and basic contract law principles, many courts will analyze
closely the government's power to burden the developer with the cost
of providing public improvements.
V. EVALUATING SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENT GUARANTEES
An evaluation of subdivision improvement guarantees presents two
major problems: first, a viewpoint must be taken from which guaran-
tees can be evaluated; second, an evaluation is difficult because of the
variety of methods by which developers structure their financial ar-
rangements.494 The evaluation here is presented from the local govern-
ment's viewpoint because it is assumed that the government's interest
is allied most closely with the purpose of the guarantee-the comple-
tion of improvements.495 The evaluation does not consider every finan-
cial arrangement adopted under each security method; rather, the
evaluation focuses on how to avoid the problems that can plague the
guarantee process. The conclusion reached can be stated at the outset:
the corporate surety bond is not the most effective method for securing
the completion of subdivision improvements. Effectiveness is based on
a consideration of four factors: security to the government; flexibility;
cost; and retention of control by the government over the security.
A. Government Security
1. Access to Sufficient Funds
Local governments impose subdivision improvement requirements
for a variety of reasons, but the requirement that the developer post
security to assure completion of improvements is designed only to pro-
tect the government from completing improvements at its own ex-
pense. Thus, the effectiveness of any security method turns on the
494. See supra notes 222-331 and accompanying text.
495. See R. FREILICH & P. LEvi supra note 1, at 103 (major purposes of bonds are
to protect health and welfare of subdivision residents and to reduce financial burden on
municipalities). Although the improvement guarantees protect the interests of neigh-
bors and lot owners, these persons have not been considered proper parties to enforce
obligations under the bonds. See R. YEARWOOD, supra note 1, at 139.
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extent to which the government can obtain sufficient funds to complete
improvements after the developer defaults. Because financial problems
generally trigger the developer's default, it can be assumed that the
government's sole source for recovery is the security itself.
Prolerty and cash escrows do not provide the assurance of adequate
funds. Property escrows in general present the problem of valuation,
and the government must hope that the property, whether real or per-
sonal, tangible or intangible, is convertible into sufficient cash to fund
completion of improvements.496 Liens also can encumber real prop-
erty escrows. These liens generally will take priority over the govern-
ment's claim. The cash escrow presents the problem of accountability.
Generally, escrowed funds are released as improvements are com-
pleted-thus creating two problems: whether the developer actually
completed the improvements and whether the developer used the re-
leased funds to pay off materialmen and laborers. Ideally, these ques-
tions are answered affirmatively, but the world of subdivision
development seldom is ideal. Corporate surety bonds also present
problems because recovery on the bond is limited to its face amount.4 97
Although the developer will be independently liable on any underlying
contract for completion of improvements,49 the developer probably
will be judgment proof. The local government must assure itself that
the face amount of the bond is sufficient to complete improvements. A
guarantee or letter of credit by a surety, usually the lender on the pro-
ject, does not create the problems of property or cash escrows. Maxi-
mum liability limits under these security methods, however, can result
in the government receiving inadequate funds with which to complete
improvements. The message to the local government is that all secur-
ity methods pose the danger of providing insufficient funds if the gov-
ernment accepts inadequate security or releases the security
prematurely. Subjecting errant officials to liability for their negligence
may provide an incentive to avoid these problems.
2. Defenses to the Government's Claims
When the developer provides security to guarantee completion, the
496. For example, if the government accepted securities at the time of final plat
approval, the value of the securities can decline significantly at the end of the two year
completion period. Meanwhile, the cost of completion probably has increased.
497. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 3.
498. See Town of Brookfield v. Greenridge, Inc., 177 Conn. 527, 536-37, 418 A.2d
907, 912-13 (1979).
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government must face only the defenses that the developer can raise
against an alleged default. When the government requires the devel-
oper to post a corporate surety bond, the surety can interpose all de-
fenses available to the developer, plus several of his own. The
corporate surety has an incentive to avoid paying a claim to the gov-
ernment: the surety may be unable to collect on an indemnification
agreement that the surety may have with the developer either because
the developer has a legitimate defense or the developer is insolvent.
Consequently, claims against the surety often result in litigation.
Security arrangements by which the developer's lender assures com-
pletion are more promising. The lender has an incentive to complete
improvements if it is forced to foreclose on its lien against the develop-
ment property. Because the lender will be more likely to find a buyer
for the development if improvements are completed, the lender can
recoup its cost in the selling price of the development. Thus, guaran-
tees or letters of credit issued by the lender are superior to cash, prop-
erty escrows, and corporate surety bonds.
The continuing reliance on corporate surety bonds by many local
governments 499 is attributable to statutory requirements in only a few
jurisdictions. Most states and local governments permit other security
methods to assure completion of improvements. Although a guarantee
or letter of credit might not fit within the traditional scope of subdivi-
sion improvement guarantees,500 each method assures completion of
improvements and should be permitted by the courts.
3. Avoiding the Risk of the Developer's Bankruptcy
Given the state of flux in bankruptcy law, it is difficult to make any
definitive statement about how the courts may apply the law to a par-
ticular set of facts. The problem, however, is relatively straightfor-
ward: if the developer seeks the cover of bankruptcy laws, is the
government's action after default barred by the automatic stay provi-
sions of federal law, 0 1 and will a developer's, or surety's payment con-
stitute a preferential payment in violation of the law?502 The sparse
case law on point suggests that the automatic stay provisions will bar
499. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 136. Of cities responding to survey, 96.2%
reported that they accepted a corporate surety bond. Id. The letter of credit was the
least used security method. Id.
500. See McPherson, supra note 32, at 465-66.
501. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
502. See id. § 547.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/2
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
the government's claim against a developer in bankruptcy when the
security is a property or cash escrow or something else of value pledged
by the developer himself. The bar probably will not apply when the
government's claim is against some third party such as a corporate
surety or a coguarantor. Because the surety or coguarantor is likely to
have an indemnification agreement with the developer, however, any
payment by the third party affects the financial status of the debtor-
developer. Consequently, a bankruptcy court retains the power to stay
an action by the government against a third party if the debtor's estate
ultimately is at risk.5"3
Payment of a claim out of escrowed cash or property or payment of
a claim by a coguarantor or a surety can be viewed as a preferential
payment in violation of the bankruptcy law. A preferential payment
arises when a debtor makes a payment to a creditor within ninety days
of filing bankruptcy and the transfer permits the creditor to obtain
more than he would have received from a liquidating bankruptcy if the
payment had not been made."° The purpose of permitting the trustee
in bankruptcy to void preferential payments is to ensure that all simi-
larly situated creditors are treated alike. Thus, a trustee may set aside
a payment to a local government when the government obtains pay-
ment within the criteria established for preferential treatment. The is-
sue is not as clear when the payment is made by a third party that the
debtor-developer will indemnify. Besides being a possible preferential
payment, a coguarantor or surety can use a third party payment prior
to the developer's bankruptcy as a device to ensure that their security is
not exhausted before they are required to pay a claim presented by the
government. 505
At best, the potential problems that the new bankruptcy laws create
can be raised so that parties to subdivision improvement guarantees
will be able to devise imaginative schemes to avoid the effect of the law.
503. See id. § 541(a)(1) (defining the debtor's property); Aaron, The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-For-Lawyers Bill Part III: Business Bank-
ruptcy, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 405, 416-29 (discussing the property of the debtor's estate).
504. See Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Full-Employment-For-
Lawyers Bill Part IV: Avoiding Powers of the Trustee, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 19, 38-44.
See also I 1 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
505. A secured surety may fear that it may have to pay a claim after the debtor's
bankruptcy because the security may be exhausted by others when disbursements are
made. Thus, the surety has an incentive to pay a claim before bankruptcy to ensure that
he will be repaid, at least in part, out of his security. See Aaron, supra note 503, at 454-
66 (distributing the assets of the debtor's estate).
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Nevertheless, because bankruptcy law is equitable in nature, the courts
probably will look past a transaction's form to its substance.5 0 6
B. Flexibility
Modem subdivision guarantees must account for the complex finan-
cial transactions that often occur after the developer's default. Because
the developer's default is often, if not always, motivated by financial
problems, it is probable that some creditors will foreclose their interest
in the development property. Thus, the lender, a purchaser at a fore-
closure sale, or a purchaser of lots in the subdivision might desire to
complete improvements in the subdivision in order to increase the
value of their investment.
The courts are divided on the right of a subsequent developer to
claim proceeds from an improvement guarantee. Two courts have held
that the subsequent developer should be held to the same requirements
of the original developer, particularly if the subsequent developer mod-
ifies the subdivision project.5 7 On the other hand, several courts have
permitted a subsequent developer to collect under a subdivision guar-
antee when the subsequent developer completed improvements for
which the original developer was obligated. 08 These courts reasoned
that the government was entitled to collect under the guarantee for the
purpose of completing improvements; therefore the government could
authorize the subsequent developer to complete improvements in ex-
change for any proceeds that the government could collect.5 09 As pre-
viously noted, the issue is best resolved with reference to the purpose of
the guarantee: to assure a complete development free from the harmful
consequences of partial subdivision. Thus, development of the subdivi-
sion is facilitated when a subsequent developer can obtain funds from
the improvement guarantee. This financial incentive might be neces-
sary to ensure that the partially completed development does not con-
stitute a burden to the community.
The subsequent developer problem should arise only when the devel-
506. See Aaron, supra note 504, at 38.
507. See City of Ames v. Schill Builders, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1980);
Village of Warwick v. Republic Ins. Co., 104 Misc. 2d 514, 518, 428 N.Y.S.2d 589, 593
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
508. See, eg., City of Sacramento v. Trans Pac. Indus., Inc., 98 Cal. App. 3d 389,
401, 159 Cal. Rptr. 514, 520 (1979) (permitting assignment of proceeds to subsequent
developer).
509. See id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/2
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
oper himself or a third party guarantees completion of the improve-
ments.51° Each party is opposed to paying a claim that will increase
the value of property that neither owns. In contrast, if the lender on
the project secures performance by a guarantee or letter of credit, the
lender will have an incentive to complete the improvements in the
event that it forecloses its lien against the property. Although the
lender's security interest in the developer's property may be insufficient
to compensate the lender, the lender can recoup its expenses when it
sells the improved property to someone that actually develops
property.
When a party other than the developer or the lender secures per-
formance, the government should consider naming the lender as an
obligee under the bond or other security. Although several courts have
held that it was ultra vires for the government to name certain third
parties as beneficiaries under a bond,5 1' this proposition should not ap-
ply when the sole purpose of naming multiple obligees is to guarantee
completion of the improvements. The government's power to name
multiple obligees for the limited purpose of assuring completion is rea-
sonably necessary and should be implied from the subdivision control
law.512
C. Costs
1. Direct Costs
Subdivision improvement guarantees inherently increase the costs of
the development project. Cash and property escrows tie up the devel-
oper's capital without any economic return. Lenders also exact some
premium from the developer for securing completion of improvements.
Costs are especially burdensome when the government requires a cor-
porate surety bond. Not only must the developer pay a premium for
the bond, but also he or his lender must promise to indemnify the
surety in the event that the surety makes payment on a valid claim.
Thus, it is unclear why a corporate surety is necessary if the developer
or his lender must secure the surety on the indemnification agreement.
510. None of the reported cases involve a situation when the lender secured comple-
tion of the improvements.
511. See Gordon v. Robinson Homes, Inc., 342 Mass. 529, 531, 174 N.E.2d 381,
382-83 (1961).
512. See, e.g., Legion Manor, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 49 N.J. 420, 424-25, 231
A.2d 201, 203-04 (1967) (implying a right to require a maintenance bond).
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The security more easily and less expensively can run directly from the
developer or lender to the government.
2. Indirect Costs
Housing costs are related to the structure of the housing market
which, in turn, is affected by subdivision improvement guarantees. At
least anecdotal evidence suggests that a corporate surety bond favors a
large, financially stable developer that can qualify for the bond. 13
Similarly, a cash escrow favors the more financially sound developer
that can obtain sufficient cash to secure performance. Finally, a lender
will not secure the completion of improvements unless it believes that
the developer is a good credit risk.
Two alternatives to subdivision guarantees are government comple-
tion followed by an assessment of the benefited property and sequential
approval. Government completion is risky because it requires a capital
outlay by the government with no assurance that the development ever
will be populated.5 4 Sequential approval provides no guarantee at all,
and if the developer walks away from the project, the government is
left without funds to complete improvements. 15
Again, local governments must make a public policy choice. Strin-
gent improvement guarantees will work, though perhaps imperfectly,
to screen out developers that are likely to fail to complete the proposed
subdivision. Such guarantees also screen out developers that will com-
plete and whose presence in the market serves as a competitive force
driving down prices and improving overall quality. A proper balance
must be struck between the government's interest in completing im-
provements and the public's interest in holding down costs. Local gov-
ernments should consider a variety of security methods that can be
fashioned to the needs of the individual developer while also ade-
quately protecting the government. Exclusive reliance on corporate
surety bonds does not strike that balance.5" 6
513. See B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 3.
514. See id. at 8-9.
515. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 1, at 136.
516. Better empirical data are needed to assess the effect of security methods on
developers. Commentators assert too many conclusions without a firm empirical basis.
See, eg., B. ROGAL, supra note 12, at 5-11 (offering extremely conclusory advice with
little or no empirical support).
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D. Government Control Over the Security
The control issue is important because it presents another tension in
the guarantee process: the need for the government to control the se-
curity and to avoid its depletion for purposes other than completing
improvements, and the need of citizens, neighbors, or lot owners to
force a reluctant government to exercise its rights under a security
agreement.
The courts are nearly unanimous in holding that third parties such
as materialmen, laborers, neighbors, or lot owners cannot collect under
a performance guarantee.517 Most of these cases, however, went to the
purpose of the bond rather than to the right of third parties to obtain
performance.5" 8 Third parties usually brought suit to collect payment
for completed improvements or to collect damages from inadequate or
nonexistent improvements.5 19 One unfortunate holding permitted a
judgment creditor of the developer to attach a cash escrow being held
for the government on the theory that the subdivision was not ap-
proved and that the cash belonged to the developer.5 2° This holding
places the government at risk whenever it holds cash or property be-
cause it may be confronted with conflicting demands for the funds.
Thus, a government should avoid holding cash or other property to
secure completion of improvements.
Persons with a legitimate stake in the completion of improvements,
usually neighbors or lot owners, should have a means by which they
can force the government to exercise its rights under the security agree-
ment. Mandamus is one method that interested persons may use to
compel the local government to assert a claim under the security agree-
ment. Mandamus is available when the government has a nondiscre-
tionary duty to perform and some person has an indisputable right to
enforce that duty. 521 A statutory right to force government action
should present no problem to a court, but a common law right of a
neighbor or lot owner should exist to force the government to exercise
its legal rights after the developer's default.
Statutory reform can secure more effectively the right of a neighbor
517. See supra notes 429-65 and accompanying text.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. See Cammarano v. Borough of Allendale, 65 N.J. Super. 240, 241, 167 A.2d
431, 432 (Ch. Div. 1961).
521. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 26.01; D. MANDELKER, D. NETScH, & P.
SALSICH, supra note 342, at 767-75.
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or lot owner to force completion of improvements when the govern-
ment is not vigilant in enforcing its rights. By statute, the legislature
can give the local government a certain period of time within which to
bring suit; after that time, the aggrieved citizen can bring suit on behalf
of the government. The government can be made a party to the suit
and can show good cause for not bringing suit against the developer or
his surety.
E. Summary
The extent to which local governments use various subdivision im-
provement guarantees is not known with any degree of accuracy. The
available evidence suggests that corporate surety bonds are the prevail-
ing security method,5 22 but that other more infiovative methods are
being used. 23 For a variety of reasons, corporate surety bonds do not
adequately serve the needs of the government, developers, neighbors,
or lot owners. Guarantees or agreements by which the development
lender assures completion are potentially more likely to serve the pur-
pose for which governments require security-to secure the completion
of improvements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Residential subdivision is a complicated process that involves a vari-
ety of persons and government agencies, each with its own interests.
Government regulation of the development process necessarily im-
pinges on these interests and has the potential for creating unwanted
side effects. The original purpose of subdivision improvement require-
ments continues in importance, but the methods to secure completion
of improvements change continually. This Article has examined the
complexity of the subdivision process and the wealth of issues raised by
improvement requirements and guarantees. Although it cannot pro-
vide ready answers for developers, lenders, local governments, or ag-
grieved homeowners, the Article, hopefully, points out the many
problems that arise and some methods by which these problems may
be avoided.
522. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
523. See supra notes 271-331 and accompanying text.
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